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WALIR - Water Law and Indigenous Rights 
The program Water law and Indigenous Rights is an international, inter-institutional endeavor 
based on action-research, exchange, capacity-building, empowerment and advocacy. This 
comparative research program builds upon academic research and action-researchers in local 
networks - both indigenous and non-indigenous. It attempts to be a kind of think-tank to critically 
inform debates on indigenous and customary rights in water legislation and water policy, both to 
facilitate local action platforms and to influence the circles of law- and policy-makers. Equitable 
rights distribution and democratic decision-making and therefore, support for empowerment of 
discriminated and oppressed sectors, are major concerns. 
In co-ordination and collaboration with existing networks and counterpart-initiatives, WALIR sets 
out to analyze water rights and customary management modes of indigenous and peasant 
communities, comparing them with the contents of current national legislation and policy. Thereby, 
it sheds light on how the first are legally and materially discriminated against and destructed. The 
aim is to contribute to a process of change that structurally recognizes indigenous and customary 
water management rules and rights in national legislation. It also aims to make a concrete 
contribution to the implementation of better water management policies. As part of its strategy 
WALIR plans to contribute to and present concepts, methodologies and contextual proposals and 
to sensitize decision makers regarding the changes needed for appropriate legislation and water 
policies. 
In its initial phase, WALIR has set up an inter-institutional network of institutions, scholars and 
practitioners of various disciplines and backgrounds, involved in and committed to the above 
objectives. Preparatory studies conducted so far have focused on current legislation and legal 
attention to, or neglect and discrimination of, indigenous and customary water rights. The project 
aims to have an effect beyond this Andean focus, by providing an example and tool for similar 
action research to be pursued in other regions. Second phase studies of WALIR focus on 
indigenous water rights in international law and treaties, indigenous identity and water rights, 
current indigenous water management systems, field case studies, and thematic, complementary 
research projects (on the relation between "WALIR" and gender, food security, land rights, water 
policy dialogue methods, among others). Short comparative studies in other countries will further 
complement and strengthen the project and its thematic networks, and lay the foundation for a 
broader international framework. Next a number of exchange, dissemination, capacity-building and 
advocacy activities will be implemented, in close collaboration with local, national and international 
platforms and networks. 
The program, therefore, is not just academic but also action-based. While especially the 
indigenous populations are being confronted with increasing water scarcity and a traditionally 
strong neglect of their water management rules and rights, the current political climate seems to be 
changing. However, actual legal changes are still empty of contents, and there is a lack of clear 
research results and proposals in this area. The program aims to help bridge these gaps, facing 
the challenge to take into account the dynamics of customary and indigenous rules, without falling 
into the trap of decontextualizing and 'freezing' such local normative systems. Fundamentally, 
WALIR program is directed towards activities and conclusions that facilitate local, national and 
international platforms and networks of grassroots organizations and policymakers. But the 
practical and conceptual pitfalls rights analysis and recognition initiatives are manifold. 
WALIR is coordinated by Wageningen University arid the United Nations Economic Commission 
for Latin America and the Caribbean (UN/ECLAC) and is implemented in cooperation with 
counterpart organizations in Bolivia, Chili, Ecuador, Peru, Mexico, France, The Netherlands and 
the USA. The counterparts, with whom they work together, form a much broader group of 
participants: institutions at international, national and local level. The water Unit of the Netherlands 
Ministry of Foreign affairs funds the program. 
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WALIR - Legislación de Recursos Hïdricos y Derechos Locales e Indigenas 
(Spanish Summary) 
WALIR es un programa colaborativo coordinado por la Universidad de Wageningen y la 
Comisión Económico de las Naciones Unidas para America Latina y el Caribe (UN/CEPAL), y es 
implementada en cooperación con instituciones de contraparte en Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, 
México, Francia, Paises Bajos y Estados Unidos. Las contrapartes con las que estas trabajan 
forman un grupo de participantes mucho mâs amplio: instituciones a escalas local, nacional e 
intemacional. WALIR se formuló como una red interinstitucional basada en investigación-acción, 
intercambio, capacitación, empoderamiento y defensa legal. Se asienta sobre investigaciones 
académicas e investigación-acción en redes locales, nacionales e internacionales - indîgenas y no 
indigenas. Prétende ser un "centra de ideas" (think tank) para informar criticamente a los debates 
sobre los derechos consuetudinarios e indigenas relacionadas con la legislación y politicas 
hidricas, tanto para facilitar las plataformas locales de acción como para influir en los circulos 
donde se hacen las leyes y politicas. La distribución equitativa de los derechos y la toma 
democrâtica de decisiones y, por lo tanto, el apoyo para el empoderamiento de los sectores 
marginados y discriminados, son las principales preocupaciones del WALIR. 
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Local law and the politics of participation 
1 Local Law and the Politics of Participation. 
The pitfalls and challenges of local water rights recognition in 
the Andes1 
1.1 Introduction 
Water, being a fundamental resource for human life and agrarian production, is a source of 
great power in many regions of the world, as is the case in the Andean highlands. The fact that 
water represents power and potential leads, paradoxically, to intense confrontations as well as to 
solid collaboration among societal groups. The importance and worsening scarcity of water act to 
intensify conflicts over access to water and control over water management. At the same time, 
water is also a means of empowering and mobilizing people, often the pivot for community or inter-
community action; water can be the driving force behind the formation of strong common-property 
institutions, grounded in shared rules and collective rights. 
Obviously, these normative systems do not and have never come into being within a social 
vacuum, nor are they limited to autarkic development: alongside physical and ecological 
conditions, their development is interwoven with the past and present history of the cultural, 
political, economic, technological and institutional foundations of Andean society. They comprise 
normative frameworks that are locality-specific, displaying enormous variety from one community 
to the next and from one region to another. In general, these water rights and management norms 
are the backbone of community systems in the Andes - local frameworks of rights, obligations and 
working rules for water distribution, system operation and maintenance, including the basic 
agreements that define the organizational structure and application of sanctions for infractions. 
They sustain local production and livelihood systems which, apart from being important sources of 
food, economic development, security, and culture for local communities, also constitute the 
fundamental providers of food and security to the region as a whole. Therefore, security of water 
access and the means to manage their water systems is of crucial importance to Andean 
communities. 
Nevertheless, on top of the historically grown, extremely unequal distribution of access to water, 
indigenous and customary water rights in the Andean countries, as elsewhere in the world, are 
increasingly under pressure. Consequently, the millions of indigenous water users find themselves 
structurally among the poorest groups of society. Moreover, they are usually not represented in 
national and international decision-making water organs. This contributes to a situation of 
increasing inequality, poverty, conflict and ecological destruction. Even when indigenous rights and 
water management practices are not simply obstructed by national legislation and intervention 
policies, attention to the subject is negligible. Governments have paid it mere lip service. Most 
policies and legislation do not take into account the day-to-day realities and specific contexts of 
indigenous groups. 
In this document, the challenges of a recently set up action-research, exchange and advocacy 
program are outlined. The program - "Water Law and Indigenous Rights. Towards recognition of 
local and indigenous rights and management rules in national legislation" (WALIR) - aims to 
contribute to countering the above-mentioned discrimination and injustice. Although the 
investigations also cover the cases of Mexico and the United States, its main focus of action is in 
the Andean countries: Peru, Bolivia, Chile and Ecuador. Therefore, the article will first address 
some basic features of the Andean water law, water policy and local rights background. Next, it will 
present the action-research program and elaborate some of its key conceptual challenges: the 
concept of indigenous water rights and management rules, the concept of official recognition of 
local sociolegal repertoires, and the question of the effectiveness of legal (law-oriented) strategies 
for solving water conflicts and rights issues. The intention is not to give definite answers but to 
clarify important questions and dilemmas. Subsequently, the article will focus on the problem of 
inclusion-oriented water law and policy strategies: the tyranny of modern equality and participation 
discourses, which deny local and indigenous livelihoods, water rights and management rules. 
1
 Paper presented on behalf of the inter-institutional research and action program WALIR - Water Law and 
Indigenous Rights - at the Symposium "The UN Year of Freshwater 03: The Millennium Goals, Cultural Diversity 
and International Solidarity" held 6 and 7 November 2003, Geneva, Switzerland. 
Rutgerd Boelens 
1.2 The context of local water rights and production systems in the 
Andes: some illustrations 
Peasant and indigenous water management systems constitute the fundament sustaining local 
livelihoods and national food security in the Andes. Generally, the important role they play in water 
management and food security, being the main providers of food for the national populations, is not 
thanks to, but in spite of government policies 
Illustration 1. In Ecuador, smallholder and medium-scale farmers, mostly peasant and indigenous 
families living in highland communities, are responsible for the major part of national food 
production: their production covers more or less 70 % of national food consumption (WALIR 2003). 
Access to irrigation water is essential for most of their production systems. Nevertheless, national 
water rights distribution is enormously skewed towards benefiting a small minority of powerful 
enterprises and landlords. Today, 88 % of the small-farmers (minifundistas) have access rights to 
only in between 6 and 20 % of the available water, while hacendados (who conform 1 to 4 % of the 
irrigators population) have rights to 50 to 60 % of the water (Galârraga-Sânchez 2000). This 
unequal distribution is not just because of historical reasons of colonial occupation and the 
encroachment of peasant and indigenous communities' water rights by conquistadores and 
haciendas. Contemporary State policies have largely contributed to this. According to Whitaker's 
national evaluation study (1992), peasant and indigenous farmers with less than 1 hectare 
represent 60 % of all farmers, but they received only 13 % of the benefits of State spending in 
irrigation. At the same time, large landowners represent only 6 % of farmers, and they received 41 
% of the benefits of State spending in irrigation. According to Whitaker (1992) and the recent 
WALIR-study (2003), it was the public who financed all this: State irrigation investment in Ecuador 
at that moment represented 12 % of the total foreign debt. 
Currently, the context for water rights and management rules is changing rapidly in the Andean 
countries. Increasing demographic pressure, and the processes of migration, transnationalization 
and urbanization of rural areas, among others, are leading to profound changes in the agrarian 
structure, local cultures and forms of natural resource management. Newcomers enter the 
territories of local peasant and indigenous communities, generally claiming a substantive share of 
existing water rights and often neglecting local rules and agreements. 
Illustration 2. The famous Majes Project in southern Peru is one of the many cases in which the 
Andean peasant and indigenous communities were excluded from the water development process 
- or should we rather say: a typical example of how they, and especially their resources, were 
included in the development process. Major investments were made, some US$ 1,300,000,000 
dollars, to capture and conduct the water from the Colca Valley and irrigate the desert lowlands 
and generate power for the cities. According to Hendriks (2002:62) only 15,000 hectares have 
been irrigated, for a total of 3000 families, who each obtained a 5-hectare parcel. This is an 
investment in the order of US $ 80,000 dollars per hectare, or, what is even more appalling: US$ 
400,000 dollars per family. 
The original design excluded outright any provision of water for the upper basin where the peasant 
and indigenous communities live, and where the water comes from. Furthermore, to 'recover' 
investments, those families who did acquire land and water rights in the lower basin, had to pay 
25,000 dollars per parcel - by no means affordable for an indigenous small-holder family. 
Communities in the Andean catchment zone were completely ignored and left without benefits. 
They were 'included', however. To undo their 'backwardness', they did get the largest share of the 
burdens, for example, the expropriation of land, strong price inflation, depredation of natural 
resources, destruction of terraces, and debilitation of existing patterns of organization and culture 
(Tipton 1988; Gelles & Boelens 2003). 
"The waters of Colca will then create new wealth by irrigating dry land and driving the project's two 
power plants. But the Colca villagers will once again, as always, be left by the wayside, to demand 
the justice that will evidently not be achieved by any granting of a concession, but by fighting for 
and seizing the rights that they have historically been denied" (Manrique 1985). The United 
2
 Although the original project plan foresaw an irrigation command area of 23.000 hectares, the actual irrigated 
area proved to be far more limited, and there are indications that the availability of water has reached its limit. This 
is, among others, because the farmers applied an irrigation dotation that is twice the one that was planned by the 
project engineers (Hendriks 2002: 62) - a classical example of 'structural deceit' in irrigation project planning (see 
Chapter 4). 
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Nations/ CEPAL estimated that barely 0.2 % of total project investment was allocated to the upper 
basin, were the poorest sectors were in great need for irrigation water. Moreover, comparing this 
budget with other options at that time, 750,000 hectares of abandoned terraces could have been 
recovered and brought back into production in peasant and indigenous communities (CEPAL 1988. 
See also Manrique 1985). 
The Andes is undergoing an era of aggressive neo-liberal water reform. In this context, it is 
common to see that powerful stakeholders manage to influence new regulations and policies or 
monopolize water access and control rights. National and international elites or enterprises use 
both State intervention and new privatization policies to nullify and appropriate indigenous water 
rights. 
Illustration 3: In the last decade, the neo-liberal Chilean model, based on private water property 
rights and the creation of a water market, has been forcefully promoted to all Andean countries. 
However, making water rights transferable does not necessarily stimulate it being allocated to its 
highest economic value, as the example of Chile shows. Nor does it promote any social policy, 
such as attending the poorest sectors, prioritizing water for human consumption, or taking care of 
the environment. In Chile, companies that try to get hold of water rights do not necessarily get their 
profits from using or selling water. Speculation by holding surplus usage rights is currently much 
more profitable, leading to the emergence of private water monopolies. The Chilean Water Code 
does not prevent the emergence of such monopolies, or the hoarding and speculation by powerful 
enterprises. It is, first of all, not necessary to pay taxes or fees to own water. And second, the right-
holder has no obligation to effectively or beneficially use the water to which he/she owns the rights, 
or to build the works needed to utilize it (Solanes & Getches 1998, Dourojeanni & Jouravlev 1999). 
Hendriks provides some striking examples of water speculation by the hydro-power sector. The 
three major generating companies accumulate 78% (1324 m3/s) of the water used for this purpose; 
they have rights to 73% (8162 m3/s) of the currently unused water; and they have applied for 69% 
(26,753 m3/s) of the total volume pending grants. It is estimated that at the total, nation-wide level 
a flow exists of 30,000 m3/s usable for electric generation. The same tendency of concentrating 
water rights is repeated in mining activity in the dry northern region (Hendriks, 1998). Peasant and 
indigenous movements actively protest against such water monopolies, and also the government 
attempts to modify the current water legislation to avoid unproductive uses. Such attempts meet 
with the resistance of the existing right-holders, who are reluctant to give up their privileges and 
actively oppose any changes in the Water Code (Dourojeanni & Jouravlev 1999). 
But at the same time there appear to be opportunities for customary and indigenous cultures 
and rights systems. It can be observed that most Andean countries have accepted international 
agreements and work towards constitutional recognition of ethnic plurality and multiculturalism (or 
'interculturalidacf). At a general level 'indigenous rights' are associated with or considered to be 
'human rights'. However, when it comes to materializing such general agreements in practice or in 
concrete legislative fields, such as water laws and policies, particular local and indigenous forms of 
water management (especially water control rights) tend to be denied, forbidden or undermined 
(Bustamante 2002; CONAIE 1996; Gentes 2002, 2003; Getches 2002; Guevara et al. 2002, 2003; 
Pacari 1998; Palacios 2002, 2003). 
Illustration 4. The main water users of the Central Valley of Cochabamba, Bolivia, are peasant and 
indigenous irrigator communities, who for decades have organized access to and distribution of 
water according to their 'uses and customs'. They engaged in a major conflict when in 1997 the 
Cochabamba drinking water company started to drill wells in the Central Valley, affecting their 
already over-extracted ground water resources. In 2000, the Valley again became a violent 
battlefield when indigenous and peasant communities together with urban water users protested 
against the state's plans to privatize the drinking water sector. The government signed a contract 
with a large foreign consortium, and enacted a privatization support law that allowed the 
international company to have exclusive water rights of all waters in the district - including those of 
smaller systems in the metropolitan area and rights to exploit the aquifers. Another law was rushed 
through the parliament so that the company could capture new water resources, and even charge 
water fees for cooperative wells that were to be expropriated. Directly after privatization, the 
international company considerably raised water fees, without any system improvement. In a 
strong alliance urban and rural water users protested: the citizens protested against rising water 
rates, while the rural municipalities and indigenous communities protested against the new law, 
because it affected their rights and could expose them to new encroachments of their water 
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sources. Violent confrontations with the army were the result. At the end of this 'water war', the 
government had to retract its decision and also commit to amending all the proposed law's articles 
that the popular alliance objected to (See: Assies 2000, Boelens et al. 2002, Bustamante 2002, 
Laurie et al. 2002). 
In the Andes - and elsewhere -, the denial of contemporary forms of indigenous water 
management is often combined with a glorification of the past: "Incas yes, Indians no!" (Méndez 
2000. Cf. Almeida 1998, Baud 1997, Gelles 2000, Flores Galindo 1988, Hale 2002). We find a 
folkloristic attitude towards contemporary indigenous communities. Very common is the use of 
either romanticized, paternalistic or racist approaches. Policies are oriented towards a non-existing 
image of 'Indianity', a stereotype; or towards the assimilation and destruction of indigenous water 
rights systems. 
As a result of the above, the Andean countries are full with examples of the negative 
organizational and infrastructural impacts of many top-down water programs. They usually fail to 
understand the dynamic and plural nature of indigenous rights and management rules (Gerbrandy 
and Hoogendam 1998, Boelens and Dâvila 1998, Guillet 1992, Mitchell and Guillet 1994). 
In the last decade, as a reaction, we see a certain shift from a class-based to a class- and 
ethnicity-based ('indigenous') struggle for water access and control rights, especially in countries 
such as Ecuador and Bolivia. In many regions the traditional struggle for more equal land 
distribution has been accompanied or replaced by collective claims for more equal water 
distribution, and for the legitimization of local authorities and normative frameworks for water 
management. But why, particularly, the theme of water rights? 
1.3 Water rights and WALIR 
In these times of growing scarcity and competition regarding access to water resources, water 
rights become a pivotal issue in the struggle of local indigenous and peasant organizations to 
defend their livelihoods and secure their future (see Hazeleger & Boelens 2003, Vincent 2002). 
Water in Andean communities is often an extremely powerful resource. Apart from being a 
foundation for productive, social and religious practice and local identity, the particular, collective 
nature of 'water' almost by definition forces people to build strong organizations: in most cases, the 
resource can be managed only by means of day-to-day collective action. Collaboration instead of 
competition is the only way to survive and secure water rights in this extremely adverse environment. 
This 'forced' collective action to manage the resource cannot be romanticized and is not 
embedded in a presumed 'Andean solidarity'. It is a form of local, 'contractual reciprocity' to sustain 
and reproduce local water management systems and the households and communities that depend 
on them (Cf. Boelens & Doornbos 2001; Mayer 2002). And apart from the local orientation of this 
collective reciprocal action, it may also create a strong basis for broader political alliances, for 
example, in order to claim particular water policies and oppose forms of legislation and policies that 
deny indigenous or customary rights. 
Consequently, as field evidence shows, water rights privatization policies create an enormous 
danger for indigenous and peasant communities in the Andes. This is also the main cause of the 
recent, very intensive, Water Wars in Bolivia (Assies 2000, Bustamante 2002, Laurie et al. 2002). 
Again, why water rights? In order to deeper penetrate the power of water, it is necessary to 
understand the multi-layered concept of water rights in most indigenous and peasant communities. 
Typically, water rights do not refer to rights of access and withdrawal only, but are considered to be 
authorized claims to use water and control decision-making about water management (Beccar et 
al. 2002, Vincent 2002, Zwarteveen 1997). Therefore, it is a struggle over the following key issues: 
access to water and infrastructure; rules and obligations regarding resource management; the 
legitimacy of authority to establish and enforce rules and rights; and the discourses and policies to 
regulate the resource. And it is precisely the authority of indigenous and peasant organizations that 
is increasingly being denied, their water usage rights that are being cut off, and their control over 
decision-making processes that is being undermined. 
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Fundamentally, a water right, more than just a relationship of access and usage between 
'subject' (the user) and 'object' (the water), is a social relationship and an expression of power 
among humans. It is a relationship of inclusion and exclusion, and involves control over decision-
making. Therefore it is crucial to consider the two-sided relationship between water rights and 
power: power relations determine key properties of the distribution, contents and legitimacy of 
water rights and, in turn, water rights reproduce or restructure power relations (see Boelens & 
Hoogendam 2002). 
Based on the above mentioned considerations, the program Water Law and Indigenous Rights 
was formulated - an international, interinstitutional endeavor based on action-research, exchange, 
capacity-building, empowerment and advocacy.3 This comparative research program builds upon 
academic research and action-researchers in local networks - both indigenous and non-
indigenous. It attempts to be a kind of think-tank to critically inform debates on indigenous and 
customary rights in water legislation and water policy, both to facilitate local action platforms and to 
influence the circles of law- and policy-makers. Equitable rights distribution and democratic 
decision-making and therefore, support for empowerment of discriminated and oppressed sectors, 
are major concerns. 
In co-ordination and collaboration with existing networks and counterpart-initiatives, WALIR sets 
out to analyze water rights and customary management modes of indigenous and peasant 
communities, comparing them with the contents of current national legislation and policy. Thereby, 
it sheds light on how the first are legally and materially discriminated against and destructed. The 
aim is to contribute to a process of change that structurally recognizes indigenous and customary 
water management rules and rights in national legislation. It also aims to make a concrete 
contribution to the implementation of better water management policies.4 As part of its strategy 
WALIR plans to contribute to and present concepts, methodologies and contextual proposals and 
to sensitize decision-makers regarding the changes needed for appropriate legislation and water 
policies. 
The program, therefore, is not just academic but also action-based. While especially the 
indigenous populations are being confronted with increasing water scarcity and a traditionally 
strong neglect of their water management rules and rights, the current political climate seems to be 
changing. However, actual legal changes are still empty of contents, and there is a lack of clear 
research results and proposals in this area. The program aims to help bridge these gaps, facing 
the challenge to take into account the dynamics of customary and indigenous rules, without falling 
into the trap of decontextualizing and 'freezing' such local normative systems. Fundamentally, the 
WALIR program is directed towards activities and conclusions that facilitate local, national and 
international platforms and networks of grassroots organizations and policymakers. 
WALIR is a collaborative program coordinated by Wageningen University and the United Nations Economic 
Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (UN/ECLAC) and is implemented in co-operation with 
counterpart institutions in Bolivia, Chile, Ecuador, Peru, Mexico, France, The Netherlands and the USA. The 
counterparts, with whom they work together, form a much broader group of participants: institutions at 
international, national and local level. The Water Unit of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs funds the 
program. 
4
 In its initial phase, WALIR has set up an inter-institutional network of institutions, scholars and practitioners of 
various disciplines and backgrounds, involved in and committed to the above objectives. Preparatory studies 
conducted so far have focused on current legislation and legal attention to, or neglect and discrimination of, 
indigenous and customary water rights. The project aims to have an effect beyond this Andean focus, by providing 
an example and tool for similar action research to be pursued in other regions. Second phase studies of WALIR 
focus on indigenous water rights in international law and treaties, indigenous identity and water rights, current 
indigenous water management systems, field case studies, and thematic, complementary research projects (on 
the relation between "WALIR" and gender, food security, land rights, water policy dialogue methods, among 
others). Short comparative studies in other countries will further complement and strengthen the project and its 
thematic networks, and lay the foundation for a broader international framework. Next, a number of exchange, 
dissemination, capacity-building and advocacy activities will be implemented, in close collaboration with local, 
national and international platforms and networks. 
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1.4 Conceptual problems and strategic challenges 
WALIR itself is based on diversity. It has an interdisciplinary composition with lawyers, 
anthropologists, water professionals, sociologists and agro-economists. Their social background 
also differs strongly: from scholars and policy-advisors to action-researchers and legal advisors of 
indigenous organizations. And obviously, the countries studied and their respective legal 
structures differ strongly, as do the national debates on indigenous and customary rights, and the 
languages and concepts that are used. Therefore the challenges are manifold, and they are both 
practical and conceptual. For example: 
The social and political construction of 'indigenous' 
Half a century ago Frantz Fanon made the following observation, which is useful to recall in the 
context of the program: "Colonial specialists do not want to recognize that the culture has changed, 
and they hasten to support the traditions of native society. It is precisely the colonialists who have 
become the defenders and advocates of a native lifestyle" (Fanon 1967 (1954)). 
It gives a powerful warning to scholars, action-researchers and NGOs, to refrain from naive 
participationism or philanthropical imperialism and critically rethink every intent to support so-called 
'indigenous' knowledge, culture, rights, livelihoods and natural resource management. It also 
provides a background for the discussions that the program intends to stimulate, and shows partly 
how complex its objectives are. For example, what is, or who is, 'indigenous' ? 
In the Andean region, so-called 'Indians' were invented and the concept of 'indigenous' was 
constructed by various racist currents, developmentalist paradigms and romanticized narratives, 
and by the indigenous peoples themselves. Divergent regimes of representation constructed 
images or projections of 'Andean identity' or 'indigenous cultures', even long before the year 1492. 
These projections refer either to the backwardness of the 'Indians', populations who therefore 
should be assimilated into mainstream culture, or to neo-positive, idealized images of 'real and 
pure Indians', isolated from cultural interaction and defenders of original positive human values. 
Indigenous groups have often adopted or contributed to the creation of these stereotypes, 
sometimes unreflectively, sometimes with clear ideological and political purposes.5 
Is it possible to speak of specific 'indigenous' or 'Andean' cultures, communities, water 
management forms or socio-legal systems? On the one hand, indigenous peoples dynamically 
shop around in other normative systems and discourses, selecting and appropriating those 
elements, tools, and meanings that can strengthen their positions and legitimize their claims. New, 
diverse indigenous identities are being constructed and strategically strive to represent the 
indigenous collectivities in their struggle against subordination and discrimination. On the other 
hand, Andean communities show specific historical and cultural forms of collective action and 
resource management, embedded in specific Andean cultures with their particular normative 
repertoires, symbols and meanings, livelihoods and local economies. 
Together, both aspects show the importance of analyzing Andean cultures and management 
forms as dynamic and adaptable to new challenges and contexts. As mentioned by Gelles 
(2000:12), Andean culture and identity, therefore, is "a plural and hybrid mix of local mores with the 
political forms and ideological forces of hegemonic states, both indigenous, Iberian and others. 
Some native institutions are with us today because they were appropriated and used as a means 
of extracting goods and labor by Spanish colonial authorities and republican states after 
Independence; others were used to resist colonial and postcolonial regimes". 
5
 It was therefore not just the dominant, racist class and social Darwinists, but also many 'indigenist' (and later 
'indianist') scholars - e.g. Marxist thinkers and activists, who fought against racial discrimination and racial 
oppression - who contributed to the great mestizaje project, intending to paternalistically 'include the poor 
indigenous peoples in modern society'. This was done, among other means, by 'modern' irrigation technology, 
legislation and capitalization of Andean communities, or by defining 'indigenous' as synonymous with 
'revolutionary', in Western schools of thought. Furthermore, some indigenous and Indian scholars and movements 
tried to create the 'modern Indian', rooted in ancient indigenous myths and symbols and pan-Andean discourses, 
in order to foster regional pride and nationalism or legitimize their political and ethnic (often mestizo) positions. The 
'indigenous' was -and often still is- essentialized by projecting stereotyped images (see, for example, Almeida 
1998; Baud 1997; Baud et al. 1996; Gelles and Boelens 2003; Gelles 1998, 2002; Degregori 2000; Iturralde 1993; 
Stavenhagen 1994; Stavenhagen & Iturralde 1990). 
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Nowadays, we find a mixture of diverging positions with respect to the notion of 'indigenous' and 
its implications in practice, for example, racist constructions of the concept (oriented toward either 
'exclusion' or 'bio-political inclusion'), constructs related to developmentalist integration 
('backwardness'), to Maoist-Leninist missions ('revolutionary nature'), to indigenous-advocates' or 
romanticized ways of life ('cosmovisionist') or based on postmodern analysis ('deconstruction'). It 
is interesting, therefore, to see in this current complex situation a strategic struggle of indigenous 
water user groups to re-appropriate not just the above mentioned water access rights, water 
management rules, water organizational forms, and legitimate water authority: they also aim to 
actively construct their own counter-discourses on 'Andeanity' and 'Indianity' and the policies to 
regulate water accordingly. Obviously, this dynamic, strategic-political struggle for counter-
identification (self-definition), is not necessarily based on solely 'local' truths, rules, rights and 
traditions. 
The plural and contradictory concept of 'recognition' 
A next main challenge of the program is related to the notion of 'legal recognition'. In order to 
confront the processes of discrimination, subordination and exclusion, indigenous and advocacy 
groups often aim for political action with clear, collective, unified objectives and answers. However, 
the struggle for formal and legal recognition poses enormous conceptual problems and challenges 
with important social and strategic consequences. 
In another paper we have discussed the dilemma regarding 'recognition of legal hierarchies' 
arguing that a distinction must be made between analytical-academic and political-strategic 
recognition6. "In an analytical sense, legal pluralistic thinking does not establish a hierarchy (based 
on the supposedly higher moral values or degrees of legitimacy, effectiveness or appropriateness 
of a legal framework) among the multiple existing legal frameworks or repertoires. In political 
terms, however, it is important to recognize that in most countries the existing, official legal 
structure is fundamentally hierarchical and consequently, in many fields state law may constitute a 
source of great social power - a fact that does not deny the political power that local socio-legal 
repertoires may have. Recognizing the existence of this political hierarchy and the emerging 
properties of state law in particular contexts offers the possibility to devise tools and strategies for 
social struggle and progressive change. In the discussion about 'recognition' as a way of giving 
legal pluralism a place in policy-related issues, both the political-strategic and analytical-academic 
aspects of recognition combine" (Boelens, Roth and Zwarteveen 2002). 
Thus, instead of collective and unified claims, many questions arise in the debates and 
struggles for 'recognition', for example: 
• Do indigenous peoples and their advocates claim recognition of just 'indigenous rights' 
(with all the conceptual and political-strategic dilemmas of the 'indigenous' concept), or do 
they also struggle for recognition of the broader repertoires of 'customary', and 'peasant' 
rights prevailing in the Andes? And what precisely is the difference in concrete empirical 
cases? 
• There are no clear-cut, indigenous socio-legal frameworks, but many dynamic, interacting 
and overlapping socio-legal repertoires: should indigenous peoples try to present and 
legalize delimited frameworks of own water rights, rules and regulations? Or should they 
rather claim the recognition of their water control rights and thereby the autonomy to 
develop those rules, without the need to detail and specify these rules, rights and principles 
within the official legal framework? 
• Or would it be a more appropriate and effective strategy to claim and defend legalization of 
their water access rights - since these are increasingly being taken away from them - and 
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 "Taking 'recognition' as a point of departure implies that there is a 'recognizing party' and a 'party being 
recognized'. This would put us in the kind of state-biased position in which matters are decided upon according to 
a state-determined hierarchy of legal systems' validity and capacities of validation. Such a position, needless to 
say, would invalidate the insights derived from attention to legal pluralism. On the other hand, it is important to be 
aware of the possible opportunities involved in (state) recognition, taking into account and taking seriously the fact 
that many local groups of resource users, ethnic and other minorities actively aspire and strive for this form of 
recognition. As we have mentioned before, water users (and especially marginalized actors) are often constrained 
by state law, but at the same time they can (try to) approach it as a powerful resource for claiming or defending 
their interests and rights" (Boelens, Roth and Zwarteveen 2002. See also Benda-Beckmann 1996, Moore 2001). 
Rutgerd Boelens 
assume that water management and control rights will follow once the material resource 
basis has been secured? 
• Do recognition efforts only focus on the legal recognition of explicit and/or locally formalized 
indigenous property structures and water rights ('reference rights', often, but not always, 
written down), or do and should they also consider the complex, dynamic functioning of 
local laws and rights in day-to-day practice? These 'rights in action' and 'materialized 
rights' emerge in actual social relationships and inform actual human behavior, but are less 
'tangible'. 
• How to define and delimit the domain of validity of so-called indigenous rights systems, 
considering the multi-ethnic compositions of most Andean regions and the dynamic 
properties of local normative frameworks? In terms of exclusive geographical areas, 
traditional territories, or flexible culture and livelihood domains? 
• How to avoid assimilation and subsequent marginalization of local rights frameworks when 
these are legally recognized? And how to avoid a situation in which only those 'customary' 
or 'indigenous' principles that fit into State legislation are recognized by the law, and the 
complex variety of 'disobedient rules' are silenced after legal recognition? 
• Indigenous socio-legal repertoires only make sense in their own, dynamic and particular 
context, while national laws demand stability and continuity: how to avoid 'freezing' of 
customary and indigenous rights systems in static and universalistic national legislation in 
which local principles lose their identity and capacity for renewal, making them useless? 
• 'Enabling' and 'flexible' legislation might solve the above problem. However, enabling 
legislation and flexible rights and rules often lack the power to actually defend local and 
indigenous rights in conflicts with third parties. How to give room and flexibility to diverse 
local water rights and management systems, while not weakening their position in conflicts 
with powerful exogenous interest groups? 
• And what does such legal flexibility mean for 'internal' inequalities or abuses of power? If, 
according to the above dilemmas, autonomy of local rule development and enforcement is 
claimed for (instead of strategies that aim to legalize concrete, delimited sets of indigenous 
rights and regulations), how to face the existing gender, class and ethnic injustices which 
also form part of customary and indigenous socio-legal frameworks and practices? 
The pitfalls and challenges of 'Law-oriented strategies' 
Following from the above mentioned dilemma's or problems, a major conceptual and strategic-
practical challenge stems from the fact that national (positivist) legislation by definition claims that 
law must focus on uniform enforcement, general applicability and equal treatment of all citizens, 
where local and indigenous rights systems, on the contrary, by definition address particular cases 
and diversity. How to deal with the conflict and fundamental difference between legal Justice 
(oriented at 'right'-ness / generality) and diverse, local Equity ('fair'-ness / particularity)? Various 
forms of State legislation have recognized this fact when faced with the problem of law losing its 
legitimacy in practice: official Justice was perceived of as being 'unfair' in many specific cases. 
Legal rules are general and individual cases are particular, hence common laws were called upon. 
In many cases this second set of principles (fairness) has been institutionalized. This was not to 
replace the set of positivist Tightness rules, but to 'complement and adapt it'. In fact, it appeared 
that official legislation, Justice, often could survive thanks to the 'fairness' and acceptability of 
common laws that were incorporated. More often than not this was done by formulating 'special 
laws'. However, this institutionalized equity is a contradictio in terminis. It leads almost 
automatically to the ironical situation in which the set of common or customary rules, 'equity', itself 
becomes a general, formalized system and loses its pretensions of 'appropriateness', 'being 
acceptable' and 'doing justice' in particular cases (Schaffer and Lamb 1981. Cf. Boelens 1998, 
Benda-Beckmann et al. 1998, Correas 1994, Lauderdale 1998, Vidal 1990). 
A closely related dilemma involves the effectiveness of legal recognition strategies. Considering 
peasant and indigenous communities' lack of access to State law and administration, this question 
comes prominently to the fore: is legal recognition indeed the most effective strategy, or would it be 
better and more effective for peasant and indigenous communities to defend their own water laws 
and rights 'in the field' ? Moreover, it often is not the State law as such that sets the rules of the 
game in peasant and indigenous communities, but hybrid complexes of various socio-legal 
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systems. Formal rights and rules cannot act by themselves, and it is only the forces and 
relationships of society that can turn legal instruments into societal practice. Especially social and 
technical water engineers, lawyers and other legal advocates have often overestimated the actual 
functionality or instrumentality of formal law and policies in local contexts. On the contrary, their 
legal anthropological colleagues sometimes tended to underestimate the power of formal law, 
assuming that all conflicts are settled by means of local normative arrangements, without any 
influence from official regulations. However, the neo-liberal Water Laws (e.g. Chile) or top-down 
instrumental water policies (e.g. in Ecuador and Peru) have not only neglected customary and 
indigenous water management forms, they also have had concrete, often devastating 
consequences for the poorest people in society. 
It is because of this that indigenous and grassroots organizations have fiercely engaged in the 
legal battle. Moreover, in this regard it is important to consider here that efforts to gain legal 
recognition do not replace but rather complement local struggles 'in-the-field'. On both levels there 
is political-strategic action to defend water access rights, define water control rights, legitimize local 
authority and confront powerful discourses. 
In the next section I will elaborate how these four key issues, at the local and national level, 
shape the complex arena in which local water rights and customary laws confront uniform policies 
and politics of participation. 
1.5 Inclusion and exclusion 
National water policies in the Andean countries, and especially their translation in field practice, 
reflect and deploy the political power and cultural hegemony of a dominant stakeholder group. 7 
This group has historically imposed rules, rights and regulations, and has controlled nation-building 
processes in the last centuries. As shown by Gelles (1998, 2000), State bureaucracies usually 
ignore indigenous models of resource management not only because of the alleged superiority of 
'modem' Western cultural forms and organization, but because the power holders and dominant 
cultures of these nations regard indigenous peoples as racially and culturally inferior (Gelles 
2000:9-10).8 
Here we need to examine an important change that clearly differentiates power relations in the 
Republican states from their Inka and Spanish colonial predecessors: there is a move from real 
political exclusion to an imagined political 'inclusion' of indigenous peoples, from a discourse of 
racial (and thus 'natural' social) differentiation to a discourse of equality (Boelens 1998). 
In former days, indigenous property rights were taken away through violence, conquest, 
colonization and oppression, and they were excluded from the benefits of society. In addition to 
appropriating local cultural norms for their own extractive purposes, the Inka emperors and other 
indigenous leaders, as well as the kings, conquistadores and hacendados during the Spanish 
colonial period, differentiated and elevated themselves by excluding the subordinated classes from 
resources, services, and social life (see e.g. Arguedas 1987, Bolin 1990; Flores Galindo 1988; 
Patterson 1991; Van der Ploeg 1998). Many different means, including public displays that glorified 
and reified the might of the groups in power, reinforced this differentiation and social exclusion. 
In the post-colonial area the opposite occurs: not the powerful authorities and landlords, but the 
peasant and indigenous communities and the common people are made visible and brought to the 
fore, by means of a Foucauldian 'disciplining', 'participatory' power of 'equalizing normalization', 
which is present in everyday interactions; "it actually manifests and reproduces or transforms itself 
in the workplaces, families and other organizational settings of everyday life" (Foucault, 1980). Yet 
the powerful groups that benefit from this 'inclusive' power, as well as the new mechanisms and 
rules of subordination, in fact remain invisible (cf. Achterhuis, 1988). 
New irrigation legislation and state policies are thus often an expression of post-colonial equality 
discourses; as De la Cruz (1993) observed, "the principle of equality before the law is valid for the 
identical and profoundly unjust for the diverse" (cf. IUAES-CFLLP, 2000; Stavenhagen and 
This section is based on Gelles and Boelens (2003). 
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 This bureaucratic irrigation tradition (Lynch 1988) has been especially powerful in countries such as Peru and 
Ecuador. As Lynch (1993) and Boelens and Zwarteveen (2002) have shown, its devaluation of particular water use 
actors extends to women, as the gender discrimination found in the field and in irrigation offices is part and parcel 
of the bureaucratic tradition. 
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Iturralde, 1990). This horizontal, disciplining power functions because it penetrates people and 
society as a whole. "This power is exercised rather than possessed; it is not a 'privilege', acquired 
or preserved, of the dominant class, but the overall effect of its strategic positions - an effect that is 
manifested and sometimes extended by the position of those who are dominated" (Foucault 1978). 
Thus we see, for example, that in the Andes and many other world regions, irrigation 
technicians and development professionals introduce virtually the same irrigation techniques, 
knowledge, and norms (developed in western research centers, universities, and development 
enterprises). But they are not just 'imposed' in a top-down way: in many instances, it is the 
indigenous peasants themselves, in the Andes and elsewhere, who ask for this same technology, 
in order to 'progress' and leave behind their traditional 'backward' technology; in order to become 
like the western-oriented, 'modern farmers, in order to gain economic parity' (cf. Boelens 1998; 
Escobar 1995; Van der Ploeg 2001). 
In this way power in modern nation-states seeks for the inclusion, rather than the exclusion, of 
Andean communities, indigenous peasants and other oppressed classes (Achterhuis, 1988; 
Boelens and Dàvila, 1998). At the same time this 'uniformity' and 'equality' supposedly makes it 
I easy to measure these social groups: they are individualized, classified, and made 'cases' 
i according to the ways that they do or do not fit the model. Yet, their participation often results in 
disappointment, in social and cultural disintegration, and in their being defined as 'permanently 
backward people', due to the impossibility of meeting the norms for being equal. In the words of 
Fanon (1967): "The western ideology, which is a proclamation of the fundamental equality of 
men... invites inferior men to become human beings, according to the western example of the 
humanity that it represents. In spite of being fundamentally racist, it generally succeeds in hiding 
this racism through ever more subtle modifications; thus, maintaining its proclamation of men's 
extraordinary dignity". 
Another clear example of this is found in the normalizing, 'equalizing' and categorizing 
properties of neo-liberal market ideologies penetrating the Andean nations, including the legal and 
policy frameworks regarding water management. The neo-liberal economic principles are, on the 
one hand, imposed on Andean states by international institutions and national power groups, but, 
on the other hand, many of its basic concepts and dynamics have been adopted and internalized 
by Andean communities, penetrating and subtly transforming local management forms and often 
disarticulating indigenous water control. Thus, the deployment of secular, rational, universally 
applicable irrigation models, supported nowadays by water management privatization ideologies, is 
a powerful means by which contemporary nation-states and private interest sectors extend their 
control. 
In sum, it is clear that contemporary nation-states employ a new and different symbology of 
power - espoused in modernization and development discourses as well as in neo-liberal economic 
policies - which aims to 'include', not to 'exclude'; it pretends to provide universal benefits, while in 
fact extending state control and the cultural orientations of national and international power 
holders. Within this context, the recognition and balanced valuation of local beliefs and practices is 
' necessarily precluded because any legitimization of these local norms calls into question the 
\ state's and market ideology's supposed monopoly on rationality and legitimate culture. 
The politics of participation 
Although violent take-overs have not disappeared, as outlined above, the keywords are not 
anymore exclusion and outright oppression, but so-called 'inclusion', 'integration' and 
'participation', in the name of 'equality'.9 But then, with these modern concepts, fundamental 
questions come up: First, if Equality is strived for, the question is: equal to what, equal to whom, 
equal to which model? The basic assumption in current Latin American water policies is, that 
'progress' means: equality to the occidental, technocentric and male-biased water management 
model. The concept of rational water management is interspersed with non-indigenous norms 
about efficiency, social security, effective organization, private ownership and economic 
functionality. In practice, indigenous peoples are forced to "equalize": In other words, to adopt the 
norms and practices of white or mestizo water users, which most often run counter to local social 
relations and environment, and disintegrate local communities and identity. 
9
 For an analysis of equality and participation discourses, see, among others, the works of Michel Foucault, Hans 
Achterhuis, Arturo Escobar, Michael Taussig, Ivan lllich, René Girard, Bernard Schaffer. 
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Second, if Inclusion and Participation is the objective, the obvious question is: inclusion in what? 
Participation in whose objectives, visions, and terms? To this respect, the Second World Water 
Forum (2000) concluded that: "...there is a recurrent problem for indigenous peoples, who are 
often constrained to deal with vital issues on terms dictated by others. Traditional knowledge is 
seen as inferior in current political, legal, and scientific systems and therefore their arguments are 
discarded time and again by courts and other institutions". 
Third, regarding the important current concepts of 'integrated' water management and 
'integrated' policies, there seems to be a general consensus, but: who does the integration? Let us 
have a look at some common, inclusion-oriented examples: 
A first, very common example shows, at field level, the problems of outside-driven integration of 
indigenous communities in uniform, national legislation, organizational models and engineers' 
designs10: The Ecuadorian State intervened in an indigenous area of 20 communities in the Andes, 
in Licto, to build an irrigation system and carry out an integrated development program. The 
design was made in the country's capital, without user involvement. The hydraulic design 
disregarded community production systems and boundaries, and imposed a classic, universal 
blueprint. 
Although the great majority of water users were female, because of male outmigration, the 
infrastructure had no night reservoirs and the schedule was based on 24 hours irrigation. Night 
irrigation, however, would make it impossible for women to make use of water rights - because of 
reasons such as sexual violence, child care, soil erosion, remote fields, and others. The nation-
wide, uniform legal recipe dictated the organization of the system, which would strengthen 
bureaucratic power and artificial leaders, and weaken community structure and collective action -
the only way to survive in this region. Law also pre-established that most women could not get 
water rights -unless they were formally recognized as 'heads of households'-, although they were 
the ones that, according to local indigenous rules, had worked, invested and thus created the water 
rights. 
This, maybe, constituted the major problem according to the indigenous families. The State 
imposed a model in which water rules and rights were established by uniform government 
rationality: those individuals who have land and pay fees, get water rights. Indigenous rationality, 
on the contrary says: you cannot just buy rights. Those who contribute with labor, organizational 
capacities and participate in the meetings, create water access and decision-making rights. 
Thereby, individual rights are derived from the collective ownership of infrastructure. 
In many indigenous and peasant communities this is the motor of local water management and 
collective action (see diagram): at the same time that you create your infrastructure, you create 
your water rights and you create your organization. Then, to maintain and re-create your water 
rights, you have to maintain and re-create the collective infrastructure, and you strengthen and re-
create your organization. There is a dynamic and permanent interaction among the technological 
system, the normative system and the organizational system. 
10
 Based on the chapter 'Recipes and resistance. Peasants' rights building and empowerment in the Licto irrigation 
system, Ecuador1, of the book Water Rights and Empowerment (Boelens & Hoogendam 2002) 
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Diagram 1: "Driving force" behind indigenous water management and collective action: 















When the State agency, because of financial crisis and lack of capacity, did not complete 
system construction, the indigenous communities took over its development with the help of a local 
NGO. They adapted design, management and water rights to local demands and capacities. 
Although many had no formal education or were illiterate, the means were developed to 
collectively discuss the design, the rules and the rights. For example, by using scale models and 
user-to-user training in local language, in all communities. Through interactive design and visual 
capacity-building tools, the creation of infrastructure and water rights were linked. Next, combined 
literacy training and water management capacity-building strengthened the position of female 
water users and female leaders, since they were to become involved in the management of the 
system. And especially they were the ones who were in charge of creating and maintaining water 
rights in the system. Fundamentally, collective action formed the basis for the construction of 
infrastructure and the construction of water rights. A system was developed which the communities 
themselves now manage, from the main level to the field level. 
However, once the 20 indigenous communities had finished the system, with clear rules and 
rights and strong collective management, the State administration came in again. It did not want to 
recognize local management, regulations and water rights. Simply because local rules were not 
sustained by national law, they were declared 'illegal'. 
At this moment, the State agency, in their interpretation of the universal Decentralization and 
Management Turnover policy, claims to get the management of the system back from the 
indigenous communities. It argues: "How can we hand it over if it is not in our hands?" International 
and national policies usually have different effects in the field than in the theory, and behind official 
arguments a power play is going on. 
Indigenous communities, however, defend their technological, normative and organizational 
water use system. But they strongly face positivist, uniform law and inclusion-oriented water 
policies. Ecuadorian Water Law, just as most others, does not allow for local water rights and 
management principles, and destructs the variety of normative systems that do try to find particular 
solutions for diverse contexts. 
Another example is the inclusion of indigenous water communities in current global water policy 
models. In Chile, indigenous peoples have become included in the 1981 Water Code, dictating 
privatization of water rights. While ideological studies continue to praise the model, empirical field 
studies indicate the disintegration of especially collective, indigenous systems: the individualization 
of water rights has increased insecurity and disorganization - in stead of decreasing insecurity, as 
neoclassical theory wants to have it (Bauer 1997,1998; Hendriks 1998; Dourojeanni and Jouravlev 
1999; Castro 2002). Moreover, according to the new legislation, decision-making rights on water 
management are now attached to economic buying power of individuals: right-holders with more 
'water actions' (volumetric rights per time unit) have more decision-making power, contrary to 
indigenous management and collective interests. In many cases, the interests of a water rights 
owning elite have been able to effectively deny the interests of the majority (the group of poorer 
users), and impose their own playing rules (Hendriks 1998). 
Next, since individual water property owners can make use of the water entirely according to 
their personal interests, Chile faces the problem of strong increase in water contamination, and 
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individual property owners are not sanctioned for polluting their property. Often, indigenous 
communities and downstream cities bear the consequences (Bauer 1997, Dourojeanni and 
Jouravlev 1999). 
At the same time, the water market itself has not developed (or in some cases only very 
marginally), but extreme monopolization, speculation and hoarding of water rights did. As was 
mentioned earlier, a few power-generating and mining companies have accumulated the fast 
majority of rights, most of it is not used at the moment: the Water Code does not request water 
rights owners to actually make use of these rights, neither are they obliged to pay concession fees. 
This makes hoarding and speculation of water rights, in a context of scarcity, extremely attractive 
(Solanes and Getches 1998, Solanes and Gonzâlez-Villareal 1999). 
A major source for this accumulation and monopolization of water rights was the expropriation 
of the so-called "unregistered" indigenous community rights (Castro 2002, Dourojeanni and 
Jouravlev 1999, Gentes 2002, Hendriks 1998, Van Kessel 1992). When the new Water Code was 
enforced in 1981, most indigenous communities were left unaware of the need to officially register 
their century old customary rights. A Mapuche leader: "The big landowners here in the area have 
registered the water rights in their names, and the Mapuches, for not knowing about the laws of the 
Chilean State, were left without possibilities to claim their rights" (Solon 2003). Water rights that are 
not claimed, or the so-called 'unused rights', were allocated to those who presented official 
requests: powerful commercial companies, especially mining and power generation enterprises 
and landlords. Mapuche communities are furious about this. As one Mapuche leader phrases his 
anger: "The water sources that originate in the communities here have 98 % of their trajectory on 
Mapuche territory, but the owner of the water is a landlord who lives in the city. He bought the 
water from the State, and nobody can use it. We cannot use it for irrigation, not even for drinking 
water, because the water has been bought. But the water was born in and flows through Mapuche 
communities, and no one of the Mapuches was aware of the need for official recognition when this 
person registered the water rights on his name. No one of us was consulted and no Mapuche ever 
knew of the existence of this law" (Solon 2003). It is not only the neo-liberal assumption that 
(market) information is freely available to every-one that is challenged here, but also the very basis 
for rights claims. Mapuche communities strongly feel that the water is theirs, because they have 
been using it for centuries and because it flows through their territory, whereas the Water Code 
demands official registration as a first basis for rights allocation (Boelens & Zwarteveen 2003). 
This relates also to a recurrent problem of universal or national policy models: their validity is 
based on theoretical models and paradigms, but they usually fail to look at human suffering and 
internal contradictions in the field (Cf. Long and Van der Ploeg 1989, Van der Ploeg 2001). 
The inclusion of local and indigenous rights frameworks in bureaucratic, State-oriented models 
or neo-liberal, market-oriented models is not always based on brutal impositions. On the contrary, 
water reforms are presented as merely neutral and technical interventions aimed at better 
controlling and managing the water crisis. The suggestion is created that such interventions do not 
fundamentally alter or influence existing social and political relations. And to peasant and 
indigenous water user communities it is explained that flows of money and water follow universal, 
scientific, laws and that human beings share the same aspirations and motives everywhere. Such 
inclusion-oriented policies establish a universal rationality based on a 'natural' truth and 'objective' 
criteria for optimizing efficiency and water management. 
Peasant and indigenous movements point at the fact that this is a false representation of reality: 
the proposed water reforms are not just slight modifications which basically leave existing social 
relations intact, but they involve quite radical modifications in the social and political structures in 
which water management is embedded. The proposed ways in which water is to be owned, 
distributed and managed imply fundamental change, and so do the ways in which different water 
users relate to each other. If the policies are implemented, such relations are increasingly dictated 
by extra-communal laws, institutions and markets (Boelens & Zwarteveen 2003). 
-o-o-o-
Particularly the local peasant and indigenous water users' collectives are the ones who face 
both the water scarcity crisis and the policies that are developed to counter that crisis. 
Paradoxically, precisely the ones with solutions - the producers of local livelihood and national food 
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security, who developed a variety of water rights and management systems in order to adapt them 
to the multiple local constraints and opportunities - are being denied and suffer most from the 
devastating consequences of 'modern water approaches': inclusive policies and uniform, positivist 
legislation and market-oriented receipts. But, if current cultural politics and policies of 'inclusion' 
constitute the problem, the solution can never be to go back to 'exclusion'. Participation, yes, but 
with a different rights approach. Taking into account, from a critical perspective, that peasant and 
indigenous communities want to take part on their own terms, considering the plural identities, 
organizational forms and normative frameworks that govern their water management in practice. 
And, at the same time, considering the fact that most access and control rights have been taken 
away from them. 
The 'politics of inclusion' meet with fierce resistance of different social movements who demand 
for alternative strategies of natural resource use and maintenance. While such movements are 
motivated by a range of concerns: social justice, the environment, 'right to livelihood' or ethnic 
identity, they all make claims for more equitable and just access to environments and natural 
resources. And all center on the question of property rights. This is logical, because whoever 
controls property rights controls the processes of resource extraction and environmental change. 
The struggle is not just over control over water, but also and importantly over the right to define 
what a water right entails. 
On the one hand, there is a general demand for greater justice and equality regarding the 
unequal distribution of decision-making power, water, and other water-related benefits. On the 
other, there are the demands for internal distribution to be based on autonomous decisions, locally 
established rights and principles, and local organizational forms for water control which reflect the 
diverse strategies and identities found in indigenous communities today. Therefore, in indigenous 
and peasant communities today, water users claim both the right to equality and the right to be 
different. 
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2 Politicas Aguadas y Canalización del Poder. 
Descentralización, gobiernos locales y el reconocimlento de los 
derechos campesinos e indigenas11 
2.1 Introduction 
En los paises andinos, los debates sobre las politicas de gestion de los recursos naturales y la 
bûsqueda de una legislation apropiada llenan los foros y mesas de discusión. El tema es urgente, 
ya que solo en muy pocos casos, y generalmente en émbitos aislados, se lograron définir e 
instalar politicas cohérentes que conducen a un régimen democrâtico, equitativo, que ademâs 
resguarda la sostenibilidad del sistema ecológico a mes largo plazo. Por la ausencia generalizada 
de reglas pûblicas efectivas para el interés comün, el uso de los recursos naturales se caracteriza 
por conflictos desmedidos. 
El caso de los recursos hidricos es ejemplar, y se ha vuelto tema central en muchos de los 
debates luchas y propuestas politicas de las organizaciones campesinas e indîgenas y de las 
plataformas de la sociedad civil. Tal como en muchas otras regiones del mundo, se observa una 
creciente competencia sobre el uso del agua entre diferentes usuarios y tipos de 
aprovechamiento La demanda local y exógena de agua se expandió de forma répida. La 
creciente presión demogrâfica y el proceso de migración, transnacionalización y urbanización de 
las àreas rurales entre otros, estân llevando a cambios profundus en la estructura agraria, en las 
culturas locales y en las formas de manejar los recursos. Nuevos grupos de interés, sobre todo los 
grandes centros urbanos y las empresas agricolas, industriales, mineras y energéticas, entran los 
territorios de pueblos indigenas y comunidades campesinas. Reclaman una porción sustantiva de 
los derechos de agua existentes y frecuentemente ignoran los acuerdos y reglas locales. A esto se 
agrega que hay una disminución de la disponibilidad de agua. Por estas razones, el contexte de 
los derechos de agua y las reglas de su gestion esté cambiando répidamente en los paises 
andinos. , . . . . , • • , 
Ademâs en los nuevos procesos de reforma h/dnca es comun ver a los actores poderosos 
arreglérselas para influir en las nuevas regulaciones y politicas para monopolizar el acceso y el 
control del agua Las élites y empresas nacionales e internacionales usan tante la intervention 
estatal como las nuevas politicas de privatización para anular y apropiarse de los derechos de 
agua indîgenas y campesinos. Encima de la históricamente desarrollada y extremadamente 
desigual distribución del agua, el marco de los derechos y beneficios recientemente generado por 
las politicas pûblicas (estatistas) présenta una situación espantosa. Esta constituye la pista de 
despegue para las nuevas politicas neoliberales, comûnmente muy agresivas frente a las 
comunidades usuarias del agua. Ecuador es un caso ilustrativo. De acuerdo con el estudio de 
Whitaker (1994) en la época de las grandes inversiones pûblicas en el desarrollo del agua los 
productores campesinos e indigenas con menos de 1 ha, responsables de la mayor parte de la 
producción nacional de alimentes, representan 60% de todos los agricultures pero solo recibieron 
13% de los beneficios del Estado en términos de inversiones en el riego. Al mismo tiempo, los 
grandes terratenientes representan solo 6% de los agricultores y recibieron 41% de los beneficios 
de los qastos estatales en riego. El publico financió todo este: las inversiones estatales del 
Ecuador para rieqo en ese momento representaban 11,6% del total de la deuda externa (Whitaker 
1994) De manera similar la distribución de los derechos de agua es sumamente inequitativa y 
bénéficia a una minoria pëquena de terratenientes. Hoy en dia, 88 % de los minifundistas tienen 
acceso a solo entre 6 y 20 % de las recursos hidricos disponibles, mientras que los hacendados 
tienen derecho al entre 50 y 60 % del agua (Galarraga-Sanchez 2000). 
11
 Capitulo borrador (version julio 2005) del libro "Movimientos Indigenas y Gobiernos Locales" Eds. Willem Assies 
^ÏSuïrdïSmbioïd imESVpor 'S degeneration de la capacidad de retention y almacenamiento de agua, 
hecho aue contribue también al aumento de los caudales extremes en épocas de lluvia. La competencia, 
«femfe? no se»limiteNi tema de la disponibilidad del agua (cantidad, lugar y temporalidad), sino se extiende 
también a su calidad. 
21 
Rutgerd Boelens 
Por la proclamada crisis, "agua" figura prominentemente en las agendas politicas nacionales e 
internacionales. En el discurso internacional se suele hablar sobre el peligro de las 'guerras 
intemacionales por el agua', y el movimiento civil supra-nacional generalmente tiende a enfocar 
sobre todo los conflictos abiertos, como entre pueblos indfgenas y grandes empresas 
hidroeléctricas, o las luchas de la sociedad civil organizada frente a los consorcios mineras o 
forestales. Es llamativo también la atención internacional que han recibido las llamadas 'guerras 
del agua' en Cochabamba - todo esto, sin embargo, frente al silencio ensordecedor sobre los 
miles de guerras sucias y silenciosas que dia a dia se producen en localidades cotidianas de la 
region andina. Son las comunidades indigenas y campesinas, asi como otros grupos locales de 
gestion hïdrica, que buscan mantener y mejorar sus sistemas de riego, agua potable, pequefias 
hidroeléctricas, y otros usos multiples, pero que a mas de perder sus derechos de agua a actores 
nuevos, sufren las politicas orientadas a la intervención vertical o al fomento de la inversion 
privada en la explotación de sus aguas. De manera similar, las leyes que sustentan estas 
politicas, de manera general, niegan sus propios sistemas de gestion y marcos normativos del 
agua. 
Pero emergen algunas oportunidades para las culturas locales y sus sistemas de derechos 
propios. La mayor parte de los paîses andinos ha aceptado convenios internacionales que piden 
respetar la pluralidad étnica y la multiculturalidad (o interculturalidad). Ademâs, los nuevos 
discursos y politicas tienden a reconocer la necesidad de "descentralizar" el poder de gestion 
hacia organizaciones locales. Sin embargo, en el momento de materializar estos acuerdos 
générales en la practica, o en campos legislativos concrètes como las leyes y politicas de agua, 
las formas de gestion de agua indigena o campesina tienden a ser negadas, prohibidas o minadas 
(Bustamante 2002, Gentes 2002, Guevara et al. 2002, Pacari 1998, Palacios 2002). 
En las secciones siguientes haré un anâlisis breve de las propuestas y enfoques politicos sobre 
la gestion del agua en la region andina, con ilustraciones del caso ecuatoriano. Ya que el uso de 
agua para fines de producción agricola cubre alrededor de 80 % del uso total y consecuentemente 
domina el debate, inclusive los debates de gestion integrada de cuencas, daré mayor atención a la 
temética del sector riego. Cada uno de los enfoques 'estatistas', 'mercantiles', y de 'concertación', 
tiene su propio anâlisis, solución, y discurso, y asi como su vision sobre el papel y el rumbo que 
deben tener los procesos de 'descentralización'. En la siguiente sección presentare un bosquejo 
general del debate sobre la descentralización del gobierno hîdrico en la region, dibujando algunos 
rasgos distintivos de los enfoques y, lo que es mâs importante, los fundamentos y supuestos 
erróneos que estos comparten. En la tercera sección profundizaré el centralismo legal del enfoque 
estatista mostrando su fuerte inclinación positivista y universalista. En la cuarta sección haré los 
mismo para el modelo de gobierno hidrico neoliberal, que es el fundamento materializado del 
enfoque mercantil. En la quinta sección analizaré, sobre la base de algunas ilustraciones, cómo 
muchos de los enfoques de concertación suelen heredar las perspectivas positivistas en sus 
propuestas de descentralización, siempre cuando no se basan en un anâlisis contextualizado de 
las relaciones de poder y del pluralismo legal y cultural. En la ultima sección daré algunas 
reflexiones sobre estos enfoques y propuestas, analizando las respuestas de las comunidades 
campesinas e indigenas usuarias del agua. 
2.2 El debate de la descentralización de la gestion del agua13 
Estudios en paîses como Ecuador, Bolivia y Peru han mostrado que los proyectos estatales y 
las agencias responsables de la gestion del agua, en su mayorîa responden en primer lugar a 
preferencias politicas - no solo deben servir como soluciones hïdricas y sociales, sino también 
tienen como objetivo implicite el generar apoyo politico y oportunidades económicas para las élites 
y los gobernantes. Existe una desorden en la politica del agua, y la aplicación de las regulaciones 
oficiales muestra una gestion fragmentada y desarticulada, a menudo a través de la intervención 
descoordinada de una serie de organismos sectoriales que administran separadamente los 
distintos usos del agua. Fomentan acciones con intereses muy particulares que muchas veces 
son contradictorias con los intereses püblicos y derechos colectivos (Hendriks et al. 2003; 
Cremers et al. 2005; Dourojeanni 2000; Bustamante 2002). 
13
 Para una mayor profundización de esta sección y casos ilustrativos de diversos paîses andinos, véase Boelens, 
Dourojeanni y Hoogendam (2005). 
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La falta de funcionalidad y las consecuencias negativas de las polïticas pübücas actuates no es 
un fenómeno que se limita a los paises andinos. Por ello, a nivel internacional, creció el interés en 
buscar una mayor coordinación de la gestion hidrica, formulando leyes que den mayor libertad de 
decision a nivel local. En esta vision se considéra que es necesario llegar a una mayor 
descentralización y desconcentración de funciones y atribuciones, desde las autoridades 
nacionales hacia el âmbito de organizaciones de cuencas, subcuencas y microcuencas, en las 
que los multiples grupos de interés deben decidir sobre la adjudicación, distribución y manejo de 
agua. Este llamado a favor de la descentralización y desconcentración de la gestion de agua, se 
fundamenta en argumentas como (Boelens, Dourojeanni y Hoogendam 2005): 
• Los conflictos sobre el agua entre usos y usuarios multiples seguirân aumentando a causa 
de la creciente demanda y escasez del agua y el aumento de su contaminación. Estos 
conflictos multisectoriales se materializan en el âmbito de las cuencas. 
• Los limites de la jurisdicción de gestion de agua deben coincidir con los limites de la unidad 
geogrâfica en la que se acumulan y fluyen las aguas. 
• Las instituciones y gobiernos locales tienen diferente capacidad que las agendas 
nacionales para entender, analizar y resolver los problemas locales de la gestion del agua. 
• Cuando las decisiones se toman al nivel de la cuenca, es mâs fâcil mejorar las relaciones 
de responsabilidad entre los proveedores o reguladores y los usuarios del agua. 
• Se pueden reducir pérdidas económicas y gastos püblicos en la gestion de agua cuando se 
minimizan conflictos entre los grupos de usuarios mutuamente dependientes. 
• La gestion del agua debe hacerse con la participación de los gobiernos locales e 
instituciones de usuarios cuyos limites polftico-administrativos se superponen o forman 
parte de los limites de las cuencas a ser gestionadas. 
Las propuestas de cambio en las politicas de gestion de aguas, se recogieron en los debates 
de formulación de nuevas leyes de agua en la region andina. Bajo titulos como descentralización, , 
participación, privatización y transferencia de gestion, se estân proyectando procesos para^ 
transferir parte de las responsabilidades de la gestion de agua hacia autoridades estatales 
locales/municipales, grupos de usuarios, empresas privadas o instituciones mixtas. Los aspectos 
por transferirse varîan segûn las circunstancias y vision politica. Puede tratarse del manejo de 
toda una cuenca, la operación de un embalse, sistemas de distribución de agua o las unidades 
secundarias o terciarias de los grandes sistemas de riego, el mantenimiento de ciertas obras y su 
operación, hasta incluir la privatización de la infraestructura y el agua misma, como en el caso de 
Chile. 
En la region, existe consensu entre la mayoria de los actores involucrados - tanto grupos de 
mayor poder de inversion, como las organizaciones indigenas, comunidades campesinas y 
sectores marginados - sobre la necesidad de un cambio hacia la descentralización de la gestion 
del agua. Sin embargo, sus motivos, los intereses y las propuestas concretas difieren mucho. Por 
ello, la redefinición de las politicas de agua, es un tema dificil y sumamente contestado. Las 
discusiones se centran alrededor de temas como el roi del estado versus el sector privado, y la 
aptitud de las fuerzas del mercado para adjudicar el agua14. De manera general, las acciones 
gubernamentales para privatizar los servicios de agua y establecer mercados de agua no se 
complementen con instancias regulatorias adecuadas. Donde se implementaron instancias, 
muchas veces solo fueron de 'buenas intenciones', pero sin el respaldo suficiente de estrategias, 
medios y capacidades realistas (CEPAL 1992; Dourojeanni 2000. Cf. Wester & Warner 2002). 
Como resultado, en varias partes, se crearon entidades de gestion de agua virtuales o artificiales, 
que no se basan en un anâlisis detallado de los problemas y précticas locales ni en la 
participación efectiva del abanico de actores, sino que fueron liderados por los burócratas o élites 
locales. Estas entidades, ademâs, fécilmente pueden negar y sustituir las iniciativas locales de 
gestion del agua. 
En el debate y en los diferentes discursos, preguntas claves sobre la gestion integral del agua 
en un contexto de creciente escasez y competencia, tienen que ver con: <,Qué mecanismo de 
14 Las interrogantes principales de estos debates son: 'Se puede y se debe tratar el agua como una mercancia 
privatizada, o como una necesidad humana bâsica y no-transferible, como un derecho publico y colectivo?' y 'La 
adjudicación y el servicio de la provision del agua deben ser controlados por autoridades publicas nacionales, o 
se puede descentralizar y privatizar este control?' 
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regulation puede dar los destinos mâs adecuados al agua?, £Qué instantia de regulation debe 
encargarse de su asignación?, y iCómo pueden resolverse los conflictos sobre el reparto de agua 
asi obtenido? Las respuestas bâsicas tienen diferencias marcadas, y fundamentalmente se puede 
distinguir entre cuatro enfoques politicos, desde los que se formulan propuestas y contra-
propuestas legales y estrategias de intervention (Boelens, Dourojeanni & Hoogendam 2005): 
1. El enfoque 'estatista'; que propone el control estatal sobre la gestion del agua y la 
adjudication y adecuación de derechos de agua. 
2. El enfoque 'mercantil'; que busca la descentralización de la gestion y la adjudication de 
los derechos mediante la regulation mercantil y la 'racionalidad de actores individuates'. 
3. El enfoque de 'gestion consensual' o de 'concertación'; que prétende la 
descentralización de la gestion y la adjudication de los derechos mediante la regulation 
por mesas de concertation multi-usos y multi-usuarios. 
4. El enfoque de 'acción colectiva'; que propone el fortalecimiento de las organizaciones y 
redes locales (grupos de base y sectores marginados) para generar equilibrio entre el 
poder y las capacidades de los actores involucrados en la descentralización de la 
gestion del agua. 
En las ultimas décadas, los primeras dos enfoques han dominado los debates sobre el agua y 
todavia dominan la practica en la region. Aunque parecen contradictorios, en aspectos 
fundamentales son muy similares, sobre todo en cuanto al fuerte sentido de positivismo que les 
caracteriza (que se compagina bien con la tradition positivista del profesionalismo del hîdro-
desarrollo y las ciencias hïdricas). Les une también (en gran parte como consecuencia de su 
positivismo y universalismo) por su negation de la realidad existente de la gestion del agua en los 
paises andinos: la gestion de sistemas colectivos por los grupos, pueblos y comunidades 
campesinas e indîgenas, con sus propios derechos, marcos normativos, y formas organizativas. 
Un tercer elemento importante (también comûn en las ciencias positivistas del agua) es que 
niegan las relaciones de poder que dan la base para la formulation de las leyes y polîticas 
hidricas, que moldean su implementation, asî como influyen en la distribution del recurso mismo. 
A menudo, el tercer enfoque, de manera consciente o inconsciente, comparte este ultimo aspecto, 
razón por la cual grupos de usuarios marginados muchas veces se resisten en contra de la 
implementation de los tres y, en la practica de la gestion del agua, tratan de construir una forma 
contextualizada del cuarto enfoque. Analicemos. 
2.3 Centralismo legal, positivismo, y la gestion del agua - una 
ilustración ecuatoriana 
En los Andes, las normas y prâcticas propias de las comunidades campesinas e indîgenas 
conforman un papel clave en la gestion local del agua. En el caso del riego, las organizaciones de 
usuarios han desarrollado, a veces durante varios siglos, sus prâcticas de gestion de riego que 
incorporan elementos de las tradiciones hidricas andinas, coloniales, y republicanas y de las 
normas y tecnologias 'modernas'. Tanto los sistemas de riego antiguos como los sistemas nuevos, 
sean éstos 'comunales', 'estatales' o 'particulares', se caracterizan por prâcticas y normas propias 
y especificas, donde las normatividades se derivan de marcos légales locales y supra-locales 
(Beccar et al. 2002). Por tanto, pesé a la existencia de un marco normativo general y oficial a nivel 
del Estado-nación, el juego de reglas de cada uno de los sistemas de riego se diferencia del otro. 
Simultâneamente, la gestion local no funciona de una manera aislada del contexto nacional. El 
'derecho campesino', 'derecho indfgena' o 'derecho local' esta imbricado con normas, reglas y 
formas organizativas del derecho oficial. Usuarios apelan usualmente a reglas y prâcticas locales 
'mixtas'. 
Asi, la existencia de un pluralismo legal es comün y corriente en la region, hecho que, sin 
embargo, no siempre fue reconocido politicamente.15 Históricamente, la mayorîa de los paises 
15
 El pluralismo legal, en su sentido de reconocimiento y uso analitico, se refiere a la posibilidad teórica de existir 
mâs de un solo marco normativo en el mismo espacio sociopolitico y fisico-técnico. No establece una jerarquia moral 
o juridica entre los diversos repertorios existentes. En un segundo sentido, se refiere a la existencia empirica de una 
pluralidad normativa en una sociedad particular, con sus relaciones sociales concretas (con marcos normativos que 
ademâs suelen interactuar mutuamente): es el reconocimiento o la constatation analitica sobre una base empirica. 
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andinos se ha caracterizado por un centralisme» legal muy fuerte, en particular en el émbito de la 
legislación de los recursos hfdricos. La producción de leyes, procedimientos, y la definición y 
adjudicación de derechos sobre el recurso fueron, y muchas veces son todavia consideradas 
prerrogativas exclusivas del Estado. También el control sobre la ejecución de estas leyes y la 
aplicación de las sanciones respectivas siempre han sido considerados como el monopolio de las 
instituciones y agentes estatales.16 
Una caracterïstica importante de estas legislaciones es la negación de la existencia de esta gran 
variedad de formas de gestion y repertorios sociolegales para regular los derechos y el uso del aqua 
(ver Beccar et al. 2002; Gentes 2002; Perla 2004; Urteaga et al. 2003). De manera general las 
prâcticas sociales de la gestion del agua no son consideradas en la formulación de las leyes 
nacionales y toda la sociedad es dibujada como una realidad homogénea, en la cual no caben dere-
chos distintos (Vidal 1990). Ademâs, muchos de sus conceptos y procedimientos resultan de copiar 
ordenamientos juridicos extraderas, basândose en el mito de la ingenierîa social y legal Este 
supone que con la sola formulación y sanción de normas légales oficiales se puede moldear y 
homogenizar la multifacética realidad de la gestion del agua en los Andes transforméndola en una 
gestion 'moderna', 'eficiente' y 'racional'. Volvamos al caso del Ecuador: 
A pesar de contener algunos avances importantes en comparación con leyes anteriores17 la 
Ley de Aguas de 1972 y sus respectivos reglamentos dan poca responsabilidad y autoridad a los 
usuarios: solo permiten realizar las tareas y funciones verticalmente establecidas, de forma 
autoritaria. De ninguna manera correspondan con procesos de gestion local, ni otorgan la 
autoridad para establecer reglas y organizaciones que responden a los problemas, soluciones y 
capacidades particulares de cada contexto. 
Por ejemplo, la administración de los sistemas de riego estatales18 en las ültimas décadas ha 
sido normada por un reglamento rigido y ünico: una sola version que norma la gestion de los 
sistemas en todo un paîs que se caracteriza por tener zonas sumamente diversas, como la Costa la 
Sierra y la Region Amazónica, con poblaciones y sistemas de riego muy distintos. El reglamento 
debe régir tanto para el riego costeno con sus sistemas estatales de gran escala y las empresas 
agroexportadores, como para los pequenos sistemas andinos manejados por minifundistas 
campesinas e indîgenas, que producen mayoritariamente para el autoconsumo. 
Un problema ilustrativo tiene que ver con la estipulación detallada y uniforme de la asignación de 
derechos y la distribución del agua entre los usuarios, que no coinciden con la practica campesina 
Por ejemplo, la Ley introduce la obligatoriedad del riego, o sea, la utilización de las aguas de riego 
conducidas por canales construidos por el Estado es obligatoria. Este norma se combina con 
dispositivos teenicistas en la legislación que establecen que: "la distribución de las aguas, el sistema 
de riego, intervalos, laminas y tiempo de riego, se harâ sobre bases téenicas" (Art. 40, Cap IV 
Regl. Ley de Aguas) y que las asignaciones de agua son establecidas de acuerdo con la superficie 
del predio. De esta manera queda explicito, que todo terreno debajo del canal debe ser regado, y si 
un propietario dispone de terrenos mâs grandes, segun la Ley la intervención estatal debe 
favorecerle mediante una inversion mes grande en sus propiedades. Y después, también en 
sistemas con escasez de agua - de manera obligatoria - debe obtener mâs agua. Esta forma de 
diferenciación social legalmente institucionalizada no déjà espacio para concepeiones locales mâs 
En un tercer sentido se refiere a un reconocimiento politico-administrativo y jurfdico, generalmente por parte del 
Estado, de que existen multiples órdenes legales en la misma sociedad concreta (Boelens & Hoogendam 2002-
Benda-Beckmann et al. 1998). 
Cabe mencionar que la legislación hidrica en los diferentes paises andinos se caracteriza por rasgos y 
contextes institucionales distintos. Por ejemplo, históricamente, Peru y Ecuador han conocido una intervención 
estatal (legal, administrativa y mediante proyeetos) mucho mâs fuerte que Bolivia. 
Avances que se refieren sobre todo a la asignación de derechos segün prioridades sociales y la restriction de 
'a acumulación de derechos en las manos de pocos, los monopolios por grupos hegemónicos, y la especulación 
dentro de un régimen privatizador. 
Si hablamos de los sistemas estatales es necesario entender que muchas veces la mayorfa de los beneficiarios 
son comuneros de las comunidades campesinas e indigenas. La diferencia principal con los sistemas campesinos 
particulares es que éstos Ultimos generalmente son construidos y administrados por los mismos usuarios, mientras 
que los sistemas estatales se operan bajo una administración burocrâtica o de 'co-gestión'. 
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equitativas y las muchas soluciones locales que distribuyen la escasez de agua entre todos los 
usuarios (Boelens & Doornbos 2001).19 
Directamente vinculado con los derechos, esté la reglamentacion de las obligaciones de los 
usuarios. El marco regulatorio original déclara una sola tarifa para el agua en todos los sistemas 
de riego. No distingue entre proyectos de gran o pequefîa inversion, ni entre los distintos sistemas 
y regiones en cuanto al incremento de la productividad que pueda darse para el retorno de las 
inversiones y autofinanciar la operación y mantenimiento; tampoco distingue entre sistemas 
orientados principalmente al autoconsumo y sistemas para la producción exportadora. Forzado 
por la minima recuperación (solo 4 %) de los costos de inversion estatal, nuevos décrètes légales 
han otorgado mâs autonomîa a las agendas regionales para determinar la tarifa bâsica de riego 
(recuperación de la inversion) y la tarifa volumétrica (gastos de operación y mantenimiento). Pero 
muchas veces no se ha implementado este cambio (véase Hendriks et al. 2003). 
Otro ejemplo es la rigidez e inaplicabilidad de la reglamentacion oficial que, detallada y 
uniformemente, establece la estructura organizativa para la gestion de riego. La Ley de Aguas de 
1972 impone, en el caso de mâs de cinco usuarios, la formación de un Directorio de Aguas. 
Ademâs, el reglamento dicta la formación de Juntas de Regantes en cada unidad terciaria -
'módulos' artificiales y nuevos, cuyos linderos, segün el Reglamento, se basan en dates solo fisico-
técnicos. Esta estructura organizativa niega completamente las formas organizativas existentes, 
incluso puede romperlas fâcilmente debido a la superposición. El espïritu del texte legal prétende 
encajar el Directorio de Aguas dentro de una dependencia administrativa del Estado que debe hacer 
cumplir las disposiciones dictadas por el Estado, casi sin autoridad propia. Esta tendencia de tutela 
que (formalmente) déjà poco espacio a la gestion autónoma de los usuarios, es caracteristica para 
toda la normativa legal. El reglamento es uno de los instrumentes principales para manejar el 
sistema de riego y entonces debe estar adecuado a las circunstancias especificas de los regantes 
y de la zona. En cambio, el reglamento nacional impone una estructura rigida a la cual los regan-
tes tienen que adaptarse, instalando nuevas formas artificiales de liderazgo y estructuras organi-
zativas inadecuadas. Por tante, no existen sistemas en donde funciona el reglamento en la 
manera como se habia previsto. Y es cierto, en el caso de que si funcionara, significarîa una 
amenaza fuerte para la actual estructura y organización comunal de sobrevivencia de las 
comunidades andinas. 
Ejemplos como el caso de la Ley de Aguas de Ecuador son muy comunes en los Andes. La 
concepción ideológica es que la Ley es omniprésente y no puede tomar en cuenta las 
particularidades de las diversas normas existentes. Los principios fundamentales del derecho 
oficial son la generalidad de la aplicación de las leyes nacionales en todo el territorio nacional, y la 
igualdad ante la ley de todos los sujetos sociales, sin establecer excepciones que reconozcan a 
otros repertorios sociolegales para la regulación de los recursos hidricos. 
En este discurso, la función ideológica del derecho apunta claramente a la formación de una 
identidad nacional dentro de una 'comunidad imaginada' (Anderson 1983), concretada en una 
nación uniforme en que todos tuvieran intereses armónicos y posiciones iguales con respecte a la 
gestion de los recursos hidricos. En la practica, sin embargo, la "comunidad imaginada" en los 
Andes se basa en los intereses de los grupos hegemónicos. Las normas locales sobre la gestion 
del agua no caben dentro de este imperio uniformizadora orientado a las percepciones de la 
'hidrocracia' (Rap, Wester y Pérez-Prado 2004) sobre lo que es una gestion 'moderna'. Segün los 
hidrócratos - aquellas personas que dominan las estructuras y discursos oficiales de gestion y 
politicas de agua a nivel nacional (e intemacional) - esta gestion moderna se caracteriza por un 
manejo hidrico 'high-tech' acorde al modelo occidental, basado en un proceso de producción 
enteramente mercantilizado. Aun hasta después de las ultimas reformas en el sector hidrico, esta 
'tradición burocrâtica' tecnicista, legalista, masculina y etnocentrista ha persistido como un factor 
déterminante en la formulación de politicas de riego y de gestion del agua.20 En este sentido, la 
19
 Existen muchos repertorios normativos en el riego campesino en los que, en situaciones de escasez, se opta 
por distribua el agua en base de unidades familiäres en vez de unidades parcelarias, se privilégia cultivos de 
subsistencia, o se decide limitar la superficie a regar por cada familia, o alternativamente los derechos de agua se 
basan en la mano de obra que los usuarios han invertido en la construction del sistema. El reglamento oficial 
bloquea estas perspectivas sobre una distribución mâs equitativa. 
20
 Ver Gelles 2003, Gelles & Boelens 2003, Lynch 1993, Vera 2005, Vos 2003, Zwarteveen & Boelens 2005. Cf. 
Roth et al. 2005, Wester & Warner 2002, Zwarteveen 1997. 
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'nueva' tradición neoliberal y privatizadora en la gestion del agua (ver abajo) ha heredado gran 
parte de estos rasgos fundamentales. 
Sin embargo, no siempre los paises andinos han seguido este modelo monojuridico y 
monocultural. En los primeras dos siglos después de la conquista, la situation legal y la practica 
con relación a la gestion del agua y los derechos indigenas fueron fuertemente cambiantes y 
complicadas, entre la segregación y la inclusion.21 Con la independencia de los paises andinos, en 
el siglo XIX, se legtimizó el modelo asimilacionista, basado en el derecho monista del Estado-nación 
y una ideologîa liberal. A nivel de la nación se formuló una 'ideologia de la igualdad' en términos de 
un gran proyecto politico de mestizaje: equiparar e igualar a todos los habitantes de la nación al 
modelo de los grupos hegemónicos bianco-mestizos, en cuanto a los códigos culturales, normas, y 
aspectos fisicos inclusive (Albo 2002, Assies et al. 1998, Baud 2005, Degregori 2000, Stavenhagen 
& Iturralde 1990). Luego, sobre todo por influencia de las corrientes indigenistas22, este modelo 
asimilacionista se combine- con un modelo integracionista (Yrigoyen 1998), que pretendió otorgarles 
a las comunidades indigenas mayores derechos e integrarles en un sistema mercantil, para hacerles 
participe de los beneficios de la sociedad 'moderna'. Si bien se revalorizaron ciertas 'normas 
culturales indigenas', incluso en la legislación, estas no debieron afectar a la ideologia y la 
soberania de la administración politica del Estado-nación. El enfoque de normalizar e igualar a los 
'inferiores' al modelo de los grupos hegemónicos blanco-mestizos se combiné con un enfoque 
paternalist^ orientado a 'apoyar a los atrasados', reconociendo ciertas normas tradicionales, 
costumbres folelóricas, asi como los derechos individuates. 
En la ultima década, sin embargo, se ha dado un cambio importante en la legislación de la 
mayoria de los paises andinos. En Colombia, Peru, Bolivia, y Ecuador las constituciones ahora 
reconocen formalmente la diversidad cultural y el pluralismo legal. Las constituciones otorgan 
validez jurîdica, en diferentes grados y amplitud, a la jurisdicción propia de los pueblos indigenas, a 
las normas y autoridades propias en las comunidades campesinas y nativas. La inclusion de los 
contenidos del Convenio 169 de la Organización Internacional de Trabajo (OIT) en la legislación 
nacional, asï como otros dispositivos de los convenios internacionales sobre derechos indigenas, 
otorga mayor fuerza a este derecho de reclamar reconocimiento de normas propias (ver Guevara et 
al. 2002, Palacios 2002). Pero es muy temprano para analizar la dirección real y la profundidad de 
los Ultimos procesos de cambios legislatives. Muchas veces estos cambios no se han materializados 
en forma practica y concreta, y hace falta un proceso de apropiación (Assies et al. 1998; Yrigoyen 
1998). Las comunidades de regantes a menudo no han sabido o podido aprovechar las 
oportunidades de autogobierno que ofrece la nueva constitución de un estado pluricultural y 
multiétnico (corn. pers. Nina Pacari, oct. 2004). 
En cuanto a nuestro interés temético, de igual manera, los cambios relacionados al 
reconocimiento de la diversidad no se reflejan en la siempre 'poderosa' Ley de Aguas o Ley Agraria. 
A pesar de la gran importancia que tienen las multiples formas de gestion del agua para las 
sociedades locales, estas siguen siendo negadas. En Bolivia se esta discutiendo la version numero 
33 de la propuesta sobre una nueva Ley de Aguas (con ciertos avances en campos especïficos 
como el de riego), en el Peru tampoco se avanza en promulgar una Ley de Aguas que respete los 
derechos campesinos e indigenas y la diversidad del pais, y en Chile los sectores hegemónicos con 
derechos monopólicos al agua (todavia) logran impedir un cambio legal que busca mayor justicia 
social, equilibrio ambiental y democracia politica. En Ecuador la CONAIE23 lideró un proceso para 
formular una propuesta de una nueva Ley de Aguas (CONAIE 1996), que reconoce la diversidad de 
poblaciones, regiones e instituciones de gestion hïdrica en el pais. El Foro de los Recursos Hidricos, 
plataforma amplia de instituciones de la sociedad civil, de igual manera, présenté sus propuestas al 
respecta (FRH 2004). Sin embargo, sigue cierto lo que Nina Pacari, lider indigena y ex-Ministra de 
Asuntos Exteriores en el Ecuador, comentó sobre la resistencia de los sectores de poder en contra 
de reformas légales que reconozean la diversidad: 
21
 Para un anâlisis de la historia de la legislación especial y plural sobre agua y comunidades indigenas y 
campesinas en los Andes, véase Boelens et al. (2005). 
22
 El indigenismo fue encabezada sobre todo por intelectuales mestizos, y surgió en las primeras décadas del 
siglo pasado, como respuesta a la subordination de los indigenas y a la sentida ausencia de una identidad 
nacional propia, para lo cual la cultura indigena fue 'revalorizada'. La actitud hacia las poblaciones indigenas 
contemporâneas se caracterizó por una gran ambivalencia y varias corrientes: de romanticismo, patemalismo y 
enfoques revolucionarios. 
23
 Confederation de Nacionaiidades Indigenas del Ecuador. 
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"AI momento, sobre la Ley de Aguas, hemos preferido detener el debate porque una correlación 
de fuerzas no favorable en el Congreso puede trastocar la defensa de los pueblos indigenas para 
una mejor distribución del agua. Prima mâs bien la logica del mercado, la logica de privatización y 
en este contexte mes bien [estes grupos de poder] lograrian con un instrumente legal viabilizar o 
materializar a la brevedad posible sus objetivos rentistas y de mercado, y este de ninguna manera 
contribuye a la sociedad ecuatoriana. Desde este punto de vista, creemos que es preferible 
mantener nuestra propuesta en stand-by y seguir por el momento con la Ley que hoy tenemos". 
(com. pers. Nina Pacari, agosto 2002). 
Este ultimo hecho parece ser clave: hasta que punto los cambios légales de 
'reconocimiento' y su implementación en la sociedad pueden contar con el apoyo politico y social 
necesario? Cuâles son los poderes reales detrés de las disposiciones legales? De que manera las 
nuevas disposiciones logran reproducirse mes allé de la constitución, tanto en la legislación 'fuerte' 
(como la Ley de Aguas), como en los procedimientos y la administración publica, y en la practica 
cotidiana de la gestion del agua? Y hasta que punto los nuevos cambios legales realmente 
responden al reclamo de mayor autonomia local y autogobierno en la gestion del agua? 
2.4 Neoliberalismo, positivismo, y la descentralización de la 
gestion del agua 
Cómo analizar la paradoja de que justamente la década en que emergió un mayor 
reconocimiento oficial de los derechos indigenas y consuetudinarios en los paîses andinos, en que 
ademés fue descentralizado el aparato estatal para la gestion del agua, es la misma década en 
que se instrumentaliza el modelo neoliberal y privatizadora. Muchos lo han explicado diciendo que 
esta contradicción surge por la resistencia de los pueblos indîgenas y sectores campesinos y 
populäres en contra del modelo hegemónico y uniformizador, sea estatista o mercantilista. Cuanto 
mâs fuerte la imposición del modelo neoliberal, cuanto mayor resistencia y reclamos de los 
sectores campesinos e indigenas, y mes cambios que estes sectores y sus aliados logren en la 
arena juridico y las politicas nacionales. Otros, sin embargo, han senalado el gran apoyo que 
prestan las instituciones multilaterales y los organismos de préstamos financieros a la causa de la 
'multiculturalidad' y el 'reconocimiento de la diversidad'. De hecho existe una convergencia de 
objetivos e intereses entre el modelo neoliberal y ciertas corrientes multiculturales (ver, por 
ejemplo, Haie 2002). Tîpicamente, la ideologia liberal defiende el reconocimiento de la libertad de 
individuos de transitar entre la diversidad de culturas e identidades autodefinidas. Pero en la 
racionalidad del proyecto neoliberal moderno son también los colectivos indigenas y campesinos y 
las instituciones de la sociedad civil los que pueden facilitar la transición hacia una sociedad 
'decentralizada' y mercantilizada, siempre y cuando respetan las reglas del juego. 
Paradójicamente, en la era neoliberal con su reducción del aparato estatal era comün que la 
'decentralización' de la administración del agua fue aprovechado por gobiernos centrales para 
reducir sus responsabilidades y en ciertos campos fortalecer su legitimidad y control a nivel local 
(véase Boelens & Zwarteveen 2005, Pereault 2004). Por ejemplo, como ilustran Conaghan et al. 
(1990), el gobiemo boliviano mencionó explicitamente que el objetivo central de la 
descentralización es el re-establecer la autoridad del Estado sobre la sociedad. La legislación con 
respecte a la gestion de cuencas hidrogrâficas en el Peru es otro ejemplo ilustrativo de cómo el 
Estado usa el nuevo discurso 'participativo y descentralizador' para fortalecer su control (véase 
Boelens, Dourojeanni & Hoogendam 2005). El 'reconocimiento' contiene claros contenidos 
ideológicos y politicos, que se fundamentan en la posición de aquellos grupos que tienen el poder 
decisivo (Cf. Assies 2003, Baud 2005, Gelles 1998, Van der Ploeg 1998). 
En el tema de los servicios de agua para riego, el debate de la privatización y el reconocimiento 
de normas locales adquiere especial importancia, ya que a diferencia de la privatización de 
muchos otros servicios püblicos - que se transfieren a manos de empresas comerciales y privados 
-, aqui se trata sobre todo de una transferencia de poder de gestion desde la burocracia central 
hacia colectivos locales.24 Aparentemente los argumentes y reclamos tradicionales de los sectores 
24
 El debate de la privatización de los servicios de agua potable urbanos, por lo tanto, es distinto, ya que alli, 
mayormente, si se trata de transferir autoridad y poder a compafiias comerciales multinacionales. También es 
necesario distinguir entre el debate de la privatización neoliberal de los derechos de uso del agua (la propiedad de 
los derechos sobre el recurso) y la privatización de los servicios de gestion del agua. 
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campesinos, indîgenas y progresistas coinciden con aquellos de los polîticos neoliberales. Pero la 
coincidencia es superficial, ya que las razones de fondo del ultimo grupo son distintas, orientadas 
sobre todo a la reducción del presupuesto estatal en servicios de riego y a la instalación de un 
mercado de servicios y derechos de agua. Asi, al igual que 'reconocimiento' en el modelo 
burocrâtico, también en el modelo neoliberal no todas las formas organizativas y normas de 
gestion estén reconocidos politicamente: solo aquellos que corresponden a los intereses de los 
gestures del 'reconocimiento'. 
Definitivamente, las politicas oficiales de reconocimiento no responden solo a reclamos de los 
sectores marginados por mayor autoridad y autonomîa. Aunque esto si puede ser el argumente 
retórico para el cambio legal, el interés de la burocracia hïdrica (la poderosa 'hidrocracia') o los 
hacedores de politicos neoliberales es distinto. El congelamiento y la subordinación de repertorios 
sociolegales legales a través de estrategias de 'reconocimiento oficial' contribuyen al control que 
pueden ejercer sobre un conjunto de normas locales dinâmicas y derechos diversas 'intangibles'. 
Ademâs, ilegaliza a los sistemas normativos locales 'no reconocidos' y no convenientes al 
proyecto de control uniformizado por el Estado y por el mercado. El congelamiento de ciertas 
normatividades locales combinado con la ilegalización de otras, facilita y refuerza el control politico 
y el poder vertical de los hidrócratos, y ayuda a los sectores neoliberales a incorporar los grupos y 
organizaciones locales en el sistema mercantil (Boelens y Zwarteveen 2005). 25 Analicemos 
enfonces mâs de cerca los fundamentos del proyecto neoliberal para la gestion del agua, y cómo y 
qué tipo de comunidades de usuarios de agua quiere 'reconocer'. 
Los regimenes de propiedad privada prevalecieron en los Andes mucho antes de que se 
pasaron las leyes de agua estatistas (que en muchos paîses nacionalizaron los derechos de 
propiedad de agua, en los afios setenta). Muchos estudios han documentado cómo la 
privatización historica conllevó una masiva transferencia de los derechos de agua desde los 
sistemas comunales indigenas hacia duenos privados poderosos, especialmente las haciendas. 
Para muchas organizaciones campesinas e indîgenas en los Andes, las reformas de agua 
actuates son una mâs en una serie de intentes seculares de expropiar los recursos que forman la 
base de su sustente y su identidad. Las nuevas herramientas y teorias instrumentales cientîficas 
han dado un împetu al antiguo modelo de politica, y defienden la importancia de ponerlo en 
practica. La fe en la superioridad y la aplicabilidad universal de las tecnologias y de los modelos 
institucionales cientificamente desarrollados se asemeja a la antigua proclamation de la 
superioridad de la civilización occidental. 
Los tres ingredientes bâsicos de las recetas para las reformas hidricas neoliberales son: toma 
de decisiones descentralizada, derechos de propiedad privada y mercados. La atención hacia los 
derechos de propiedad (privada) se justifica principalmente porque los mercados dependen de 
ellos. En pocas palabras, el razonamiento es asi: el agua necesita ser transferible y mercadeable 
de modo que pueda ser usada de una forma económicamente eficiente, produciendo los retornos 
marginales mâs elevados posibles. Para que los esfuerzos privatizadores tengan éxito, se 
necesita establecer derechos de agua claramente definidos y exigibles. Los derechos de agua son 
asi una condición critica para que los mercados de agua emerjan. Los derechos de agua 
permitirian que el agua sea puesta precio por unidad consumida, induciendo a los usuarios a 
reducir el desperdicio del recurso. Ademâs, los derechos de agua proveen de una buena base 
para distribuir las responsabilidades de mantenimiento de los sistemas entre los beneficiarios. 
También proveen de manera importante de seguridad de tenencia a los usuarios, lo que en el 
pensamiento neoliberal es muy valorado puesto que parece establecer incentivos para la inversion 
en infraestructura. 
A la par de sus efectos profundamente probleméticos en la practica de las colectividades de 
usuarios andinos, el pensamiento neoliberal sobre el agua tiene algunas fallas conceptuales 
importantes. Por ejemplo, de manera errónea liga auteinâticamente los derechos de agua con los 
mercados de agua, como si ambos fueran inseparables. Esto no es verdad. La mayorfa de 
beneficios atribuidos a los mercados de agua se lograrian a través de la provision de la seguridad 
de la tenencia por si sola, sin importar si los derechos de agua son mercantilizados o transferidos. 
Otro error mayor, entre otros, es la suposiciôn de que la seguridad en la tenencia solo puede ser 
25
 El siguiente anâlisis del modelo neoliberal de las reformas hidricas esta basada en un articulo que hice con 
Margreet Zwarteveen (Boelens & Zwarteveen 2005). Para ilustraciones de las grandes contradicciones y errores 
de este modelo aplicado en el campo andino, refiero a este documento. 
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alcanzada por medio de los derechos de agua privados. Esto es obviamente falso desde la 
perspectiva de los usuarios de agua campesinas e indigenas andinos, cuya seguridad de agua fue 
tipicamente menor durante las épocas de privatization. 
El pensamiento neoliberal conecta lo global con lo local (véase tambien Assies 2003; 
Swyngedouw 2003) al mismo tiempo que desconoce y destruye lo local. Predica que el manejo del 
agua se basa en verdades globales, no basadas en localidades particulares y conocimientos 
contextualizados. El modelo, de hecho, activamente promueve la deslocalización y la 
externalización de los derechos de agua: los derechos de agua deben ser desligados del la tierra, 
de la comunidad o del territorio, de modo que se permita la competencia y se mejore el libre 
comercio del agua hacia sus usos mâs productivos. Sin embargo, los usos y formas de 
distribution del agua existentes en las comunidades campesinas e indigenas de los Andes son 
tipicamente locales, embebidos y especificos segûn el contexto. Son instituciones dinâmicas que 
han evolucionado y siguen evolucionando a través de largos procesos históricos de inversiones 
colectivas en infraestructura y una lucha comûn contra los intrusos. Existen a través de la 
contextualidad y la historicidad, y los procesos de externalización y deslocalización amenazan su 
exigencia y supervivencia. 
Mientras el discurso neoliberal ve los derechos de agua primariamente desde una posición 
positivista e instrumental, como una expresión de la ley estatal y la logica mercantil, los derechos 
de agua en las comunidades andinas tipicamente existen y funcionan en condiciones de 
pluralismo legal. Los derechos individuates (o a nivel de unidad familiar) para usar el agua y su 
infraestructura, y para participar en la toma de decisiones relacionada con el agua, existen porque 
hay derechos colectivos de toda la comunidad, con los cuales estân ligados. Los derechos 
individuates (o familiäres) son por tanto radicalmente diferentes a los derechos privatizados desde 
el punto de vista de las polîticas neoliberales. Ademâs, las definiciones de derechos, usos 
apropiados y la legitimidad de los usuarios y sus autoridades estân cercanamente embebidas en 
panoramas históricos especificos de estructuras politicas y económicas asi como en sistemas 
culturales de significados y valores (Gelles y Boelens 2003; MacCay y Jentoft 1998; Pacari 1998; 
Roth et al. 2005). 
Estas instituciones locales de gestion del agua que han existido desde hace décadas y siglos 
en los Andes, tienen particularidades y una logica de su funcionamiento que son dificiles de 
explicar a través del lenguaje moderno de la racionalidad instrumental de mercado. No obstante, 
las polîticas y las leyes neoliberales cada vez mes dictan no solo los términos discursivos, sino 
también los términos materiaîes de su existencia. A través de poderosas leyes y reglas, el modelo 
neoliberal del mundo hidrico se vuelve realidad a la fuerza. Efectivamente, y en las palabras de 
Bourdieu (1998: 86), "lo que se présenta como un sistema económico gobernado por las leyes de 
hierro de una suerte de naturaleza social, es en realidad un sistema politico que puede 
constituirse solamente con la complicidad activa o pasiva de los poderes polîticos oficiales". 
Cuando el comportamiento relacionado con el riego y el manejo del agua no puede ser 
entendido ni expresado en términos hidricos 'modernos', es probable que esto sea usado como 
una prueba de su atraso e irracionalidad. Las colectividades de riego que despliegan tal 
comportamiento son "anomalïas" que merecen languidecer y ser presas de las fuerzas del 
mercado: no hay lugar legitimo para ellas en las sociedades modemas. En contraste, aquellas 
comunidades de riego que estân conformes con las nuevas polîticas y reglas son premiadas con 
la estampilla de aprobación del "buen gobierno": son recompensadas con apoyo y ayuda para que 
se vuelvan instituciones modernas que se comportan de acuerdo con la nueva logica institucional 
y mercantil. 
Una creencia importante que energiza las nuevas politicas hidricas es que el comportamiento 
de los usuarios y administradores del agua se déjà llevar por incentivos que estân mayormente 
determinados por las instituciones formates y el mercado. El producto de los procesos 
organizacionales y polîticos en el manejo del agua se ve como la suma de las decisiones 
racionales hechas por individuos con base en intereses que pueden ser definidos objetivamente y 
pueden ser conocidos desde afuera. En otras palabras, se piensa que, dadas las estructuras de 
incentivo apropiadas, los seres humanos desplegarân el mismo comportamiento con respecto al 
agua en cualquier parte del globo. Supone que todos los seres humanos son iguales y comparten 
una racionalidad comûn. 
El pensamiento neoliberal sobre el agua, con su negación de las conexiones entre poder y 
conocimiento y su moralismo de los derechos individuates, acopladas a la casi religiosa referenda 
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a la racionalidad cientifica, generan una herram.enta pol.t.ca j ^ x i ^ ^ t o ^ ß ^ o n ^ 
reformas e intervencior.es de largo alcance26. Estas intervenc.ones, a su vez al mentan aun mâs 
la fe en el modelo neoliberal ya que se establecen las condiciones para que este funcionecomo 
se ha pronosticado27 No es coincidencia que la politica neoliberal, que prétende Itbertad mdmduat 
para todos, fue materializado mediante la reforma de agua de mes largo alcance prec.sarnente por 
uno de los regimenes dictatoriales mâs represivos de un ^ » J ^ ^ « 1 * ' * " " * * ; * j ° * 
régimen dictatorial en Chile fue capaz de crearlas cond,c,ones necesar as pareque e lmxle lo se 
concretara, por medio del silenciamiento y el control coercit.vo f ' f s voces de protesta y de os 
actos de resistencia en las comunidades campesmas e .ndigenas. El régimen p.nochet.sta creó las 
oportunidades de experimentación y las condiciones para que el modelo cumphera con sus 
PTientréaTtantSod mtchos organismos internacionales siguen considerando la ley y la politica de 
destn tS izac ión 'hTdïa a
 l a chilena como uno de los modelos mâs exitosos y efectivos. En las 
décadas de 1980 v 1990 Peru, Bolivia y Ecuador, asî como otros pa.ses en Lat.noaménca, fueron 
forzados po efBanco Mundial, el FMI y el BID a adopter l e g i s l a t e s de agua neolibera.es 
coDiadas de modelo chileno. Los bancos contrataron expertes de Chile para promover el modelo 
en lo^ Daises^ednosTcuando, bajo protestas populäres a escala nacional e intensas luchas de 
T â ! S Z " ^ l 7 ^ 9 e s L l estes no puojron aceptar su adopciôn, se usaron e. 
chantaje y la amenaza de no sersujetos de prestamos de los Bancos. 
La lev tâmbtén preestablecia que la mayoria de mujeres no pud.eran tener derechos de agua, 
a neser a u T S a ^ formalmente reconocidas como »jefes de familia", a pesar de que ellas eran 
fas aue de acue do conlas reglas locales, habian trabajado, invertido y asi creado los derechos 
de aaua En Juchas comunidades indïgenas y campesinas este es el motor de la gestion local del 
aqua ï de la acción c o S v a al mismo tiempo que uno créa una infraestructura, uno créa también 
S ^ r e c h ô s dTaqua y uno créa la organización. Después, para mantener y re-crear los derechos 
de agTa uno ïne 9 que mantener y re'crear la infraestructura coectiva, y uno refuerza y recréa su 
propfa^organizadón Hay una interacción dinâmica y permanente entre el s.stema tecnológ,co, el 
sistema normative y el s i s tems^n \za two . ^ ^ indïgenas. El estado 
Este fue posiblemente el mayor P ^ b ' e m J ö e
 d e e r a n e s t a b l e c j d o y s a través de un 
impuso un modelo en el que las regJas y dere
 g ^ ^ ^ 
T Z T T r a l o ^ T ^ X e n t zona die lo contrario: no se pueden simplemente 
ai agua. t l razonam,er"° V" y contribuyen con mano de obra, capacidades organizacionales 
comprar los derechos. A q u e l l o > J « « J ™ £
 a c œ s o a l a g u a y derechos de participacion en la 
ffi"ÄT I f o r t Ü ^ » derechos individua.es se derivan de una propiedad 
^ n t s l Ä argumente forma, de la agenda fue ,Cômo podemos 
begun las comunia«»* .
 t a e r1 n u e s t ras manos? Las politicas nacionales e 
entregar la gestion a ' ° s . " f . ^ ^ L t o s diferentes en el campo y en la teoria, y detrâs de los 
mtemac.ona.es usu almentetenen eertos d,r «JunWades indïgenas, no obstante, 
argumentes ofic.ales se desarjolla u . uego aep p0sitivista y a politicas 
han segu.do d e f e n d e r . ^ ^ ^ ^ T e s ^ f i c a la descentralizacion en la practica. La Ley de 
de gestion de agua o r ^ ^ C ^ u % n9uevas no permiten derechos ni principios de gestion 
Aguas del Ecuador y las politicas aniiguds y .. J* , . . .
 p n c o n t r a r q0|i.clones 
locales, y destruyen la variedad de s.stemas normat.vos que s, tratan de encontrar soluc.ones 
particulares en contextes diversos. 
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 Véanse también Gleickl^Goldman 1998; Moore 1989; van der Ploeg 2003; Zoomers y van der Haar 2000; 
Zwarteveen 1997.
 n r m i r a r n f l , neoliberales los .esultados y produetos son medidos versus las 
Ademâs, en la apl-cacón de programas neon ^
 g i c i o n e s re|acionadas con el comportamiento y la 
expeetativas de los mismos modeios ™™'* • *
 A s i ,a creenCia en el modelo y consecuentemente en la 
operación en la practica muv P°f a^ n v .^ p & a u i e n e s P|anifican jamâs se objeta, como tampoco se cuestionan las 
efectividad de los mecamsmos de control de quienes pwumw. j 
bases de la validez del conocimiento sobre e agua ^ ^ ^ documentas que hacian que los nuevos 
Este chantaje fue atestiguado ein Ecuador cuan ^ ^ ^ ^
 g g u a s ^ chJ |eno ( R e d B a n c Q s i g g 5 ) E n préstamos estuvieran C 0 n d l c l 0 " a a ° s 1 a o l " ^ Mnndial Trawick reveló el mismo tipo de prâcticas (véanse Trawick 
el caso del Peru, el ex-consuttor * l Ban» Mu«jm
 e s t a s d e pnvatización actuates en Bolivia, por 
2003). Ilustrativos son también las expenencias w» H 
ejemplo en Cochabamba y en el Alto. 
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En sus oficinas, los planificadores neoliberales poco han percibido de la razón de las protestas: 
es que originan de las mismas comunidades andinas que no logran actuar "racionalmente" o 
"democraticamente", y por eso fallan en su adaptación al modelo. Las formas actuates de manejar 
y usar el agua en muchas comunidades andinas no son vistas ni juzgadas en sus propios 
términos, ni siquiera sobre la base de la eficiencia en el uso del agua y los retomos marginales, 
sino que son evaluadas contra el modelo universal ideal. Tienden a ser vistos como obstâculos 
para el control eficiente y modemo del agua, que tienen que ser removidos para pavimentar la vîa 
hacia la modernización del agua y para el surgimiento de los actores 'racionales'. Los problemas 
acerca de eficiencia y equidad no son vistos como efectos de las leyes y politicas neoliberales, 
sino que se analizan como algo originado en una implementación aûn incompleta del modelo y en 
la incorporation aûn imperfecta de las comunidades en los mercados y en los sistemas légales 
estatales. Por eso, y paradójicamente, el remedio recetado es incrementar las reglas del mercado 
libre en las comunidades locales y dar mâs libertad a los grupos de interés privados externos para 
mejorar la gestion, incrementar la eficiencia y poner en vigor los derechos de agua. Asi, el modelo 
neoliberal de agua se vuelve una profecia que se comprueba a sî misma. 
Es por estas razones también que el modelo no logra percibir sus propios errores y 
contradicciones fundamentales que a menudo causan resultados contrarius a los pronosticados: 
inseguridad de la tenencia del agua, disminucion de la inversion por los usuarios, reducción de la 
productividad, baja de la decision democrética, menor eficiencia de uso, y mayor inestabilidad de 
los sistemas andinos (para algunos ejemplos llamativos, ver Hendriks 1998; Boelens & Dâvila 
1998; Boelens & Zwarteveen 2005). Por la naturaleza necesariamente colectiva del agua en la 
mayorîa de los sistemas y cuencas andinos, con condiciones adversas e impredecibles, para 
poder manejar el agua y generar sustentos sostenibles se requière de la colaboración, como una 
condición fundamental, en vez de la competencia entre los usuarios de las mismas fuentes 
hidricas. 
También en el tema de la descentralizaciôn las propuestas neoliberales tienen fuertes 
contradicciones intrinsecas, como muestra la experiencia chilena (Hendriks 1998; Bauer 1997, 
1998; Dourojeanni & Jouravlev 1999). Bauer (1998), entre otros, describe cómo el modelo 
neoliberal ha llevado a retos y conflictos inmensos no solamente a nivel del sistema, sino también 
a nivel de sectores de uso multiple, por ejemplo a nivel de microcuenca y cuenca. Si antes de la 
privatization los conflictos entre las empresas generadoras de energîa y los grupos de regantes 
podian ser resueltos con base en argumentas relacionados con el interés publico, a raîz de la 
introduction de la politica de agua neoliberal debieron empezar a competir como contendores 
supuestamente iguales en el "mercado libre". Las plataformas de multiples interesados, 
propuestas dentro de este esquema como mecanismos para encontrar las soluciones, fueron 
dominadas por los représentantes de las companias, que eran personas mâs locuaces y con mâs 
education formai, mientras que los resultados eran fâcilmente ignorados porque no tenîan rigor 
legal y no estaban apoyados en politicas pûblicas. Si bien la descentralizaciôn debia ayudar en la 
reducción de la intervention estatal (y los gastos gubemamentales), parece que en realidad, para 
resolver sus disputas, los diferentes actores dependen crecientemente de caros procedimientos 
legalistas en la cortes centralizadas y, por lo tanto, de la burocracia estatal. 
Este bien conocido ejemplo chileno es la razón de que muchos defensores de los mercados de 
derechos de agua y de la privatización "con rostro humano" en los Andes argumentan que el 
modelo debe ir acompafîado de, y estar embebido en, un marco legal equitativo. Pero si bien las 
companias privadas saben bien cómo hacer uso de las cortes civiles y de los marcos légales 
cuando se trata de defender sus intereses privados en el agua, aparentemente hay una carencia 
enorme de capacidad legal en los paîses andinos al momento de defender los derechos de 
propiedad comunitarios o pûblicos.29 
Ademâs, a pesar de que la privatización tiene como meta la delegación de las decisiones al 
nivel mâs bajo posible, las actuates reformas hidricas en los Andes tienden a tener consecuencias 
opuestas para los sistemas de derechos locales. A través de la instalación de las regulaciones 
estatales y derechos neoliberales, los sistemas de propiedad colectiva localmente embebidos se 
vuelven desembebidos de las relaciones sociales y de los sistemas de seguridad de la comunidad, 
y los actuates arreglos de gestion del agua son remplazados por reglas de juego foréneas. Pero 
29
 La subyugación de facto de la Ley Indigena al Código de Aguas y al Código de Mineria en Chile es un ciaro 
ejemplo (Gentes 2000; Boelens et al. 2005). 
32 
Polfticas Aguadas y Canalización del Poder 
no todos los usuarios o usuarias aceptan estas reformas de normalización y descentralización 
impuestas y cada vez mâs demandan una adherencia a estândares diferentes de equidad en vez 
de los que ofrecen los modelos neoliberales como algo inevitable y natural. De manera creciente 
las organizaciones campesinas e indigenas se levantan contra los esfuerzos privatizadores y los 
programas de reforma hîdrica neoliberales. La resistencia demuestra que el "no calzar" en el 
modelo es a menudo una opción consciente y no el resultado de atraso, irracionalidad y terquedad 
sin razón. 
2.5 Politicas aguadas: la 'devolution del gobiemo del agua' en la 
practica 
A la par de enfoques estatistas y mercantiles en la region, un tercer conjunto de estrategias y 
propuestas institucionales para el manejo de los conflictos intersectoriales sobre el agua, el 
fomento del uso beneficioso y de derechos equitativos del agua y la preservación del ambiente, se 
fundamenta en el enfoque de la gestion consensual o la 'concertación'.30 No es el Estado 
omnipotente, ni las reglas del mercado libre, sino la negociación y colaboración entre los distintos 
actores, muchas veces con intereses divergentes pero mutuamente dependientes, que tienen que 
llevar a una situación consensuada y equilibrada para todos. Las estrategias y propuestas 
incluyen como elemento central la generación o el fortalecimiento de plataformas y mesas de 
concertación para la gestion integrada del agua al nivel de la cuenca, subcuenca o microcuenca. 
Idóneamente suelen ser conformadas por entidades mixtas: organismos gubernamentales y no 
gubernamentales, multisectoriales, endógenos y exógenos, que representan las necesidades de 
los distintos grupos de interés. La gestion concertada requière de un adecuado sistema de 
información que ademâs sea transparente y de acceso general. Generalmente las propuestas y 
proyectos de concertación tienen pretensiones que no se limitan a la gestion multisectorial del 
agua sino involucran a otros recursos y actividades. 
Sin embargo, hay muy pocos casos en los Andes en que se concretizaron verdaderas 
plataformas de gestion democrâtica y multisectorial. A menudo existen solo en papel o fueron 
institucionalizadas desde arriba por agencias estatales o organismos de desarrollo (Dourojeanni 
2000). El punto aparentemente fuerte de este enfoque es también su debilidad: se requière de un 
marco de concertación democrâtico y transparente en el que todos los actores son conscientes de 
los objetivos que plantean, de sus responsabilidades y de las consecuencias futuras en el manejo 
del agua (IPROGA 1996). Sin embargo, el ordenamiento concertado del uso del agua y la 
adecuación o redistribución armónica de derechos de agua a nivel territorial no es tarea fâcil para 
tal plataforma, justamente porque va en contra de intereses establecidos, muchas veces 
poderosos. Teóricamente se basan en el consensu 'general' y pueden funcionar bien cuando 
existen posibilidades de transacción entre los actores. Estas transacciones solo se logran con 
conocimiento de propuestas de solución y anâlisis de costos y beneficios sociales, ambientales y 
económicos, y con un interés politico para un cambio social real. Si no se encuentran beneficios 
mutuos, el proceso de adecuación de derechos comünmente es obstaculizado por los actores o 
sectores poderosos. Los Ultimos buscarén cómo dominar las plataformas, caso contrario recurrirân 
a otros medios para lograr sus intereses (Boelens, Dourojeanni & Hoogendam 2005). 
La mayoria de las propuestas de concertación, por tanto, tiene como presuposición que a 
través de una racionalidad (positivista) que todos compartirian se lograrân las soluciones mes 
óptimas. Y aunque reconocen la importancia de las posiciones de poder divergentes, no suelen 
basar sus estrategias en esta constatación. Pero conciliar los intereses y descentralizar la gestion 
fundamentalmente significa redistribuir recursos, autoridad y poder; entre autoridades, usuarios, 
no-usuarios y los 'concertadores' mismos. Las relaciones de poder existentes, que se maniflestan 
en el reparto desigual de los medios de producción y «Je la riqueza generada, obviamente tienen 
una influencia decisiva en la formulación y ejecución de estas politicas y plataformas 
descentralizadas. 
En los procesos de concertación a menudo hace falta cuestionar las estructuras de poder y los 
intereses poli'tico-económicos (Warner y Moreyra 2004). Particularmente los programas formates 
de descentralización evitan las discusiones pûblicas al respecta y las posibles estrategias de 
30
 Boelens, Dourojeanni & Hoogendam 2005; véase también CEPAL 1992, Dourojeanni 2000; IPROGA 1996. 
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solución: son reemplazadas por polîticas de intervención 'ya establecidas' y por criterios 
profesionales 'ya probados'. También en el campo socio-organizativo hay una tendencia de 
imponer las reglas y estructuras organizativas 'mas adecuadas' de la entidad de concertacion, que 
en la practica canalizan los intereses y mensajes de las instituciones exógenas, o refuerzan las 
regulaciones jurîdicas nacionales. Por el consecuente y comûn fracaso de estas plataformas multi-
sectoriales y multi-usuarios verticalmente establecidas en la region andina, las politicas de 
descentralización a menudo se han limitado a 'transferir' las responsabilidades y tareas de la 
gestion del agua a los usuarios, mientras que (casi) no transfirieron los recursos y poderes, o 
solamente a entidades del gobiemo 'decentralizado'. Ademâs, la transferencia irresponsable 
('dumping') de la gestion de muchos de los sistemas estatales mâs respondió a la urgencia 
neoliberal de reducir el aparato estatal y los gastos püblicos que a un proceso de transferencia de 
recursos y capacidades para apoyar sistemas viables. De manera general se transfirieron los 
problemas a los usuarios: sistemas degenerados casi sin viabilidad y perspectiva, que requerirîan 
enormes esfuerzos e inversiones de los usuarios para operar y mantenerlos. 
La implementation en la practica de las polîticas de descentralización nacionales e 
internacionales enfonces es un proceso complejo que no se presta a una especie de 'ingenieria 
social' o 'ingenieria legal'.31 Las medidas legales son influenciadas, mediadas y modificadas - a 
veces fuertemente - por los âmbitos locales polïticos, económicos y normativos. Por esta razón, 
entre otros, es claro que no se ha dado un proceso real de 'gestion integrada' o 'gestion por 
plataformas descentralizadas'en la gran mayorïa de las cuencas andinas. Aquî influye también el 
arriba mencionado caos en las legislaciones hidricas de la region, lo que facilita a los polïticos y 
hidrócratos a que manejen sus propios juegos y defienden sus propias instituciones, frente a los 
usuarios menos acomodados. La interpretación de las legislaciones y politicas hîdricas en 
condiciones de legislation caótica y sobrepuesta ofrece espacios a los agentes oficiales de 'hacer 
su propia torta legal'.32 Ademés, las polîticas de descentralización en casos concretos emitan 
mensajes muy contradictorios. Una investigación de WALIR en el Ecuador (Hendriks et al. 2003; 
Cremers et al. 2005) ha mostrado como los multiples decretos de descentralización de la gestion 
del agua ha ilevado no solo a una reducción tremenda de la capacidad nacional para una gestion 
verdaderamente publica del agua sino que ademâs ha permitido que una variedad de actores 
oficiales 'descentrales' han recibido poderes traslapados e intransparentes, sin que se han 
cambiado sus bases 'hidrocrâticas', lo que fâcilmente Neva al nuevo abuso de las familias usuarias 
en las comunidades campesinas e indîgenas. 
Abajo se revisa algunos de entre un sinnümero de casos que muestran que la 
descentralización positivista, sin atención a los poderes reales existentes ni a la pluralidad 
normativa local, no resuelve la crisis del agua - al menos, no para los grupos marginalizados. 
Partimos de un sistema intercomunitario de riego campesino-indigena en Licto, provincia de 
Chimborazo, Ecuador. Se analiza ejemplos cotidianos de su interacción con aquellas instituciones 
que segûn las politicas oficiales (y en ausencia de plataformas multi-actores) deberian recibir los 
poderes descentralizados, como es la Junta Parroquial del canton, la Corporación Regional de 
Desarrollo de Chimborazo (CODERECH), el Municipio de Riobamba, y la Agenda de Aguas. 
Casol: La defensa de la autogestion del sistema Guarguallé en Licto33 
Licto es el nombre de una zona de la provincia de Chimborazo en el centra de los Andes 
ecuatorianos, que hospeda a 28 comunidades campesinas indîgenas. También es el nombre del 
31
 Esta perspectiva positivista, comûn y corriente en procesos legislativos y en intervenciones de desarrollo rural, 
asume que relaciones sociales son calculables y planificables tal como en las ciencias naturales se usan las 
formulas hidrâulicas. Es un mito, porque las legislaciones que intentan cambiar la situation social muchas veces 
fracasan, no tienen resultados o tienen efectos no planificados y no previstos. Es justamente porque, para tener 
éxito, deben cambiar las relaciones sociales. Y frecuentemente las relaciones sociales y de poder existentes tienen 
mâs fuerza y efectividad que reglas nuevas y externas. 
32
 Dentro y fuera del aparato estatal, es frecuente que los actores hegemónicos en el sector hidrico de la region 
andina tienen gran influencia sobre la selección de los ingredientes de esta 'torta'. Su influencia va mâs alla de solo 
la selección de dispositivos legales existentes. En palabras de Weber: "Son precisamente estos grupos con 
intereses propios que se encuentran en la position de distorsionar el propósito intentado de una norma legal, 
hasta el punto de convertirla en su opuesto..." (Weber, en Moore 1973). 
33
 Basado en investigaciones de campo que realicé entre 1992 y 1997, y en 1998, 2000, 2002 y 2004; publicado 
en e.o. el capitulo 7 del libro Water Rights and Empowerment (Boelens y Hoogendam 2002). 
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pueblo, el centra poblado de la region, alrededor del cual se ubican estas comunidades. La 
población total de Licto cuenta con 13.000 personas, de las cuales alrededor de 90 % son de auto-
identification indigenas y 10 % mestizas. Las ultimas residen mayoritariamente en el pueblo. En la 
zona, como en muchas partes de los Andes, históricamente se ha dado un proceso de 
subordination de las comunidades indigenas frente a los 'bianco-mestizos': los terratenientes y 
otros grupos de poder en el pueblo. En gran parte de su historia, la domination en Licto fue 
encabezada por la 'Santisima Trinidad': cura - hacendado - teniente politico. Hasta hace pocos 
aiïos, cualquiera actividad para cambiar la situation de marginación en las comunidades 
indigenas fue atacada por los grupos de mando en Licto pueblo. 
Cuando en 1989 la organization CODOCAL (Corporation de Organizaciones Campesinas de 
Licto) fue invitada de participar en un ambicioso proyecto, el desarrollo del Sistema de Riego 
Guarguallâ, no era de sorprenderse que las comunidades indigenas se mostraron sumamente 
desconfiadas. El recelo era fuerte, mâs aûn, porque anteriormente habian sido justamente los 
moradores de Licto pueblo que habian impulsado este proyecto a través de sus contactas con el 
INERHI (Institute Ecuatoriano de Recursos Hidrâulicos), la anterior agentia estatal de riego. A 
pesar de ello, algunos lideres indigenas de las comunidades y personas - sobre todo mujeres - de 
los grupos menos acomodados del mismo pueblo, aprovecharon la oportunidad de este proyecto 
como un medio para desafiar las estructuras de poder existentes. En estas comunidades andinas 
el agua es un factor de mucho poder, y razonaron que, para cambiar la situation, 'hay que 
meterse adentro, sea como sea'. 
Desde el ano de 1974 el INERHI habia estado trabajando los estudios, disenos y obras 
principales. Fue un ejemplo clâsico de un proceso de diseno y ejecución vertical, en el cual se 
excluyó a la población campesina de la toma de decisiones. Los disefios fueron realizados de 
manera recetaria en las oficinas de Quito por técnicos sin conocimiento de la realidad campesina. 
Para ejecutar las obras conforme a sus disefios, el INERHI contrató a empresas privadas. La falta 
de compromiso de los ejecutores con el sistema y su debilidad técnica no solo conllevó a actos de 
corruption, al aumento explosivo del costo de las obras, a retrasos y a la construction de canales 
de mala calidad, sino que también hizo imposible que los usuarios futuros se involucren en el 
diseno y la ejecución del sistema. 
Este diseno, sin base en las condiciones y necesidades locales , fue acompafiado por un 
disefio organizational, también recetario y rigidamente fundamentado en la Ley, que reforzó las 
falencias técnicas enunciadas y las consecuencias socio-politicas. Por ejemplo, el Reglamento 
para la Administration de los Sistemas de Riego del INERHI establece que cada módulo de riego 
debe nombrar cinco cargos directivos (presidente, vice-presidente, etc.). Considerando el hecho 
de que Licto contarïa con unos 120 módulos de riego, esta implicarfa la obligation de nombrar 
unos 600 dirigentes nuevos, una estructura dirigencial paralela a las estructuras de liderazgo 
comunales ya existentes. En el diseno, estas módulos cruzarian los linderos de las comunidades y 
tendrian que ser encabezados por una Junta General. Asî se generaria un conjunto de estructuras 
organizativas adicionales que - por controlar el factor agua - contarïa con mucho poder, con el 
gran peligro de cruzar, desintegrar y reemplazar a las estructuras comunales (y no modulares) 
existentes. Implicarfa que, no solo el liderazgo y el poder de decision, sino también las asambleas 
y los trabajos comunitarios tendrian que ser reorganizados artificialmente de acuerdo con los 
nuevos limites modulares. 
Las comunidades, enfonces, formularon una contra-propuesta al INERHI: adecuaron el 
Reglamento a la situation particular de Licto y a los criterios formulados por los usuarios. Después 
de unas rondas de discusión en todas las comunidades y la aprobación en la Asamblea General, 
el documenta fue remitido al INERHI, que calificó el documenta como 'ilegal'. A la par de este 
contra-propuesta administrate 'oficial y externa', los futuros regantes iniciaron la elaboration de 
un reglamento interno: un reglamento 'vivo y dinâmico' que en los afios posteriores iba 'crectendo' 
durante la generation e implementation del sistema de riego. En todo este proceso, los 
gobernantes blanco-mestizos de la zona (e.o. juntados en la Junta Parroquial), habitantes del 
pueblo de Licto, buscaron frustrar el trabajo colectivo de las comunidades indigenas en la 
34
 Por ejemplo a pesar de que, debido a la emigration masculina, la gran mayoria de usuarias eran mujeres, la 
infraestructura'no incluyó reservorios nocturnos y el horario estuvo basado en turnos de 24 horas de riego. El 
riego nocturno hubiera hecho imposible, sin embargo, que las mujeres hicieran uso del riego, por razones como la 
violencia sexual el cuidado de infantes, la erosion del suelo, la lejania de los campos y otros. 
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construcción del riego. A través de sus contactos con los oficiales del Estado trataron de mantener 
sus posiciones de poder, manipulando la incipiente organization intercomunal. Fue solo después 
de un largo proceso de lucha, liderado por dirigentes indïgenas y sobre todo las mujeres de los 
estratos mâs pobres de Licto que - muchas veces a pesar de los procesos y discursos oficiales de 
descentralización - se produjo el cambio. Los mestizos pobres del pueblo se deshicieron de sus 
lideres manipuladores y se unieron a la organization intercomunal. 
Cuando INERHI, que desde 1994 fue descentralizado en Corporaciones Regionales de 
Desarrollo (ahora CODERECH, para la provincia de Chimborazo), debido a una crisis financiera y 
la falta de capacidad por la privatization, no pudo completar la construction del sistema (salvo las 
obras del canal principal), las comunidades indigenas tomaron a cargo su desarrollo, con el apoyo 
de la ONG CESA. Aûn cuando al inicio bajo protesta fuerte de los técnicos estatales y luego de 
confrontaciones importantes con la agentia estatal, adaptaron el diseno, la gestion y los derechos 
de agua a las demandas y capacidades locales. 
Se desarrollaron medios para colectivamente discutir el diseno, las reglas y los derechos. 
Fundamentalmente, la action colectiva fue la base para la construcción de la infraestructura y 
para la construction de los derechos de agua. También se incorporaron otras comunidades 
Lictefios en el sistema que habian sido excluidas, asi como módulos hidréulicos que técnicamente 
y organizativamente respondieron a las estructuras (inter)comunales. Obras estratégicas (por 
ejemplo, reservorios para evitar el riego nocturno) complementaron el disefio. Se desarrollo un 
sistema que ahora es manejado por las mismas comunidades desde el nivel principal hasta el 
nivel de campo. 
Pero una vez que las comunidades habian terminado el sistema, operândolo con reglas claras 
y socializadas, derechos equitativos y una fuerte gestion colectiva, la descentralizada 
administration estatal vino a reclamar. No queria reconocer la gestion local ni sus reglas y 
derechos. Por el simple hecho de no estar reconocidas por la ley nacional fueron declaradas 
"ilegales". La agencia estatal, en su interpretation particular de la politica de Descentralización y 
Transferencia de Manejo de los Sistemas de Riego, reclamó a las comunidades indïgenas la 
devolution del manejo del sistema a la agencia. En palabras de la dirigente campesina Inès Chapi 
(entrevista agosto 2002): "Con el CODERECH mismo tenemos un gran problema porque ellos han 
dicho que ya que todo sistema esté terminado tienen que hacer ellos la administration, operation 
y mantenimiento y que tenemos que pagar tarifa a ellos".35 
Los usuarios no se oponen a tarifas en si, pero que sean organizadas a través de su propia 
organization para invertir en su propio sistema. Ademés, se resisten a 'transferir' el sistema y toda 
la administration e information autogeneradas al Estado. "En cuanto a la gestion, ellos han 
mandado un oficio que ellos van hacer en su totalidad la administration y la operation, incluso han 
mandado un oficio que les proporcionemos ya los planos y catastros, [...] no estamos de acuerdo, 
si ellos quieren tener pianos, quieren tener catastros, tienen que hacer por su cuenta. [...] El 
sistema tenemos que manejar nosotros, la junta, porque nosotros hemos trabajado desde antes y 
seguimos trabajando. Ya hemos pagado cuotas y estamos trabajando para la operation y el 
mantenimiento de nuestro propio canal. [...] No hemos de dar paso al CODERECH en el sistema. 
Para nosotros es necesario defender nuestro sistema. Vamos a defender nosotros, organizando 
mes de lo que hemos estado, si es posible tenemos que hacer comisiones a Quito al Consejo 
National de Recursos Hîdricos, tenemos que hacer marchas [...]. No es que nosotros vayamos al 
CODERECH y decir 'bueno, vamos a pagar', nos hemos de organizar. Somos 1.300 usuarios y 
estén ingresando mes usuarios, hemos de tomarnos si es posible la oficina del CODERECH pero 
no hemos de permitir que ellos vengan y digan 'ya esta terminado el proyecto y ahora ya hay que 
administrar nomâs el CODERECH'. No pues, nosotros hemos trabajado, nosotros hemos 
aportado, nosotros hemos sufrido y tenemos derecho nosotros a mantener el sistema" (Inès 
Chapi). 
Caso 2: El enfrentamiento entre las comunidades regantes y el Municipio de Riobamba 
"Para mi séria una falta tremenda cuando quieren quitar estos senores del Municipio, nosotros 
hemos trabajado, hemos tenido durante treinta anos de luchamiento para tener esta agiiita, lahora 
35
 Otra institución que es importante en las politicas de descentralizado esta involucrada también: "Asi mismo, 
nos van a cobrar otra tarifa de la Agencia de Aguas, sin consultar a nadie ellos han aprobado una tarifa que hay 
que pagar" (Inès Chapi). 
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estos senores quieren quitar nuestros terrenos, que quieren expropiar ellos! Lo mâs hemos tenido 
trabajo nosotras las mujeres, llevando nuestras criaturas en la barriga, llevando nuestras criaturas 
en la espalda, con todo el sacrifice-, fbamos a pie a las 3.00 de la mafiana, 4.00 de la mafiana 
levantando, ibamos al puesto de trabajo que se llama bocatoma, alla al rio Guarguallâ para 
trabajar. Venimos trayendo agiiita para riego, ahora estamos felices, pero ahora estos sefiores 
vienen a querer expropiar, no estamos de acuerdo y estaremos hasta las ultimas consecuencias 
en nuestros terrenos, nuestro reservorio, no estamos para soltar..." (Pacifica Yupacabay).36 
Junio de 2002. El camino que conduce a la zona de Tulabug, parte del area de riego de Licto-
Guarguallé, se encuentra bloqueada por una barrera enorme, hecha por los moradores locales. 
Grupos de vigilancia de las comunidades cercanas controlan la entrada de cada persona. Lideres, 
organizadas instantâneamente en el comité de defensa de la tierra regada, se trasladan 
permanentemente a la ciudad de Riobamba para reclamar y negociar con la alcaldïa y para 
reforzar sus alianzas con instituciones afines como la Comisión Permanente de los Derechos 
Humanos, la Defensoria del Pueblo, y hasta fueron hablar con el Congreso Nacional en Quito. Es 
alerta roja para las comunidades unidas en el sistema de riego, que se han puesto solidarias con 
las familias regantes amenazadas por la expropiación de sus terrenos. Segün los téenicos del 
Municipio, es necesario esta expropiación ya que la planta de tratamiento del nuevo sistema de 
agua potable tiene que ubicarse precisamente en la zona de Tulabug - "no hay otra alternativa 
téenica y económicamente viable".37 Para ello es necesario expropiar entre 6 y 14 hectâreas de 
los minifundios regados, una gran cantidad de terrenos de unas treinta familias campesino-
indigenas de diversas comunidades. Las comunidades también protestan ferozmente trente a la 
propuesta oficial de afectar una parte importante de su sistema de riego mediante esta 
expropiación, lo que posiblemente perjudica a su reservorio nocturno mâs grande, el de Bellavista. 
El Municipio de Riobamba, para abastecer la población urbana con agua potable, ha formulado 
y disenado un gran proyecto que doblarïa el caudal actual.38 El alcalde de Riobamba, en la 
promesa principal de su campafia electoral, ha asegurado la población riobambefia realizar este 
proyecto en menos de dos anos - "... en mi administración soluciono el problema del agua, en 
agosto ya son dos anos que estoy aquî, yo ofrecî solucionar el problema y no quedo mal, no me 
quedo cruzado de brazos" (Dr. Fernando Guerrero, Alcalde de Riobamba). De la misma manera, 
el Vice-alcalde (Dr. Luis Cargua Rfos) expresa la gran importancia politica de este proyecto: "... 
estamos abocados ya a la salida del gobierno, el sistema de agua potable es clave... imaginase si 
ahorita por todas las emisoras nos estén pero insultando que no hemos hecho nada en agua 
potable con el proyecto Alao, que solo palabras ... que solo palabras han sido". 
Pero los usuarios de riego locales, después de muchos anos de sacrifiera y sufrimiento para 
construir e implementar el sistema Guarguallâ y traer el agua de lejos, estân determinados de no 
soltar sus chacras. Como afirma Pacifica: "El Sefior Alcalde tiene que respetar nuestras tierras, sin 
tierra no podemos vivir, porque somos campesinos necesitamos tierra, este pequefio minifundio 
necesito para mis hijos, para mantener, para poder defender, hasta las ultimas consecuencias 
regaré mi sangre en mi terreno, pero no he de salir!". 
El Alcalde de Riobamba también hace referencia al fuerte deseo de la gente de no moverse de 
sus tierras ancestrales, es solo que su interpretación de este hecho es algo distinta de aquella de 
los afectados- "Hay gente que se aferra por ancestros, y aunque no le sirve el pedazo de terreno 
para nada, le defiende a morir. Es la 'ftucallaqta', en quechua la Madré Tierra, la tierra, con ese 
pedazo de tierra me muera, aquî me muera y con eso me voy, esas personas son beligerantes, 
esas pelean, esas dicen 'me matan pero yo no salgo de aquî' ". 
Uno de los lideres del comité explica la resistencia: "...muchas personas se tiene un ünico lote y 
son 30 anos de lucha de trabajo para conseguir el agua de riego, mucha gente ya ha faltecido sin 
ver ni el agua se han quedado esposas con hijos pequefios, necesitan el agua para sostener a 
sus hijos en sus tierras También nos preocupa que no solo se perjudicarîa esas hectâreas, sino 
se perjudicarîa a mâs ese reservorio que alimenta a ^0 módulos, de Tulabug, Molobog y Licto. 
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 A los 475 l/s actuates se aftadirian 500 l/s extra mediante la extracción de un caudal de un rio que actualmente 
se aprovecha para uso no consumptive por una central hidroeléetrica (Alao), Es un proyecto de 12 millones de 
dólares, a serfinanciado a través del Banco del Estado (Entrevista con Ing. Diego Saltos, Vice-Director del Dept. 
de Agua Potable, Riobamba). 
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Nosotros como Junta de Riego no nos oponemos a la obra, es una obra social que va a hacer el 
Municipio, pero lo que si decimos que no se haga los tanques de tratamiento de agua potable ahi 
en esos terrenos, nosotros como Junta de Riego lucharemos hasta las ultimas consecuencias". 
Las comunidades han expresado claramente su no-oposición a la realización del proyecto de 
agua potable en si, pero durante los Ultimos meses el furor colectivo ha crecido enormemente, ya 
que son justo las tierras regadas de los minifundios las que se quieren expropiar, y esto es 
inaceptable para ellos; mâs aün ya que han ofrecido al Municipio que construya la planta en otro 
sitio, no regable, encima del canal de riego y de propiedad de las comunidades mismas. "Ya le 
dijimos nosotros: 'no estamos contra del proyecto de Alao de agua potable', nosotros hasta hemos 
ofrecido con mano de obra una minga no calificada aqui en el cerro Bellavista, queriamos que se 
haga all! y ahora ellos dicen que esta muy alto, que esta muy trabajoso, 'no queremos ahi, sino 
queremos éstas tierras, es mes fécil, mes bueno'. Ellos le botan [este plan], eso nosotros no 
permitimos". 
Ademâs, siendo campesinos, teman que la agenda politica del Municipio no solo es expropiar 
algunas hectâreas para fines de construcción de obras de agua potable, sino que se exija mâs 
terreno de lo netamente necesario para con ello urbanizar el campo. El temor es que la 
expropiación acelera un proceso de construcción de viviendas y servicios para los no campesinos, 
cambiando el estilo de vida y despojando cada vez mâs minifundistas de su tierra. Lauro Sislema, 
dirigente de la comunidad Chumug, expresa esta sospecha: "En primer lugar es para el paseo 
verde, segundo lugar para canchas deportivas, tercer lugar para las piscinas y cuarto lugar para 
hacer la vivienda". Al expropiarles, en sus ojos (y de acuerdo con sus experiencias concretas) las 
autoridades urbanas no valoran el gran aporte que dan los campesinos a la ciudad. En palabras 
de Pacifica: "A nosotros vienen queriendo expropiar nuestros terrenos, los senores del Municipio; 
ellos no se dan cuenta, nosotros aqui con nuestro producto estamos manteniendo a la ciudad, 
produciendo nuestros animalitos, desde huevos, un huevito, un cuycito, una gallinita, un 
chanchito, un ganadito, todo llevamos a la ciudad de Riobamba, al pueblo servimos. También 
cuando produce maicito, produce frejolito, papitas. Gracias a dios, con el agiiita tenemos cultivos 
nuevos, hacemos producir, todo produce, todo llevamos allé, con eso estamos sirviendo a la 
ciudad, ellos no se dan cuenta que nosotros servimos a la ciudad". 
La reacción de las autoridades urbanas, autodeclaradas los sirvientes del bien comûn, es una 
de no entender la resistencia. Es llamativo cómo las autoridades politicas perciben su propio 
actuar como uno que responde a los discursos de la descentralización y la participación popular. 
Asuman que haya acuerdo colectivo, basado en la supuesta socialización de la información sobre 
el proyecto: "!Pero porqué no cuestionaron eso cuando supieron, porque no cuestionaron eso 
hace tres aftos! Cuando hoy el proyecto yo lo retomo y les digo 'nosotros vamos a hacer', alli se 
présenta el problema: no quieren vendemos sus terrenos, porque dicen que ya tienen su 
agricultura, que han hecho mucha inversion, efectivamente, alli hay tuberias de riego, etc., etc." 
(Alcalde de Riobamba). 
Sin embargo, al investigar las bases fundamentales del proyecto, su formulación y diseno no 
han sido tan participativos como los politicos quieren hacer créer. La misma hidrocracia, las 
autoridades técnicas con poderes ahora descentralizadas, de ninguna manera han cambiado su 
practica de siempre de disenar los proyectos de manera recetaria y sin consultar a la gente. Sin 
preocuparse de esta practica vertical generalizada, el Director del Departamento de Agua Potable 
explica: "Con logica se hizo el proyecto, no creo que muchas veces debemos involucrar al inicio 
de un proyecto a la masificación ciudadana, a poner a consideration de todo el mundo, porque 
muchas veces el hecho de que piense demasiada gente hace que algunos proyectos queden en el 
aire. Hay muchos criterios y todo el mundo quiere hacerse sabio, enfonces es una pérdida de 
tiempo bastante grande, por eso es que entiendo la administración anterior, arrancó con un 
proyecto, se hizo una prefactibilidad, se dio factibilidad y se hicieron en términos definitivos". 
Segün los comuneros, ademâs, otras razones habîan jugado un papel evidente en el no 
considerar una participación popular en la elaboración del proyecto: la aparente presión financiera 
sobre los plazos de formulación y ejecución. Inclusive, este argumento fue usado para presionar a 
las comunidades de aceptar el proyecto y, en caso de no lograr el financiamiento de la obra, 
culpar a ellas por el fracaso: "Dijeron que ya tenian la plata, que del BID habîan hecho un primer 
préstamo, [...] que ellos ya iban a pagar esos intereses y que por culpa nuestra iban a perder esa 
plata. Tenian que pagar intereses, y por lo tanto ellos ya tenian unos planos todos disenados: de 
donde van las cajas, donde va la zanja, donde va el clorador, donde va la caseta, todo tenîan ya 
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los planos listitos" (Ines Chap)). La no-información y la ausencia de alguna forma de diserio 
participativo o siquiera proceso consultivo con los afectados fue ampliamente confirmada en las 
comunidades. Como Pacifica explica: "... sefiores autoridades, sefiores alcaldes, sefiores 
concejales, a nosotros nunca han preguntado, nunca han preocupado ellos, ahora si quieren 
nuestras tierras. Pero nosotros de beneficio de ellos nada nemos tenido, nada, con nuestra fuerza, 
con nuestra sudor, con nuestro dinerito que tenemos en nuestra cintura, con eso salimos y con 
eso andamos. Ahora, para este problema perdimos tres meses de dios, a nosotros tienen en la 
calle estos senores, desesperados con pena. Con lâgrimas en los ojos, porque tenemos nuestros 
hijos [...] Y esos senores, que beneficio han dado a nosotros? y luego que vengan atropellar a 
nosotros, mandar empujando a nosotros, a mandar sacando a nuestras criaturas: a dónde vamos 
a ir?, a producir deiincuencia?, a producir tantos robos, en tantas matanzas, no se." 
Claramente, la mudanza a otras tierras ajenas o la compensation con dinero no encuentran 
aceptación entre los afectados. En el anâlisis del problema y la bûsqueda de altemativas se puede 
apreciar mundos y racionalidades sumamente distintos. Para el Director de Agua Potable, uno de 
los problemas principales es el egoismo, y la solución se encuentra en la valoración económica de 
la alternativa. Bâsicamente, a través del valor universal del dinero se pueden comparar e igualar 
los precios intrinsecos de la tierra, del agua, y de los otros factores fundamentales de la 
convivencia campesina - hasta la comunidad misma. Para ello le sirve una llamada referencial a 
la civilización, contrastândolo con la falta de ella en las comunidades afectadas: "Los paises sobre 
todo de Europa son desarrollados, no existen egoîsmos, todos queremos estar al mismo nivel y es 
lo mas obvio no? Como en los grandes proyectos tenemos que ceder, tenemos que ceder, 
porque el beneficio es para la gran mayorîa, acà en este proyecto apenas pueden ser unas 40, 30 
personas que se les puede afectar, pero afectar con el retira temporal de la tierra, porque les 
estamos ubicando en otra lado, o les estamos dando la alternativa a través del dinero....". 
En cambio, para los comuneros afectados la tierra regada no puede expresarse en solo 
términos monetarios o valores de cambio. Detrâs de la resistencia de no aceptar la compensación 
hay todo un mundo distinto de valores productivos propios de la tierra y el agua, de la historia de 
los antepasados que habitaron estas tierras y de la lucha por adquirir el agua, de los significados y 
sïmbolos de estos elementos centrales para la economîa campesina y el sustento local, y del 
mismo significado de 'comunidad' e 'identidad' dentro del contexte de Tulabug y sus alrededores. 
No se trata de algunos 'lotes individuales', como manifiesta Pacifica: "Pensamiento del Municipio, 
a nosotros lo que dicen es: que estân comprando dice por otros lugares terrenos para pagar a 
nosotros aquî Otras tierras ya son cansadas, otras tierras estân puro piedras, estas tierras estén 
ya arena esas tierras no queremos nosotras, queremos nuestras tierras [...] A nosotros cuesta 
nuestra tierra de nuestros padres, nuestras madrés, nuestros abuelitos, nuestras abuelitas, 
somos nacidos aquf Este serior alcalde, en dónde pensarâ que va a poner a tanta familia, tantas 
personas tantos comuneros que tiene este minifundio. Entonces por eso no queremos, yo estoy 
con mis muieres con mis compareras estamos aquî andando, estamos aquf trabajando. Nosotros 
no dejamos nuestras tierras, estamos aquî permaneciendo sea de noche sea de dfa". 
El argumento utilitario del Director de Agua Potable, de que hay que sacnficar algunos para el 
beneficio de 'la gran mayoria', no les suena justo a los campesinos. De manera contraria, el hecho 
de que no son solamente las familias directamente afectadas que protestan sino los comuneros y 
dirigentes de los 17 comunidades del sistema de riego que se han solidanzado - mâs algunas 
instituciones de defensoria del pueblo - es incomprensible para las autoridades urbanas, y mucho 
se molestan de esta Desconocen que a la par de intereses individuales de la gente también hay 
estructuras motivaciones y comportamientos colectivos, necesarios para que sobre todo las 
familias menos acomodadas sepan sobrevivir en el contexte adverso de los Andes. Lo califican 
como manipulación como expresa el Director de Agua Potable: Muchas veces las imposiciones, 
sobre todo en el ârèa indlgena y la solidaridad, hacen que se involucren terceros, aunque no sea 
el deseo de ellos [ ] Es una afectación a pocas familias, de ahi entonces las que deberfan 
exclusivamente pelear serfan las familias de acà no mâs. No podriamos meter al resta de las 
comunidades indîgenas de la provincia, o tal vez involucrar a los indigenas del pais, creo que no, 
para oué?!" El Alcalde de Riobamba, de la misma manera, mega a ver la posibilidad de que 
cuando se pisen los derechos y reclamos justificados de grupos marginalizados, haya personas e 
^No me refiero a la frecuentemente romantizada 'solidaridad andina'. Aqui se trata de que, al encontrar algunas 
famLs comuneras fuertemente amenazadas porfuerzas exógenas, se cierran las lineas de defensa colectiva. 
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instituciones de base que ya no lo aceptan y se hacen solidarios. "Hay gente ajena a la zona que 
nada tiene que hacer, hay esas organizaciones como se llaman polîticas, y abogados que estân 
sacândoles el dinero, sabemos quienes son, entonces hay gente ajena al problema pero que se 
va a hacer solidario para sacar provecho politico". 
AI observar que la situación desborde el control politico, fundamentalmente vemos a dos 
reacciones intermitentes de los grupos de poder. La primera es la cara suave, el discurso de la 
participación y de la inclusion. Alli, siguiendo la tradición liberal, se pone énfasis en la supuesta 
igualdad entre todos los humanos, fortaleciendo el discurso de la 'comunidad imaginada': 
"Deberian pensar en que todos somos cantón Riobamba, jurisdiccionalmente todos somos 
iguales, estamos en una misma provincia estamos en un mismo pais" (Director de Agua Potable). 
Para mantener esta igualdad y el bienestar comün de todos, entonces no deberiamos extranamos 
de que hay algunos (aquellos un poco menos iguales, en términos de Orwell) que tienen que 
sufrir. "Por el agua que se va a captar, es inevitable se debe hacer un tratamiento del agua, 
entonces hay que entender que alguien tiene que sacrificar, arrimar el hombro para el desarrollo 
del resto". 
Pero las Utopias liberales de la igualdad han sido desenmascaradas por los dirigentes 
indigenas. Ademâs, las propias autoridades estatales cambian de tono y muestran la segunda 
cara, la mâs dura y violente, cuando los comuneros no aceptan el discurso de la participación y 
del bien comün. En una carta dirigida a los dirigentes campesinos amenazan con la expropiación, 
en caso necesario con la violencia policial, sobre la cual el Estado tiene el monopolio. Argumentan 
que no puede ser que por el interés propio de un par de campesinos indigenas sin criterio técnico 
el bienestar de toda una ciudad tiene que postergar o arriesgarse. Nina Pacari analiza este 
fenômeno con precision: "Hay un contenido racista inconsciente de no darles prioridad [...] como 
que son algunas familias nomâs y a mâs de esto son indigenas nomâs. Cuando se dice que 'para 
algunas familias indigenas no podemos parar el proyecto de toda una ciudad', hay un racismo de 
por medio porque se trata de comunidades indigenas, pero si fuera un terrateniente ". Es 
cierto, el desarrollo histórico y reciente del agua en los Andes se caracteriza por hechos repetidos 
en que unas pocas personas de poder polîtico-econômico profündamente manipulan las polîticas 
e intervenciones hidricas. En Alao hay varias haciendas, y no es muy dificil encontrar alli un 
terreno amplio y técnicamente apto para construir la planta de tratamiento. Rosa Guamân, 
dirigente campesina de Licto, ha experimentado este fenômeno durante todo su vida: "Siempre es 
asî, les parece tan fâcil de perjudicar a los mâs débiles, los minifundistas". 
Sea con el discurso horizontal de la participación, sea con el mâs vertical de la violencia 
legitimada - ambos en términos del 'interés publico' - los planes hîdricos oficialmente establecidos 
no deben obstruirse, menos aûn cuando los campesinos reclaman marcos normativos propios que 
no encuentran respaldo en la ley. El hecho de que las familias afectadas no tienen papeles 
oficiales de titulación de tierras y que han 'creado' sus derechos de agua mediante su labor en la 
construcción del sistema pero no tienen papeles otorgados por el Estado, significa que no tienen 
ninguna base para reclamar. Mâs bien, asi va la logica, al ofrecerles una compensación el Estado 
les hace un favor, no es un derecho. La legislación liberal, positivista y universal no reconoce 
anomalias y justicia propia que, segun el Director de Agua Potable, es rasgo propio de los 
canibales, no de los educados: "Mire, al estar nosotros en un Estado soberano creo que nosotros 
debemos ser, estar obligados a cumplir con las leyes de la Repüblica porque todos tenemos 
obligaciones, deberes, derechos y creo que debemos cumplirlos, no creo que nosotros debamos 
retroceder al canibalismo y hacer justicia con nuestras propias manos, entiendo que todos ahora 
tenemos la oportunidad de pensar, hemos estudiado, se prétende que todo el mundo sea 
educado. [...] Yo creo que las leyes son en algunos aspectos universales, siempre se estân viendo 
el aspecto global, el aspecto general de la gente, los beneficios y las posibilidades de desarrollar. 
Creo que en todo el mundo el momento que se tiene que hacer un proyecto que abarque gran 
extension, en el que abarque gran capital, en el que abarque soluciones por muchos anos, se 
tiene que optar por las leyes y eso es lo que pasa aqui" (Director de Agua Potable). 
Claramente, aûn cuando las polîticas oficiales de la descentralización en Latino America dan 
mucho peso a la institución del Municipio como representante mâs cercana y mâs fiel a las bases, 
esto no es ninguna garantia para aliviar la situación de los grupos marginados, y las comunidades 
campesinas e indigenas también conocen la otra cara de estas representaciones. Como observa 
uno de los dirigentes del comité de defensa de Tulabug: "Yo lo califico como un acto criminal, que 
no se puede concebir que el Municipio de Riobamba que représenta al pueblo, esta en contra del 
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pueblo y en contra de la cultura indigena: si no tenemos tierra no tenemos cultura y si no tenemos 
cultura no tenemos vida. Si el Municipio va a ejecutar este proyecto creo que las comunidades 
indigenas estén dispuestas a defender inclusive con su sangre estas tierras". 
A esta observación se suma Inès Chapi, argumentando que la descentralización en si no 
asegura de ninguna manera la participaciôn ciudadana. "Solo la lucha es la que nos ha de sacar 
en adelante, solo luchando podremos defender nuestros derechos, lo que nos corresponde. No 
porque somos indigenas, porque somos campesinas, nos van a venir atropellar nadie...". La 
situación es complicada, "...yo me temo de que va a ocurrir un enfrentamiento entre el Estado y 
los usuarios, los campesinos, porque como el Municipio es institución del Estado para ellos es fâcil 
traer policias, traer ai ejército y querer desalojar a la fuerza. Pero nosotros, claro, esta comunidad 
de aqui no es una sola comunidad, son 17 comunidades que se solidarizarian para apoyar aquî a 
los companeros, pero me temo que debe haber una lucha bien fuerte, un enfrentamiento. [...] Se 
puede dar un enfrentamiento aquî, como el gobernador también esta de parte del Municipio. Fécil 
es para el gobernador pedir a la policîa, al ejército y que haya un enfrentamiento, ellos tienen 
armas, ellos tienen gases, en cambio nosotros como campesinos nosotros no tenemos nada de 
eso. Lo que nos defendemos es asî reclamando nuestros propios derechos" (Inès Chapi). 
Estas historias no tienen fin, solo fines temporales. Fue un gran alivio de todas las familias 
campesinas que las previsiones de la dirigente Inès esta vez no se hicieron realidad, y que el 
enfrentamiento con el ejército, que se ha producido tantas veces en la historia muy reciente de 
Licto, no se ha dado esta vez. Por la gran protesta campesina indigena, las autoridades 
municipales se vieron forzadas a presionar para que los técnicos disefiaran otra alternativa para la 
ubicaciôn de la planta de tratamiento, en un terreno de una ex-hacienda (de Molobog, que de 
todas maneras ya estaba en proceso de vender sus terrenos). Aparentemente, la anteriormente 
proclamada "ûnica opción técnica y economicamente viable" del discurso cientifico-positivista de 
los técnicos, no fue tan ûnica. Como todo diseno de obras hidrâulicas, fue una construcción 
politico-social, una de las multiples que se pueden concebir cuando la gente reclama y ya no 
acepta la hegemonîa del positivismo y el primado de la reglas de la hidrocracia nacional y local.40 
Caso 3: La Interjuntas frente a la Agencia de Aguas - la injusticia descentralizada 
En medio del proceso de privatization y descentralización de las instituciones estatales 
encargadas de la cuestiôn hidrica en el Ecuador, desde 1994, el Estado armé una estructura 
nacional de gestion sin ninguna consulta popular. En la region central del pais asi se creó la 
Corporación Regional de Desarrollo Sierra Centra (CORSICEN) en las provincias de Chimborazo, 
Tungurahua y Cotopaxi. Cuando, después de dos aftos, el gobierno decidió 'recentralizar' la 
estructura, aglutinando las oficinas regionales de las tres provincias para establecer la sede 
central de CORSICEN en Tungurahua, surgió una gran protesta de las organizaciones de usuarios 
del agua en Chimborazo. No aceptaron el desplazamiento de la oficina de Riobamba, porque les 
dificultarîa enormemente reclamar sus derechos y realizar sus trâmites. A raiz de este conflicto 
surgió la creación de la Junta Provincial de Regantes, en 1997, para velar por los intereses de las 
organizaciones asociadas. Como resultado de su protesta se estableció una sede estatal en 
Chimborazo, CODERECH. Por razones de manipuleo politico y falta de democracia interna y 
representatividad la Junta se debilitó, hecho que llevó a la creación de una plataforma de 
organizaciones de base mucho mâs activa, representativa y democrâtica: la organización 
provincial Interjuntas Chimborazo. Esta organización inter-sistemas, iniciado por las 
organizaciones intercomunitarias de Guarguallâ-Licto, Chambo, Cebadas, Chingazo Pungales, 
Penipe , Quimiag y otras, agrupa a una gran cantidad de organizaciones locales, grandes y 
pequenos, todos mayoritariamente de familias minifundistas. Su objetivo es "... agrupar a todos 
los sistemas de riego y agua para consumo humano de la provincia y generar capacidad de 
defensa y propuesta politica y legal de los usuarios. Busca ademâs el fortalecer la capacidad de 
gestion de organizaciones de usuarios de sistemas de agua e impulsar espacios de interlocución, 
concertación, coordinación, capacitación, y debate" (Interjuntas 2004).41 
40
 Poco tiempo después, el Estado no pudo cumplir con sus promesas financieras y hasta ahora el proyecto 
queda, con numerosos otros proyectos de gran escala, en la 'lista de espera'. 
41
 Interjuntas tiene una relación de trabajo estrecha con la Comisión Permanente de Derechos Humanos, SNV, y 
el programa WALIR (Water Law and Indigenous Rights) 
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A la par de incidir, desde abajo, en la construction de politicas y legislation hfdricas, un tema 
principal de Interjuntas es la gestion de conflictos: entre usuarios y entre sistemas asociados, pero 
sobre todo entre grupos marginados y terratenientes asi como entre los campesinos indîgenas y el 
Estado. Allî su roi es de representante y defensor legal de los grupos marginados. Por la gran 
cantidad de conflictos, muchas veces a raiz de juegos de poder o por adjudicaciones de caudales 
irreales y no existentes por la Agencia de Aguas de Chimborazo, Interjuntas ha decidido 
establecer un centra de defensa de derechos y mediation de conflictos dentro de su federation. 
Alli, campesinos indîgenas, muchos de los cuales no pueden pagar un abogado comùn, 
encuentran respaldo para sus reclamos. Allf también, los lideres campesinos junto con algunos 
abogados jóvenes solidarios se enfrentan con el gran problema que las estructuras de poder y las 
politicas hidricas del pais han causado: 
Mientras que los caudales se disminuyen y la demanda de la población y actores exógenos 
crece, hay mâs solicitudes para el registro de derechos al agua. Las Agencias de Aguas, sin 
embargo, no tienen la capacidad de monitorear los caudales realmente existentes en las fuentes y 
rîos - no existe un sistema de monitoreo de las tomas de agua, y la situation de personal 
habilitado para esto se ha empeorado después de las olas de privatization irresponsable. Aun asi, 
muchas Agencias de Aguas siguen otorgando nuevas concesiones sin poder controlar ni la 
existencia de caudal suficiente, la extraction actual, o el uso de tomas no autorizadas. Muchas 
veces son los usuarios poderosos, como terratenientes o empresas agrocomerciales, los que 
logran conseguir nuevas concesiones; alli, en las sentencias de la Agentia de Chimborazo es 
comûn que la coima, el color de la piel y el estatus polîtico-economico son factures decisivos. 
Luego, la sobre-adjudicación de derechos al agua causa nuevos conflictos (robo, destruction de 
obras, distribution injusta, etc.), muchos de los cuales llegan al proceso judicial, donde es la 
misma instancia, la Agencia de Aguas, que tiene que 'hacer justicia' (Interjuntas 2004). La 
Agencia, con la limitada capacidad personal, ademâs con sus précticas discriminatorias, no esta 
en la capacidad de resolver estos conflictos, y asi sigue el circulo vicioso. 
Es evidente como la Agencia de Aguas, que cae bajo el CNRH (Consejo National de Recursos 
Hidricos) y que es una de las bases del programa de descentralización, constituye uno de los 
mayores problemas para los usuarios menos acomodados (Dâvila et al. 2005). Como dicen los 
minifundistas, es régla casi general que la Agencia no respeta a las sentencias que ella misma ha 
otorgada (Interjuntas 2004). Muchas veces son maltratados por razones de clase (campesino), 
etnia (indigena) o généra (cuando son mujeres). Ademés de los resultados injustas en la 
adjudication de derechos y el alto costo (intransparente) de los trâmites, el proceso de 
adjudication es largo y muy inseguro. A mediados de 2003, el total de las personas empleadas en 
las oficinas de las Agencias es de solo 84 técnicos, que tienen que tramitar la acumulación de las 
21.000 solicitudes de concesiones y otras demandas légales; para fines de comparación: en todas 
las décadas anteriores se ha logrado registrar un total de 35.000 derechos hidricos (Hendriks et al. 
2003; Cremers et al. 2005). 
Los dirigentes y usuarios miembros de las organizaciones que constituyen Interjuntas, 
cansados de los muchos afîos de abuso, discrimination, corruption y arbitrariedad por parte de la 
jefatura y la secretaria judicial de la Agencia de Aguas de Chimborazo, decidieron tomar action 
colectiva para definitivamente acabar la injusticia. En enero 2005, 200 représentantes de las 
organizaciones miembras fueron a Quito para denunciar el jefe de la Agencia ante el Secretario 
General del CNRH. Forzados por las protestas, el CNRH no podia hacer otra cosa que instalar 
una comisión de investigation para analizar las denuncias. El 24 de marzo, durante una reunion 
con CNRH en Riobamba, los dirigentes campesinos y jóvenes abogados presentaren una gran 
serie de casos de corrupción y racismo notorios, minuciosamente preparados en las semanas 
anteriores. Al mismo tiempo se llenaron las calles de Riobamba con centenares de campesinos 
regantes de toda la provincia, y entraron las salas del Consejo Provincial en una protesta masiva. 
El CNRH solo pudo decidir despedir al jefe y el staff abusivo de la Agencia de Aguas. A los 
dirigentes de Interjuntas se les propuso proponer el mejor candidato para reemplazar al Jefe de la 
Agencia. La federation presentó de candidato a una profesional de agua muy comprometida con 
la causa de los regantes comunes. 
Sin embargo, después del cambio del gobierno national - producto del levantamiento national 
contra la presidencia - se cambia también la directiva nacional de CNRH, y por juegos polïticos la 
misma nuevamente ratifica en su cargo al antiguo y corrupto Jefe de la Agencia de Aguas, 
desoyendo abiertamente los reclamos y demandas planteadas por las organizaciones de usuarias 
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de Chimborazo. Los usuarios campesinos e indigenas, nuevamente y con aün mâs ferocidad, 
decider) movilizarse frente a esta injusticia, y el 27 de junio mâs de 4.000 usuarios de agua de 
toda la provincia, se toman la Agencia de Aguas. Durante 16 dias, y mediante turnos constantes 
para defenderse, ocupan la sede de la Agencia, hasta que por fin logren que su reclamo sea 
escuchado, que el Jefe sea destituida y que la Agencia se transforme en un órgano mâs justo, 
transparente y democrâtico (Interjuntas 2005, Dâvila et al. 2005). 
-0-0-0-0-0-
Los tres casos muestran no solo que las politicas de descentralización no presentan ninguna 
garantia de una mejora en las relaciones hfdricas y la toma de decisiones democrâtica sino 
también apuntan al gran peligro que puede producir la implementación de estas politicas en la 
practica, sobre todo para los actores menos acomodados. Como dice Nina Pacari (corn, pers., oct. 
2004): "La descentralización segûn el modelo occidental ha estado en que se distribuya la toma de 
decision un poquito mejor geogrâficamente, pero la forma de decision siga siendo hegemónica". 
Tienden a canalizar el poder y la toma de decisiones hacia las mismas autoridades de siempre, 
pero ahora al nivel del gobierno local. La gran importancia de que estos poderes siguen siendo 
'monitoreados' por los grupos de base - mediante control de las prâcticas, acción colectiva y, si es 
necesario, resistencia - es fundamental para garantizar o instalar (suficiente grado de) democracia 
politica, justicia distributiva, y respeto de los derechos campesinos e indigenas en la gestion de 
sus aguas. La descentralización y la redistribución del agua y del poder para la toma de 
decisiones necesariamente debe hacerse por medio de la participación ciudadana. 
Alli, esta participación no es regalada y muchas veces no se basa en el dialogo abierto, 
transparente, habermasiano, entre iguales, en un ambiente de armonîa. Las relaciones sociales y 
estructuras de poder existentes dan el trasfondo de la concertación. El caso andino muestra que la 
gran mayoria de las inversiones pûblicas en la gestion del agua se las realiza en beneficio de las 
âreas y los actores ya bien acomodados y mâs organizados. Muestra también que la acción 
publica y las instituciones estatales, nacionales o del gobierno local, no son neutras. El acceso a 
los recursos generalmente refleja los intereses de aquellos grupos que pueden influir en la 
construcción de las reglas locales y nacionales sobre el reparte 
Las luchas arriba analizadas también muestran que no son, como muchos observadores creen, 
una batalla simple entre intereses püblicos y privados sobre el agua, ni tampoco es un conflicto 
entre reglmenes comunales y privados con los primeras asociados con la tradición y los segundos 
con la modernidad. Los derechos, y las luchas sobre derechos y autoridad, no ejemplifican 
solamente la naturaleza inherentemente politica del agua y su asociación cercana con las 
relaciones de poder, sino que en los Andes también estân estrechamente asociados con 
identidades y significaciones culturales. De alli que, si bien lo que esta en juego en estas luchas 
es la seguridad en la tenencia de agua, las luchas no son solo por el agua misma. También lo son 
acerca de la representación y la toma de decisiones, acerca de significaciones culturales y 
etnicidad, acerca del derecho de autodefinirse y existir como entes colectivos e individuos, acerca 
de la igualdad y la diferencia, acerca del poder y de la identidad. 
2.6 Reflexiones 
Es llamativo como las nuevas propuestas y acciones de reforma hîdrica en la region andina 
ligan el âmbito local con lo internacional. No solo obedecen a una politica de descentralización, 
supuestamente basado en principios de subsidiaridad, sino que también tienen como objetivo 
realizar un gobierno que facilita la interacción e intercambio entre el plano local, nacional e 
internacional mediante derechos y reglas compartidos entre todos. Es llamativo también como en 
las ültimas dos décadas estas nuevas politicas internacionales, que pretenden democratizar la 
gestion del agua y descentralizar la toma de decisiones, se han impuesto sobre la region andina, 
con mucha agresividad y sin posibilidad de interferencia y control algunos de la gran mayoria de 
los usuarios y usuarias del agua. 
Debajo de las premisas de eficiencia y racionalidad, como sucesoras de los enfoques y 
politicas estatistas, los procesos de individualización de la gestion colectiva y las politicas de 
privatización de derechos de agua crean un enorme peligro para las comunidades indigenas y 
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campesinas en los Andes. Esto también es la causa mayor para las recientes y muy intensas 
guerras de agua bolivianas, y las protestas masivas en Ecuador y Peru. Los programas de reforma 
politica y legal de la gestion de recursos hidricos se fundamentan en la uniformización de las 
normas de gestion. Para facilitar el control burocrético, en la tradición de los hidrócratos, o para 
crear un mercado eficiente de derechos de agua, en la linea de los neoliberales, se considéra 
necesario superar las prâcticas de la población campesina andina que se denominan 'atrasadas' o 
'no adecuadas a los objetivos comunes nacionales'. Segün esta logica, la eficiencia económica y 
social y el bienestar de todos incrementarian considerablemente si todos siguiesen el mismo 
discurso, con las mismas normas, y si existiesen réglas generales que se pueden aplicar a todos los 
sujetos de la misma manera. Por lo tanto, aün cuando se producen cambios legales para 'reconocer 
juridico y polïticamente' los derechos consuetudinarios y descentralizar el gobierno del agua, los 
fundamentos bâsicos y valores superiores que se mantienen son la generalidad y la homogeneidad 
legal. 
La legitimación de esta generalidad se fundamenta en un supuesto objetivo comün de los 
diversos sectores sociales con respecto a la gestion del agua: una armónica fusion de intereses e 
ideologias. Supone también la existencia de una institución o entidad de regulación imparcial, el 
Estado, el mercado, o ültimamente, inclusive la plataforma multi-actor descentralizada y 
concertada, que vigile uniformemente y racionalmente los derechos de todos. Sin embargo, las 
experiencias en cuanto a los conflictos sobre el agua y su gestion en los Andes muestran lo 
contrario: la falta de respeto para los derechos locales dentro del marco legal y la falta de 
imparcialidad de las instituciones rectoras para la gestion del agua. No es dificil constatar que el 
argumento liberal de la igualdad ante la Ley, fundamental en todos los enfoques presentados, 
résulta ser un mito en la practica legal de los paîses andinos - esto es ilustrado, por ejemplo, por la 
capacidad de los sectores hegemónicos de manipular legalmente los conflictos sobre los recursos 
naturales. Sin embargo, la ideologia del argumento si es suficientemente fuerte como para 
contrarrestar las demandas de diversos grupos étnicos y sociales por un reconocimiento real del 
derecho de ser diferente. Esta ideologia deslegitima la gestion del agua de acuerdo a las normas 
locales y organizaciones autónomas. 
Tal como e! modelo estatista, el discurso neoliberal dériva principalmente su fuerza y su 
legitimidad de su presentation despolitizada y la imposition de lo suyo como algo auto-evidente, 
pero ademâs, construye e impone activamente una institucionalidad y logica de su propia 
inevitabilidad. Al hacerlo, el modelo neoliberal no solo asume y desea leyes universales, sino que 
activamente las establece. Aunque proclama 'decentralizar' y respetar el pluralismo legal y cultural 
existente, por ejemplo, en la gestion del agua, la coexistencia de una gran diversidad de reglas, 
leyes, derechos y obligaciones es activamente desalentada, ya que tal diversidad obstruiria las 
transferencias y ventas regionales e internacionales, lo que requière de un marco legal uniforme. 
Las reglas y los derechos locales son consideradas anomalias que frenan las inversiones y el 
lucro. Por tanto, en la region andina, las polîticas de agua mercantiles no remplazan a las politicas 
burocrâticas, como comûnmente se ha sugerido en los discursos de la descentralización, sino que 
se complementan unas a otras al disciplinar y actuar en contra del pluralismo de los repertorios de 
derechos de agua. Asi, las burocracias estatales son "reformadas" para proveer y pasar una 
legislación que permita que los mercados de agua emerjan. Los sistemas de derechos 
comunitarios y colectivos que no calzan en el cuadro neoliberal son, por definición, atrasados e 
ineficientes. Por lo tanto, son condenados a marchitarse y verse (sutilmente) incluidos en el 
mercado como algo con potencial para igualarse42, o son forzados a juntarse al juego neoliberal 
en términos desiguales (Boelens y Zwarteveen 2005). 
42
 Tanto en el modelo estatista (liberal), como en el pensamiento politico neoliberal se asume que todos los 
actores relacionados con el agua se comportan como si fueran iguales. Para el ultimo, tal suposición es crucial, ya 
que los mercados solo funcionan si todos los participantes actüan "como iguales". Los estândares de esta 
igualdad permanecen escondidos bajo la capa de la ciencia positivista. Tal escondimiento permite que los 
estândares y normas sean presentados como una inevitable ley natural. Las diferencias que realmente existen, 
caracterizadas por divisiones y diferenciaciones históricamente enraizadas en términos de poder de toma de 
decisiones, ingresos monetarios, habilidades aprendidas, informacion y educación, que fuertemente favorecen a 
las compafiias privadas y a los actores de poder económico, se ignoran en el discurso o se presentan 
precisamente como el hueco sobre el cual hay que tender un puente para que los potenciales iguales se unan al 
juego mercantil. 
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Para aquellos sistemas indigenas y campesinos que tienen disposición de incluirse el anâlisis 
positivista llega a la conclusion de que el problema principal es que 'carecen de educación y 
reglas modernos para la gestion racional del agua' ya que tienen un atraso y falta de acceso a la 
legislación oficial. Por tanto, el discurso oficial sugiere que a través de la explicación - es decir, la 
capacitación legal - y el mejoramiento de los medios de comunicación y el acceso legal e 
institucional - mediante el desarrollo rural y del mercado - se deberia posibilitar la inclusion de 
estos pueblos y de sus organizaciones de usuarios de agua, que se consideran excluidos del 
sistema normativo general, y consecuentemente, de los beneficios sociales de la sociedad 
nacional. Asi se llega a la capacitación de los 'incapaces', la conscientización de los 
'inconcientes' y la inclusion de los 'excluidos'. 
Pero las prâcticas actuales en el uso del agua y de los sistemas de derechos de agua en los 
Andes estân profundamente embebidas en sistemas normativos, instituciones légales y sociales, 
redes poli'ticas y ambientes agroecológicos plurales. La sugerencia fundamental de las politicas 
neoliberales de que los "derechos de agua" pueden ser de manera sencilla levantados y aislados 
de esta realidad compleja y de esta organization historica de control, para poder "llevarlos al 
mercado", no puede ser tomada en cuenta de manera séria a menos que se acepte una 
destrucción o una transformación radical de las subsistencias locales. Las reformas de agua 
propuestas, aunque son presentadas como neutras y cientificas, involucran modificaciones 
bastante drâsticas de las estructuras sociales y politicas en las cuales estén embebidos los 
sistemas de gestion de agua, y de las maneras en las que el agua es apropiada, distribuida y 
manejada. Si se implementan estas politicas, tales relaciones se ven dictadas por leyes, 
instituciones y mercados extracomunales. 
Sin embargo, la logica asimiladora basada en la 'normalización de los no normales' hace que 
muchos sectores sociales, en particular las comunidades indigenas y campesinas, no se 
reconozcan y no se sientan reconocidos. Aün cuando algunas constituciones si reconocen la 
multiculturalidad, esto generalmente no se traduce en criterios y procedimientos concretos en la 
legislación hidrica o agraria. Por ello, efectivamente, la ultima década se ha caracterizado por una 
auto-reorganización de la identidad andina e indigena, tanto en el campo de la lucha por una 
normatividad hidrica como en las sociedades andinas en general. Alli llegamos al cuarto enfoque 
de 'acción colectiva' descrita en la segunda sección: a la par de estrategias campesinas e 
indigenas dirigidas a la (re-)apropiación del recurso agua y la infraestructura asociada, también se 
produce una lucha por auto-definir las réglas, derechos y formas organizativas para la gestion del 
agua, asi como por la legitimidad de la autoridad local para establecer y sancionar estos derechos 
y reglas. Ademâs, es una pugna en torno a la construcción de sus propios discursos sobre 'la 
comunidad', 'lo andino' y 'lo indigena', y las politicas para regular el agua de manera 
concomitante. Obviamente, este proceso estratégico-politico, que busca una contra-identificación 
dinâmica, no necesariamente esta basado solo en verdades y derechos 'tradicionales', ni 
solamente en normas y reglas 'locales'. El mismo proceso de reclamar la redefinición del derecho 
positivo también es y nutre a la construcción, re-invención y transformación de los mismos 
'derechos consuetudinarios', asi como que es una afirmación y también reconstrucción de las 
identidades locales y culturas hi'dricas. 
Simultâneamente es una lucha en contra de las politicas de reconocimiento hidrocrâtico y 
neoliberal que buscan domesticar esta variedad de reglas y derechos 'desobedecientes y no-
planificables'.43 Las luchas por el agua en los Andes, enfonces, también son luchas para lograr 
una especificidad y una autonomia locales, para ejercer el derecho de autodefinir la naturaleza los 
problemas del agua asi como para decidir sobre la dirección de las soluciones. Las luchas son 
una critica de la propia racionalidad de las reformas y activamente cuestionan sus pretensiones de 
neutralidad y objetividad. Muestran que las opciones de politicas que estân justificadas sobre la 
base de la neutralidad y la eficiencia, en la practica real funcionan para promover una muy clara 
agenda politica. Evidencian también, como se ha ilustrado con algunos casos locales, que una 
simple politica de descentralización y subsidiaridad sin cambiar las relaciones de poder y las 
estructuras y comportamientos hidrocrâticos en los gobiernos locales refuerza en vez de 
43
 Aquf es importante constatar que en los Andes hay muchas formas de gestion del agua que a primera vista 
parecen ser sujetos de una influencia fuerte del sistema legal oficial y las nuevas politicas de reconocimiento y 
descentralización, mientras que un anâlisis mâs profundo muestra lo contrario. No obstante la supuesta homoge-
neidad y formalidad de estas normas 'para la representation externa' y la 'protecciôn formai' existe una tremenda 
diversidad organizativa y normativa bajo esta superficie. 
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cuestionar los abusos existentes. Necesariamente deben redisenarse estas estructuras 
institucionales, tanto nacionales como locales. Ademâs tendrian que complementarse con redes e 
instituciones de base, estrategias interactivas, e instrumentos democrâticos que explicitan y 
presionan por cambiar las relaciones de poder y que vigilan los resultados. 
Para ello, en vez de enfoques y politicas que se basan en el positivismo y la objetivación, para 
entender la logica campesina e indïgena de gestion de agua, y cuestionar las reformas hïdricas y 
proponer alternativas, se requière de perspectivas que ponen énfasis en la pluralidad y la 
contextualización. En vez de naturalizar las cuestiones politicas de la distribución y control de los 
recursos naturales se necesita un reconocimiento mucho mâs explicita de las politicas y el poder 
en las discusiones sobre reformas de agua. Hace falta permitir un enfoque sobre las normas 
reaies y prâcticas que rodean la distribución hîdrica, uno que enfoca el contenido especifico de los 
derechos y leyes de aguas como fuentes y productos de las culturas dinâmicas y luchas sociales. 
Asi, efectivamente, la lucha por el control del agua es tanto una lucha por una justicia distributiva 
como una lucha discursiva y politica por el reconocimiento y la legitimidad. 
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3 Cultural Politics, Communal Resistance and Identity in 
Andean Irrigation Development44 
RUTGERD BOELENS and PAUL H. GELLES45 
This article uses two case studies to illustrate how Andean irrigation development and 
management emerges from a hybrid mix of local community rules and the changing political forms 
and ideological forces of hegemonic states. Some indigenous water-control institutions are with us 
today because they were consonant with the extractive purposes of local elites and Inca, Spanish 
and post-independence Republican states. These states often appropriated and standardized local 
water management rules, rights and rituals in order to gain control over the surplus produced by 
these irrigation systems. However, as we show in the case of two communities in Ecuador and 
Peru, many of these same institutions are reappropriated and redirected by local communities to 
counteract both classic 'exclusion-oriented' and modern 'inclusion-oriented' water and identity 
politics. In this way, they resist subordination, discrimination and the control of local water 
management by rural elites or state actors. 
Keywords: Andes, water control, collective action, identity, cultural politics, resistance 
3.1 Introduction 
Against a historical and theoretical backdrop concerning the cultural politics of irrigation 
development, our article compares local and state norms for managing water in two Andean 
communities. In addition to detailing different political, economic and cultural forces that affect 
irrigation management and development in these communities, we examine the ideologies that 
modernizing nation-states extend to irrigation systems on their periphery. These ideologies claim to 
work to the benefit of these systems and the communities dependent upon them, while in fact they 
often serve the controlling interests of the state and national and international power holders. Our 
article demonstrates that local communities dynamically resist these subordinating water and 
identity politics through different means. 
In large part the product of each nation's colonial and postcolonial history, national irrigation 
institutions and policies in the Andean region are tied to an international bureaucratic tradition of 
development (Lynch, 1988). Notwithstanding the last decade's shift to neo-liberal economic 
policies and state downsizing, official policies have often used decentralization discourses and 
privatization programs to strengthen, not weaken, their control over local water management. This 
was done by prescribing new 'rational' forms of water management, and by transferring 
responsibilities while maintaining decision-making power. The main pillars of the bureaucratic 
tradition remain in place: the preponderance of technocratic 'expert' knowledge, top-down rule-
making and the use of system design and 'modern' management models based on the class, 
cultural and gender norms of the designers, not the users (Scott, 1990; Diemer and Slabbers, 
1992; van der Ploeg and Long, 1994; Escobar, 1995; Bauer, 1997; Zwarteveen, 1997; Pacari' 
1998). 
After providing the larger historical and theoretical contexts, we illustrate the dynamic political 
struggles found in highland water control and development through two case studies, one from 
Ecuador (Licto) and the other from Peru (Cabanaconde). The two cases were chosen because 
they illustrate both covert and overt forms of domination by outsiders as well as differing local 
strategies of resistance. Our general argument is that changes in local normative systems must be 
understood historically in relation to the cultural, political and economic foundations of Andean 
society, as well as in relation to diverse contemporary power structures within which local irrigation 
systems are generated, reproduced and transformed. Imperial and postcolonial states appropriated 
'indigenous' water-management norms and expanded upon them to legitimate their authority and 
44
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effectively organize surplus extraction. However, our article shows that diverse forms and rules of 
water management, such as water rights creation mechanisms in Licto and dual organization in 
Cabanaconde, have been reappropriated by indigenous peasants and now serve counter-
hegemonic purposes in these and many other highland communities. 
3.2 The Appropriation of Local Beliefs and Institutions by Inka and 
Spanish Regimes 
The rituals, beliefs, norms and institutions for collective action associated with Andean 
communities are those most easily exoticised and romanticized in representations of the Andes. 
Conversely, critiques of such representations often relegate Andean livelihood strategies and 
worldviews to the margins, thus trivializing a key component of highland cultural identity. Forged 
within indigenous and Iberian colonial contexts, Andean livelihood strategies and practices are 
dynamic and vary greatly from place to place, interacting with other cultural spheres and political 
ideologies (Gelles and Martinez, 1993; Baud, Konings, Oostindie, Ouweneel and Silva, 1996; 
Baud, 1997). But even the seemingly autochthonous, local worldviews are often not entirely 
indigenous to the places where they are practiced, but were forged in a colonial context, albeit that 
of an indigenous empire, the Inka. 
Local practices and beliefs of water control, in both the technical and cultural sense, were 
connected to wider 'identification policies' and embodied political processes of incorporation and 
standardization. For example, local mountain cults (often directed to sources of irrigation water) 
were strongly linked to beliefs about primordial origins and to ethnic identities; these cults were 
symbolically appropriated by the Inka Empire and incorporated in the broader framework of Inka 
state religion. The empire used the most local and primordial of religious beliefs to establish its 
legitimacy and extend its hegemony throughout the Andes. So, too, with water itself. 
The Inka claimed Lake Titicaca, the largest body of water in the Andes, as the source of its 
imperial origin. This was an extension of the widespread belief that the ancestors of local 
communities and polities originated from particular mountains, springs, lakes and other sources of 
water (Sherbondy, 1998). By appropriating Lake Titicaca as its origin place, the Inka Empire made 
itself the centre of this hydrological cosmovision. While their elaborate road system connected the 
most remote areas to a centralized power apparatus in a military and tribute-paying sense, the 
symbolic incorporation of all local water sources into one, centralized religious and hydrological 
presentation became a powerful ideological tool. 
We also find that pre-lnkaic forms of cultural and social dualism were appropriated and 
expanded upon by the Inka state as a means to legitimate its power (by using an existing symbolic 
and ritual resource, that is, dualism), to organize productively subject peoples and nations (they 
and their resources were divided along dual lines) and to extract surplus production (tributation 
was organized along dual lines, i.e., through two ethnic chieftains assigned to each conquered 
group). Indeed, the dual spatial divisions, that is, opposed halves or moieties (anansaya/urinsaya 
or upper/lower moiety) found in many Andean communities today, are a legacy of Inka and 
Spanish domination (Gelles, 1995). Under the Inka, for example, this classification was central to 
the social and spatial organization of the Inka Empire (Sherbondy, 1982, 1998; Urton, 1990; 
Zuidema, 1990), including the irrigation systems and other productive resources of the distinct 
peoples they conquered. Because different social and cultural dualisms were present in many pre-
Columbian polities, Inka dual organization restructured the resources and people of the conquered 
areas in a way that was consonant with pre-existing worldviews. Such ideological control facilitated 
the extraction of resources and surplus value along these dual lines; the Spaniards later 
appropriated many of these dual divisions for their own extractive purposes (see Gelles, 2000, for 
more detail). 
Because of its key role in the organization of production, and because it even had some affinity 
with Spanish models of social and political organization, the Spanish state appropriated the saya 
divisions, which continued to be used as a means of extracting surplus from Andean communities. 
Today, a variety of activities in many villages and towns throughout the highlands of Ecuador, 
Bolivia and Peru are still organized along dual lines. As we will see in the second case study 
below, the saya division often finds its most explicit expression in local models of irrigation. 
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Another important local norm that was appropriated by both the Inka and Spanish colonizers 
was the ancestral principle regarding access to irrigation facilities and the creation of water rights. 
Water users earn water rights and create collective hydraulic property by investing their labor and 
resources in the construction and maintenance of irrigation facilities (Boelens and Hoogendam, 
2002). Today, as we will see in our first case study, this mechanism of water rights creation 
remains a leading principle in Andean communities. Yet, we also find that the collective labor of 
local communities was also used for extractive purposes by Inka and Spanish rulers, as well as by 
local elites: communal labor benefiting the local populace was thus transformed into corvée labor. 
In sum, mountain cults, cultural categories based on dualism, the creation of water rights and 
hegemonic models of water management have conditioned each other in complex and variable 
ways over the last centuries. Local cultural orientations, symbolically and administratively 
incorporated into state systems, were active agents in the development and organization of 
centralized political authority. Today, however, modernizing nation-states have other means of 
extracting surplus production and other models for organizing irrigation. 
3.3 Imagined Communities and the Cultural Politics of Andean 
Irrigation Development 
In the Andean nations today, irrigation bureaucracies and the politics of development must be 
understood in the context of state policies which reflect and deploy the political will and cultural 
hegemony of a dominant ethnic group, one which has controlled nation-building processes since 
Independence (in this case since the early nineteenth century). As Herzfeld, in a different context, 
puts it, 'Nationalist ideologies usually lay claim to some kind of constructed "national character". 
Their bureaucracies have the task of calibrating personal and local identity to this construct' (1992: 
3). In a word, the institutional cultures generated within irrigation bureaucracies are inevitably 
shaped by the particular kind of 'imagined community' (Anderson, 1983) to which they belong 
(Maybury-Lewis, 1982; Arce and Long, 1999). 
As such, national irrigation and other bureaucracies are directly tied 'to long established forms 
of social, cultural, and racial exclusion in everyday life' (Herzfeld, 1992: 13). They treat particular 
individuals and groups differentially, depending on whether they are seen as sharing the 
bureaucrats' social world and cultural orientations; this is often expressed with metaphors of race 
and bloodlines. State officials usually ignore indigenous models of resource management not only 
because of the alleged superiority of 'modern' Western cultural forms and organization, but 
because the power holders and dominant cultures of these nations regard indigenous peoples as 
racially and culturally inferior (Gelles, 2000). And, as Lynch (1993) and Boelens and Zwarteveen 
(2002) have shown, this devaluation and exclusion extends to women, as the gender 
discrimination found in the field and in irrigation offices is part and parcel of this bureaucratic 
tradition. 
Here, we need to examine an important change that clearly differentiates power relations in the 
Republican states from their Inka and Spanish colonial predecessors: there is a move from political 
exclusion to an imagined political 'inclusion' of indigenous peoples, from a discourse of racial (and 
thus 'natural' social) differentiation to a discourse of equality46 In addition to appropriating local 
cultural norms for their own extractive purposes, the Inka emperors and other indigenous leaders, 
as well as the kings, conquistadores and hacendados during the Spanish colonial period, 
differentiated and elevated themselves by excluding the subordinated classes from social life, 
services and the public sphere (Flores Galindo, 1988; Bolin, 1990; van der Ploeg, 1998). Many 
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different means, including public displays that glorified and reified the might of the groups in power, 
reinforced this differentiation and social exclusion. In the postcolonial area, the opposite occurs 
with the establishment of the new republics: it is not so much the powerful authorities and landlords 
that are made 'visible', but rather the common people, including those living in peasant and 
indigenous communities, who are now included as 'citizens' in the national project. Indigenous 
peasants thus become 'key target groups' and 'subjects of development', and are brought to the 
fore, by means of a Foucauldian 'disciplining', 'participatory' power of 'equalizing normalization', 
which is present in everyday interactions; 'it actually manifests and reproduces or transforms itself 
in the workplaces, families and other organizational settings of everyday life' (Foucault, 1980). Yet, 
the powerful groups that benefit from this 'inclusive' power, as well as the new mechanisms and 
rules of subordination, in fact remain invisible (Achterhuis, 1988). 
New irrigation legislation and state policies are thus often an expression of postcolonial equality 
discourses; inclusive power strategies gradually get the upper hand, in some instances completely 
replacing earlier exclusive strategies, at others joining forces with them. As De la Cruz (1993) 
observed, 'the principle of equality before the law is valid for the identical and profoundly unjust for 
the diverse' (Stavenhagen and Iturralde, 1990; IUAES-CFLLP, 2000). 'Participation' and 'equality' 
as citizens in mainstream society becomes an important and subtle tool of subordination. This 
horizontal, disciplining power functions because it penetrates people and society as a whole. This 
power is exercised rather than possessed; it is not a "privilege", acquired or preserved, of the 
dominant class, but the overall effect of its strategic positions - an effect that is manifested and 
sometimes extended by the position of those who are dominated' (Foucault, 1995). 
Thus we see, for example, that in the Andes and many world regions, irrigation technicians and 
development professionals introduce virtually the same irrigation techniques, knowledge and 
norms (developed in Western research centers, universities and development enterprises). But 
they are not just 'imposed' in a top-down way: in many instances, it is the indigenous peasants 
themselves, in the Andes and elsewhere, who ask for this same technology, in order to 'progress' 
and leave behind their traditional 'backward' technology, in order to become like the western-
oriented, 'modern farmers, in order to gain economic parity' (van der Ploeg and Long, 1994; 
Escobar, 1995; Boelens, 2003). 
In this way, power in modem nation-states seeks for the inclusion, rather than the exclusion of 
Andean communities, indigenous peasants and other oppressed classes (Achterhuis, 1988; 
Boelens and Dâvila, 1998). At the same time, this 'uniformity' and 'equality' supposedly makes it 
easy to measure these social groups: they are individualized, classified and made 'cases' 
according to the ways that they do or do not fit the model. Yet, their participation often results in 
disappointment, in social and cultural disintegration, and in their being defined as 'permanently 
backward people', due to the impossibility of meeting the norms for being equal. In the words of 
Fanon (1963: 163): 'Bourgeois ideology [. . .] which is the proclamation of an essential equality 
between men, manages to appear logical in its own eyes by inviting the submen to become 
human, and to take as their prototype Western humanity as incarnated in the Western bourgeoisie. 
[. . .] The Western bourgeoisie, though fundamentally racist, most often manages to mask this 
racism by a multiplicity of nuances which allow it to preserve intact its proclamation of mankind's 
outstanding dignity'. 
Another clear example of this is found in the normalizing, 'equalizing' and categorizing 
properties of neo-liberal market ideologies penetrating the Andean nations, including the legal and 
policy frameworks regarding water management. Neo-liberal economic principles are, on the one 
hand, imposed on Andean states by international institutions and national power groups, but, on 
the other hand, many of these basic principles have been adopted and internalized by Andean 
communities, penetrating and subtly transforming local management forms and often 
disarticulating indigenous water control. The gradual individualization of land and water rights, the 
commoditization of labor and exchange relationships in local water control and the acceleration of 
monetary water rights transactions and the demise of customary rights acquisition mechanisms are 
all examples of this transformation. Thus, the deployment of secular, rational, universally 
applicable irrigation models, supported today by water management privatization ideologies, is a 
powerful means by which contemporary nation-states and private interest sectors extend their 
control. 
In sum, it is clear that contemporary nation-states employ a new and different symbology of 
power - espoused in modernization and development discourses as well as in neo-liberal 
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economic policies, which aims to 'include', not to 'exclude'; it pretends to provide universal benefits 
- while in fact extending state control and the cultural orientations of national and international 
power holders. This does not mean that vertical, exclusive power strategies have disappeared. 
Rather, inclusive and exclusive power strategies are the two, changing sides of the same coin, one 
that sometimes shows its 'soft', participatory face while at other times appearing as an outright 
oppressive, top-down strategy. Within this context, the recognition and balanced valuation of local 
beliefs and practices is necessarily precluded because any legitimization of these local norms calls 
into question the state's and market ideology's supposed monopoly on rationality and legitimate 
culture. 
3.4 Constructing Identity and Water Rights in an Ecuadorian 
Irrigation System 
Licto, the name of a highland area in the Chimborazo province of Ecuador, encompasses 28 
indigenous rural communities; it is also the name of the main town. In these communities, which 
are located between 2700 and 3600 m above sea level, demographic pressure has led to the rapid 
degeneration of natural resources. Consequently, subsistence agriculture, carried out primarily by 
women, does not meet basic needs. Intermittent migration and wage labor, especially by men, is a 
necessary complement to local production. 
The total population of Licto is 13,000; 90 per cent are indigenous and ten per cent mestizo 
(mixed). The latter, who traditionally constitute the local elite, generally reside in the town of Licto. 
As in many Andean regions, there is a long history of white mestizo landowners and other local 
power holders subordinating the indigenous communities. The situation has been characterized by 
discrimination and exploitative trade relations; so, too, collective labor investment was until recently 
expropriated by these landlords to serve their private economic goals. 
Although the forms and relationships of exploitation have shifted in the last few decades, 
poverty and ethnic and class-based discrimination endure. There have been countless promises 
from outsiders and development institutions to help these indigenous communities, and just as 
many disappointments. Therefore, when local communities, through the rural indigenous 
Corporation of Rural Organizations of Licto (CODOCAL), were invited in 1989 to take part in an 
ambitious irrigation project, many local indigenous residents were wary. Indeed, it was precisely 
the white-mestizo people living in Licto town who had promoted this project through their contacts 
with the Ecuadorian Institute of Water Resources (INERHI), at that time the governmental irrigation 
agency. Nevertheless, some indigenous leaders from the communities, and many poor women 
from the town of Licto, also saw this project as a potential means to alleviate their poverty and to 
challenge existing power structures. 
INERHI had been working on the studies and execution of the system since 1974. It was a 
classic example of the kind of vertical design and implementation reviewed in the last section, one 
that completely excluded the rural population from any decision-making. In their offices in Quito, 
technical staff who were completely unfamiliar with rural Licto provided the technical and 
organizational designs, which were presented in 1990 as 'the final designs'. 
According to the plans, the main canal would first benefit the town's mestizos, some 500 ha at 
the head-end of the system. This would yet again weaken the situation of the indigenous 
communities, located at the tail-end of the system, thus reinforcing prevailing power structures. 
And contrary to local norms, the design would distribute water to irrigators according to the size of 
their holdings, regardless of their active labor investment in building or maintaining the system. 
Moreover, no night reservoirs were included in the design, thus mandating nocturnal irrigation. This 
implied severe problems for the great majority of future irrigators: women. The difficulties of getting 
permission to go out at night and of leaving little children behind, and the threat of sexual violence, 
would make it difficult, if not impossible, for women to enact their water rights. Finally, the canals 
and hydraulic sectors were designed purely on the basis of technical and geographical criteria, 
ignoring community boundaries. 
This top-down blueprint was bolstered by an organizational and legal design grounded in 
national law and uniformly enforced nation-wide. For example, INERHI's Regulations for 
Administration of Irrigation Systems established that each hydraulic sector should appoint five 
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officers (such as president and vice president). Considering that Licto would have some 120 
hydraulic sectors, this would entail appointing some 600 new leaders, and these would be parallel 
to the existing community leadership structures. As has happened elsewhere in the region, these 
imposed structures would have interfered with communal institutions that assure collective survival. 
Moreover, the Regulations set a single blanket fee that everyone would pay for water service, in 
this way ignoring user labor and organizational contributions, as well as the broad, national 
diversity in system productivity and profitability. 
The combination of these organizational, legal and technical designs clearly illustrates the 
Foucauldian techniques of governance, or instruments of discipline, mentioned in the last section. 
The power of the state agency, as well as that of local elites, would now have an even stronger 
influence on the daily running of the irrigation system. Most communities that joined the project did 
not question the sociotechnical designs since these were portrayed as being 'normal' (i.e. 
according to the set standards), as well as 'modern and efficient' (based on expert knowledge). 
The majority of water users thus saw their communities' self-regulation according to these modern 
norms as a rational, coherent and even progressive response to the project's water development 
opportunities. Nevertheless, these uniform, 'equalizing' rules from outside institutions would deny 
local control over decision-making; they would also facilitate extraction and intensify exogenous 
domination over local livelihoods. The design of the system would thus further strengthen state 
control by the so-called 'inclusion' of the indigenous communities in exogenous, 'modem' 
management. 
However, in the course of 1992 and 1993, the sociopolitical panorama changed dramatically in 
Licto. CODOCAL elected new, strongly committed leaders who wanted to solve conflicts between 
communities, bringing them together within a unified indigenous organization. They established a 
water users' organization, the Irrigation Directorate, within CODOCAL's intercommunal structure 
and rooted it in community organization - not based on the hydraulic sector formula prescribed by 
law. An Ecuadorian NGO, CESA (Central Ecuatoriano de Servicios Agricolas) joined the water-
development efforts of the local communities and supported their claims vis-à-vis the government 
agency. 
In late 1993, INERHI sent the official regulations for administering and organizing governmental 
irrigation systems. But rather than accepting the organizational blueprint and simply paying for the 
water at nation-wide rates (the official approach, which in practice favored some powerful white-
mestizo families), the communities decided to establish their own rules and rights based on a 
fundamental principle: The right to water and management decision-making is earned by those 
who work in the communal labor work-parties, who participate in the water users' organization, and 
who pay their dues according to collectively established contribution rates. The crux of the 
indigenous peasants' protest and proposal was that 'rights cannot be purchased - they must be 
earned'. This is in keeping with notions of 'proportionality' and equity found elsewhere in the Andes 
(Mitchell and Guillet, 1994; Mayer, 2002; Trawick, 2003). 
At the same time, the communities, with support from the NGO, carefully analyzed the 
technical, organizational, and normative designs and discussed their implications and probable 
consequences; they then redesigned the system. However, the government agency's technical 
and administrative officers would not agree to such fundamental changes in 'their system'. In 
addition to having to discard the designs and norms in which they were professionally heavily 
invested, they would have to agree to the design criteria of 'outsiders', indeed, that of 'Indians', 
which was entirely counter to the prevailing racial logic in Ecuador. 
But after two years of struggle and negotiations47 in which the countervailing power of the 
indigenous communities grew strongly, the agency had to accept that the project was destined to 
fail and, even worse, was in danger of becoming a political fiasco; social peace, public image, and 
election votes were at risk. INERHI was forced to redesign the system with the participation of the 
communities and the NGO. But they refused to discuss the 'illegal' organizational and normative 
proposals proposed by the communities. 
47
 For an elaboration of this political, sociotechnical and discursive struggle, see the film 'The Right to be Different' 
(Wageningen University-Agrapen, 2003), Chapter 36 of Boelens and Da'vila (1998) and Chapter 7 of Boelens and 
Hoogendam (2002). 
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Again the communities prevailed. Despite the fact that the State agency was unwilling to ratify 
the rules formulated by the indigenous organization, the latter quickly enforced those rules as the 
guiding principles of their own system. According to these principles, paying fees to the State was 
not enough to obtain rights to water and decision-making; rather these rights would be 'created' 
during system construction and 'recreated and consolidated' through the users' participation in 
operation and maintenance. This ancient Andean norm, which in the past had been appropriated 
by states for their own hegemonic interests, was now reappropriated by local communities; it 
became the solid foundation for the system's management, and, indeed, much more. 
This norm became an all-purpose tool that indigenous communities could use to challenge both 
the State as well as the town's white-mestizo families. On the basis of this criterion of 'creating 
rights', there has been a consciousness-raising process in which communities built a new identity, 
a 'hydraulic identity', based on their own specific rules. First, the tail-end indigenous communities' 
were united in an indigenous irrigators' association with its own principles; second, once they were 
on solid ground with clear, strong norms and the capacity for negotiation, this organization 'invited 
the town to join'. The white-mestizo townsfolk of Licto thus had to accept the equitable criteria 
already established by the communities themselves. 
As one might expect, this organizational strategy and transformation at first faced great 
resistance from white-mestizo power groups in the town of Licto. When they saw their power 
dissipating, some tried to keep manipulating the situation; as one indigenous informant, recreating 
a conversation between powerful mestizos that he had overheard, related: 'Don't worry - when the 
water gets here we'll just talk with our buddies at the irrigation agency and we'll get all the water. 
There's no need to work in the communal work parties. C'mon, how could we possibly work with 
Indians?!' (Boelens and Hoogendam, 2002: 162). 
Nevertheless, the strategy of the intercommunity irrigation organization, structured within the 
indigenous peasant organization CODOCAL, succeeded; it has now grown to become the 
strongest political force in Licto. But change has come about, not only through the empowerment of 
indigenous communities and the efforts of CODOCAL and the NGO, but also through 'subversive' 
processes in the town of Licto itself. The poorest groups in town, many headed by women, called 
together all the neighborhoods in the town of Licto in order to form a democratic irrigation 
organization, just as the indigenous communities had done (for a gendered analysis, see Arroyo 
and Boelens, 1997). Despite protests from the priest, the town's administration board, and many 
white-mestizo families, this Licto irrigation committee joined forces with CODOCAL. The 
indigenous communities' criteria for equitable rules and water rights were accepted by these poor 
townspeople; so, too, the communities helped the poor of Licto to weaken the internal oppressive 
structures in the town of Licto itself. 
We see, then, that together, indigenous communities and the poor of Licto proper successfully 
faced down the abusive power relationships of the region. And since that time, through a series of 
ups and downs, the Licto irrigators' organization has earned increasing respect from development 
and state agencies, as well as recognition from more and more of the local mestizos, who have 
been forced to 'make the best of a bad situation' and who have now applied for membership in the 
irrigation organization. 
Obviously, this is not the end of Licto's struggle for a well-functioning and more equitable 
irrigation system, but part of an ongoing battle as new threats gain momentum. For example, at the 
national level, neo-liberal policies currently threaten to bring about the privatization of water rights 
and the individualization of collective water control48 However, the indigenous and peasant 
movement of the Licto region described above has created an important and solid base to counter 
such threats. 
3.5 Cultural Identity, Resistance, and Reappropriation in a Peruvian 
Irrigation System 
Cabanaconde located at 3270 m above sea level in southern Peru (Province of Caylloma, 
Department of Arequipa) and founded as a reduccion in the 1570s, is the largest community of the 
48
 Boelens and Zwarteveen (2003) present an elaborate discussion of the important implications of the neoliberal 
water policy model in the Andean region. 
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Colca Valley. The people of Cabanaconde, numbering upwards of 5000 at present, are bilingual 
Quechua and Spanish speakers who distinguish themselves ethnically from other groups in the 
region. There has long been a considerable amount of seasonal and permanent out-migration, and 
today the community has migrant colonies in Arequipa, Lima and Washington, DC, with 
approximately 1000, 3000 and 600 members, respectively. So, too, in the last few years, the 
community has been further joined to the outside world through the introduction of television, the 
telephone and other media technologies. But together with transnationalism and these other 
cultural transformations, the mountain worship and the Inka-derived dual organization reviewed in 
the second section of this article continue to structure many community activities, including 
irrigation. 
All of Cabanaconde's agriculture is irrigated, the water coming from the Majes Canal and the 
snow melt of Hualca-Hualca, a 6000-m high peak. Twenty-four hours a day, for several months a 
year, irrigation water descends the Hualca-Hualca River and passes directly through a series of 
canals to more than 1200 ha of agricultural terraces found in Cabanaconde's main fields. Hualca-
Hualca Mountain, alongside 'Earthmother' and figures in the Catholic pantheon, is a principal deity 
and the object of much worship. 
The cult to Hualca-Hualca Mountain is ancient. In 1586, the ethnic lords of the ancient Cavana 
polity told a Spanish crown official that their ancestors emerged from Hualca-Hualca Mountain, the 
source of their irrigation water. The same document states that the Cavana people dutifully 
worshipped her (Ulloa Mogollón, [1586] 1965). As we saw earlier in the article, beliefs about origins 
in, and the worship of, mountains and other sources of water is very much part and parcel of 
widespread and longstanding Andean notions of identity that link people, place and production. 
Today, the irrigation and ritual practices associated with the cult of Hualca-Hualca Mountain are 
exemplified in the 'local model' of irrigation. During most of the yearly distribution cycle, water 
management is in the hands of two men who carry snakeheaded staffs of authority and often have 
flowers adorning their hats. They alternate, each spending four consecutive days and nights in the 
fields 'together with the water". These are the water mayors (yaku alcaldes), the men responsible 
for the distribution of irrigation water. They are at the centre of the local model of dual organization 
and distribute water to the land classified as belonging to their moiety, either 'anansaya' or 
'urinsaya'. 
The water mayors are ritual actors and carry out countless rituals throughout the irrigation cycle. 
The ritual attainment of fertility and the symbolic control over the sources of water through worship 
of mountain deities and the earth are crucial aspects of the local model, and its rationale and 
practice must be understood in terms of these. Water, however, can also bewitch, and can even be 
deadly to those who do not carry out the proper rituals. The dual organization of the anansaya and 
urinsaya fields is a remnant of the extractive form of Inka dual organization reviewed early in this 
article. At the same time, dual organization involves alternation and an overriding conceptual 
dualism that seeks equilibrium through the complementarity of opposites (Maybury- Lewis, 1989) 
and is a fundamental element in the Cabanefios cosmovision (Gelles, 1995). 
But the cultural orientations embodied in this local model are challenged by the policies and 
bureaucracies of the Peruvian state. Officially, the Peruvian state ostensibly has the right to decide 
not only the uses and allocation of water, but also the organizational models by which it is 
managed. While the Peruvian state has declared that all water in Peru is the property of the state 
since the early twentieth century (Andaluz and Valdez, 1987), it is only since the 1960s that the 
state has centered its energies on extending its control to highland irrigation by imposing water 
user associations and new forms of distribution. 
Since the 1970s, the state has consistently attempted to intervene in the distribution practices of 
Cabanaconde. Today, for a brief but important period during the yearly agricultural cycle, there is a 
different type of 'repartitioner', or person in charge of distribution. These individuals, who are 
community members like the water mayors, implement the state's model of distribution. They are 
called controllers (controladores), and distribute water to the fields de canto, that is, sequentially 
from 'one end to the other', ignoring the dual classification of the plots found in the local model. 
A whole series of cultural norms that accompany the state model of distribution are different 
from those of the local model. The controllers, for example, do not receive coca and liquor from the 
irrigators as the water mayors do. Rather, they receive money. They are not fulfilling a major cargo, 
as are the water mayors, but rather a minor civic duty. Instead of a snake-headed staff to legitimate 
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their authority, the controllers have an official decree from the local Irrigators Commission. They 
neither perform elaborate rituals nor sponsor large social events, as do the water mayors. 
The de canto model, which is the official model imposed throughout the Peruvian highlands, is 
supposedly more rational and efficient since it avoids the loss of water that occurs when one water 
mayor has to irrigate a few plots of his saya's land in fields predominantly classified as belonging to 
the other saya and which the opposing water mayor has already irrigated. People admit that water 
is lost in the saya system and it sometimes causes damages. However, the general sentiment is 
that these inconveniences are made up for by the competition between the two water mayors and 
the well-established anansaya/urinsaya dual circuit that water follows. As one man put it, 
'They [the official controllers] don't give a damn, they don't care if the water moves along as 
long as they get paid. They'll even slow it down to collect more money, and they leave their posts 
without a thought'. Moreover, the dual model provides a cognitive map and fixed sequence of 
distribution not found in the de canto state model; local elites can easily manipulate the latter to 
irrigate unauthorized fields. 
Today and over the last 50 years, there have been attempts by local elites and state officials to 
supplant completely the local model of distribution with that of the state. This 'inclusion-oriented' 
strategy, whereby local production is 'rationalized' in terms of the state's universal model, would in 
fact reinforce the political power of local elites and serve the extraction purposes of both state and 
private interest sectors. However, the power of the local model, and its capacity for resisting and 
absorbing the state model, is remarkable (Gelles, 2000). 
We see that state and local models of irrigation represent two extremely different ways of 
conceptualizing and implementing water management. One is focused on ritual assurance, and 
views water as part of a larger social and symbolic universe, while the other takes a secular and 
bureaucratic view of water management. The latter has recently received greater impetus from the 
neo-liberal water policy initiatives that are currently sweeping the Andean nations. In this sense, 
the imposed state model represents the cultural interests and power not only of local elites, but 
also those of the dominant coast-based criollo society and international power holders. This is 
recognized by the townspeople of Cabanaconde and partially explains why it is that, although the 
state model has gained ground over the years, key elements of the local model remain firmly 
entrenched. In sum, the 'state' model of yesteryear, based originally on Inka and Spanish 
appropriations of local forms of dual organization, has become a 'local' model of cultural resistance 
today. 
3.6 Conclusions 
This article began with a consideration of key issues in the history and contemporary cultural 
politics of Andean irrigation. We examined how local forms and rules of water control have been 
appropriated and affected by colonial and postcolonial State policies. Both the classic 'exclusion-
oriented' policies of earlier states and the 'inclusion-oriented' policies of contemporary nation-
states have been used to extract surpluses from communities and to legitimate State authority. 
Against this backdrop, we then used the case studies from Licto, Ecuador and Cabanaconde, 
Peru, to illustrate the reactions of local communities to these imperial power plays and to the 
contemporary politics of development. 
As this article has demonstrated, the top-down, secular, bureaucratic, monetary, and 
supposedly more rational and efficient state models of water management claim to provide 
universal benefits, while in fact extending state control and the cultural orientations of national and 
international power holders. In the last several years, neo-liberal policies, sustained by national 
and international institutions and power groups, have joined the battlefield, reinforcing market rules 
and imposing the privatization of water rights on the communities, thereby attempting to externalize 
water control and shape the internal 'needs' that counteract collective action and community 
survival. Implicit in these ideologies of development is the assumption that indigenous peoples 
must renounce their cultural orientations, identities and communal forms of organization to 
progress. 
The perspective advanced here challenges this assumption and the trivialization of indigenous 
ways of life; at the same time, it problematizes indigenous irrigation beliefs, norms, and practices in 
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Andean communities by examining their production and reproduction in relation to larger political 
and economic forces. The production and reproduction of local water-management rules, forms of 
user organizations and water related cultural identities in the Andes served the extractive and 
hegemonic purposes of imperial and postcolonial states. Ironically, many of these same norms and 
organizational forms are today being strategically reappropriated and adjusted by local 
communities to resist control and surplus extraction by the state and 'outside' interest groups. 
Indeed, as demonstrated in both Licto and Cabanaconde, international and national imports have a 
hard time displacing local models of irrigation and community action. 
In the case of Licto, we saw that indigenous communities reappropriated fundamental water-
control norms in their struggle against domination by elites and against the external control of local 
water management. By creating infrastructure, the water users establish their water rights and 
create their 'hydraulic property', a common ownership of the system which bonds irrigators 
together and is the motor of their collective action (Coward, 1986). The creation and maintenance 
of collective hydraulic property, grounded in shared history, customs, rituals and struggles, links 
family and collective rights to their collective 'hydraulic identity'. This process also guarantees that 
local collective bodies have effective control over the development and application of their own 
norms; it also establishes their right to dispute the very legitimacy of the normative systems and 
authorities imposed by external political forces. Clearly, then, the collective management of water 
resources in Andean communities, and the struggle to obtain, reclaim and defend both water 
access and water rights is a powerful means to give shape and meaning to local processes of 
identity formation. 
In the case of Cabanaconde, we see once again that the State imposes a universal irrigation 
model, one that is supposedly more rational and efficient than local indigenous practices. But, as 
with Licto, the community of Cabanaconde disputed and resisted the State's control over 'its' 
water. Alternating water mayors and dual divisions, timeworn vestiges of Inka and Spanish state 
hegemony, today constitute the local 'indigenous' model of irrigation. As we saw earlier in the 
article, dualism and a diverse complex of pre-lnka cultural frameworks gained further impetus 
through Inka domination and were used as an ideological tool to naturalize state control over local 
resources and labor; this continued throughout the Spanish colonial, as well as much of the 
Republican, period. But it is the cultural staying power of duality and mountain ritual - that is, the 
instrumental meanings and ritual efficacy of the local model of irrigation - that today has 
transformed dual organization into a form of resistance against interference by local elites and the 
contemporary Peruvian state. 
The materials from both Licto and Cabanaconde clearly show the problematic and damaging 
nature of instrumental thinking, practiced by 'experts' in 'social and legal engineering' (Long and 
van der Ploeg, 1989; von Benda-Beckmann, von Benda- Beckmann and Spiertz, 1998; Bruns and 
Meinzen-Dick, 2000; Vincent, 2001). Instead of trying to formulate and implement 'the best 
universal rules, rights and procedures' as state agents and development officials would have it, it is 
essential to understand the locally based process of creating water-control norms; we must focus 
on the nature of rules in social action (Scharfer and Lamb, 1981; Cleaver 2000; Boelens and 
Doornbos, 2001). As both of our case studies show, different social groups confront each other not 
to only establish rules and water rights, but also to define the legitimate framework by which they 
will be applied. 
In conclusion, this article has studied why it is that in many Andean communities today, 
indigenous peasant irrigators claim both the right to equality and the right to be different. On the 
one hand, there is a general demand for greater justice and equality regarding the unequal 
distribution of decision-making power, water and other benefits in Andean society. On the other, 
there are demands for internal distribution to be based on autonomous decisions, locally 
established rights and principles and indigenous cultural frameworks that reflect the diverse 
strategies and identities found in Andean communities today. As the materials presented here 
clearly show, these demands are not to be taken lightly. 
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Water rights are best understood as politically contested and culturally embedded relationships among 
different social actors. In the Andean region, existing rights of irrigators' collectives often embody historical 
struggles over resources, rules, authorities and identities. This article argues, first, that the neo-liberal 
language that is increasingly used in water policies is ill-suited for recognizing and dealing with these social, 
cultural and political dimensions of water distribution. Local water rules and rights, their dynamics, and the 
way they are linked to power relations, local identities and contextualized constructions of legitimacy, remain 
invisible in neo-liberal policy discourse. Second, this same discourse actively destroys these local rights 
systems and presents itself as the only viable cure to the problems it generates. The ways in which local 
irrigators' collectives attempt to protect their water security raise questions about the fundaments and effects 
of neo-liberal water reforms, but these questions are neglected or poorly understood. This article proposes a 
more situated, layered and contextualized approach to Andean water questions, not just to improve 
representational accuracy but also to increase political visibility and legitimacy of peasant and indigenous 
water claims. What is needed is not just a new 'typology' or 'taxonomy' of water rights, but an alternative 
'water rights ontology' that understands locally existing norms and water control practices, and the power 
relations that inform and surround them, as deeply constitutive of water rights. 
4.1 Introduction 
As in many others regions of the world, most water policy proposals in the Andean countries 
tend to focus on preventing future water shortages and solving current water problems by following 
global neo-liberal recipes. The three basic ingredients of these recipes are decentralized decision-
making, private property rights, and markets. In the Andes, most actors involved in water policy 
and management agree on the need for improving water control. Most would even agree that such 
a change should take the form of decentralization. The reasons for wanting change, however, vary 
widely between different actors. Indigenous and peasant groups perceive decentralization as a 
means to redress their historical exclusion from decisions about water allocation. They demand a 
fair and adequate representation in water policy-making processes in the hope of (better) securing 
their own water rights. They depend on water for irrigating their crops and demand rights that 
enable continued livelihood security and survival as communities. International lending institutions, 
often together with national governments, see decentralization and privatization of water 
management as a means to both reduce government spending on water and to increase the 
efficiency of water use. State agencies hope to mobilize more tax revenues, and improve 
jurisdiction over water. Commercial water companies, in their turn, hope to be allowed to exploit 
existing and new water infrastructures in ways that will bring them economic profits. 
Given this diversity of interests, it is hardly surprising that water reforms are contested, and form 
the topic of much debate and political struggle. Water is a finite resource, and the proposed water 
reforms unquestionably imply changes in access to and control of this resource. Since the option of 
expanding supplies seems to have reached its limits, those who receive more do so at the expense 
of others who receive less. Yet, the terminology that is increasingly used (by all parties) for 
articulating water problems and solutions is the terminology of neo-liberalism, which does not allow 
the recognition of power and politics as constitutive of water realities. Although the proposed 
measures differ, current water reforms share a problem analysis strongly influenced by 
privatization models, new institutionalism and rational choice theory (Gleick et al., 2002; Mollinga, 
2001; Moore, 1989; Zwarteveen, 1998). Water bureaucracies are understood through the prism of 
rent-seeking, and the debate about water markets and tradable water rights is largely framed in the 
language and tools of neo-liberal thinking (Briscoe, 1996; Perry et al., 1997), while the 
organizational dynamics of local level farmer organizations are seen in terms of new institutionalist 
concepts (see, for example, Baland and Platteau, 1996; Ostrom, 1990, 1992). 
49
 Published in Development and Change 36(4): 735-758 (2005) 
50
 Researcher and lecturer at the Department of Environmental Sciences / IWE, Wageningen University, 
Wageningen, The Netherlands. 
64 
Prices and Politics in Andean Water Reforms 
This tendency is understandable: neo-classical and new institutionalist formulae are attractive 
for their clarity and for the efficiency with which they simplify complex realities and behaviors. Neo-
liberalist concepts sit easily with the mindsets of water-professionals, characterized by a 
preference for large-scale standard policy initiatives and a predilection for 'design principles' — 
universally valid sets of factors, conditions or principles that can be applied to design a particular 
institutional transformation (see FAO, 1996; Ostrom, 1992; Plusquellec et al., 1994). The beliefs 
that flows of money and water follow universal scientific laws, and that human beings roughly 
follow the same rational, utility-maximizing aspirations everywhere are important sources of 
consolation and relief for policy-makers who are confronted with increasingly complex, seemingly 
chaotic, and highly dynamic water situations. 
Yet, and as many before us have argued, the fact that neo-liberalism makes it possible to divide 
the water world into bite-size pieces which policy-makers can chew on, should not be mistaken for 
representational accuracy (Cleaver, 2000; Goldman, 1998; Mosse, 1997; van der Ploeg, 2003). 
Neo-liberalism is a strongly positivistic scientific and universalizing language. It presents choices 
that are deeply political and concerned with distributional questions, as neutral, scientific or 
technical. While some aspects of reality (those that can be influenced through policy interventions) 
and some causal mechanisms (prices and finances, markets, formal laws and institutional 
frameworks) can be expressed in neo-liberal terms, there are many elements of reality and many 
causal mechanisms that escape their notice. 
In this respect, it is worrisome that many studies on the impacts and effects of neo-liberal water 
reforms consist of comparing the normative water reality as assumed in the policy model with what 
happens 'on the ground' using the deductive method, and without questioning or empirically 
validating the behavioral and institutional assumptions employed. This typically leads to accounts 
of reality in terms of 'gaps', or of how the actual situation diverges from the desired situation as 
described in the policy model. It also leads to recommendations of interventions aimed at closing 
these gaps, rather than to proposals to re-assess the model. In this article, we argue that it is 
precisely such a re-assessment that is required. Actual water management rules and practices 
differ from what the models predict because they are embedded in, and importantly constituted by, 
existing social and political relations and hierarchies, cultural values, patterns and criteria of 
legitimacy, and locally specific ecological conditions. What water rights and management forms 
are, ontologically, and how they function can therefore not be understood or even described in 
isolation from the actual political and social context in which they are used and discussed. 
Neo-liberalism is not just one of several alternative ways of simplifying the world; it also entails a 
pro-active and interventionist agenda for change. Through powerful laws and rules, the neo-liberal 
model of the water world is (often forcefully) turned into reality. Those realities that do not fit the 
model are either transformed or destroyed. Consequently, the dominance of neo-liberal 
representations of water problems threatens to destroy those realities, not just ontologically, but 
also materially. They can no longer be talked about or referred to in official water negotiations; they 
disappear from water policy agendas; and they do not count in measuring the success of policy 
measures. Most critical writings on water privatization are about the brutal and spectacular 
entrance of large international drinking water companies onto local scenes, and the dangers of 
such capitalist expansion for poor people's access to affordable and good quality drinking water. In 
this article we want to demand attention for a different water reality that is under threat because of 
neo-liberalism: that of existing indigenous and collective irrigation management institutions. We 
fear that realizing the neo-liberal water dream may come at a high, though not easily quantifiable, 
price: the violation or even obliteration of existing water tenure arrangements and collective forms 
of water management. This price is high not so much because of a conservationist attribution of 
intrinsic values to traditions and cultural heritage51 although these also play a role, but especially 
because of the implied threats to water and livelihood securities and to existing ways of living and 
being of marginalized groups in Andean countries. It is also high because of the risks to the very 
objectives of water reform programs, of using water more effectively and efficiently. 
To prevent these threats from occurring, a critique of neo-liberal interpretations of reality is 
required. Concerted efforts to show the politics of policy choices that are presented as scientific, 
objective or purely economic are an important first step in decreasing the legitimacy of current 
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water reforms. The fact that not all values of water can be easily expressed in market terms, if only 
because attribution of values does not just happen in the market, must be constantly reiterated. 
This article emphasizes the need to place a contextualized understanding of water rights at the 
centre of the analysis. We contend that the most important question in relation to water is not 
whether to price, privatize, sell or purchase, but rather who owns water access and controls rights? 
What are the contents of these rights? Which acquisition mechanisms are deemed valid, and who 
has legitimate authority to defend, enforce and sanction these water rights? Water reforms, just like 
land reforms, are about changing entitlements to a crucial productive resource. Rights to water 
cannot be thought of as simply following from centrally ordained laws and policies; they have 
emerged historically through negotiations and often embody years of labor investments and 
struggles. In the Andes, water rights are also closely associated with cultural meanings and 
identities. We suggest, in short, replacing the current emphasis on institutional mechanisms of 
water management with a focus on the actual functioning and outcomes of water rights and laws, 
and on the norms and rules surrounding the distribution of water. In our view, such a focus 
provides a much more promising and fruitful entry-point for critical thinking and action in water 
management issues. 
In the following section, we critically analyze neo-liberal water rights rationality and suggest an 
alternative conceptualization that invites investigation of the logic and dynamics of water rights 
realities in the terms employed by those who directly use and manage water. In some respects, 
this conceptualization builds on attempts by irrigation management scholars in the 1980s who were 
concerned with finding ways of fostering the participation of farmers and understanding and 
strengthening locally existing forms of water rights and organization52 It aims to provide a new and 
better understanding of what water rights are, ontologically and in practice. Using this 
understanding, we then describe a number of cases which illustrate how irrigation collectives react 
to water reforms. Many existing water rights communities do not silently accept usurpation by 
states and markets, but resist and fight against water reform proposals. These struggles are 
expressions of fear for the destruction of existing livelihoods, local domains of agricultural 
production and identity. As such, they challenge the new water resources distribution, the new 
water rules, and the new water language and discourse. We end the article with a reasoned plea 
for a contextualized and historicized understanding of water rights and water reforms, which 
explicitly acknowledges the politics and power of water and which allows for culture and identity as 
determinants of water realities. 
4.2 Divergent conceptualizations of water rights 
Water Rights in Neo-Liberal Thinking 
Current thinking about water rights is intimately tied up with the privatization discussion, and 
emerges from the widely-held insight that states have done a poor job in managing and allocating 
water in cost-effective and efficient ways (Merrey, 1996; Ostrom, 1990, 1992; Vermillion, 1991). 
The central privatization argument is that water needs to be transferable and marketable for it to be 
used in an economically efficient way, producing the highest possible marginal returns. For water 
market transactions to succeed, clearly defined and enforceable water rights need to be in place. 
Private water rights are thus a crucial condition for water markets to emerge (Ringler et al., 2000; 
Rosegrant and Binswanger, 1994; Rosegrant and Gazmuri, 1994; World Bank, 1996). In neo-
liberal thinking, water rights, by defining rules for the allocation and use of water resources, are 
seen to provide the means for describing and accounting for committed water uses. Water rights 
allow water to be priced per unit consumed, encouraging a reduction in wasting water. In addition, 
water rights provide a good basis for allocating maintenance responsibilities among beneficiaries. 
They also provide security of tenure to users, thus establishing incentives for investments in 
infrastructure. 
This approach is right in assuming that most of the anticipated benefits of water markets will not 
be achieved unless substantial efforts are made to establish and protect security of tenure in water. 
Yet, it wrongly conveys the impression that water rights and water markets are inseparable. In fact, 
most of the benefits attributed to water markets would be achieved through the provision of 
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security of tenure alone, irrespective of whether water rights are traded or otherwise transferred 
(Bauer, 1997). While neo-liberal thinking 
suggests that the lack of (incentives for) transferring or marketing of water is the root cause of 
current water problems, a more accurate problem description would be that water management is 
such a complicated matter precisely because of the difficulties inherent in establishing an effective 
and enforceable system of water allocation and distribution (Seckler, 1993: 6). The assumption that 
security of water tenure can only be achieved by means of private water rights does not hold true, 
at least for the Andes and probably for many other places. In the Andean history of diverse 
property regimes, tenure of water was typically most insecure for large sections of the population in 
those periods characterized by privatized regimes. 
This shifts the question from whether and what to privatize, to how to distribute water according 
to agreed objectives and values. In other words, the question that lies at the heart of many water 
problems (and reforms) is how to create the infrastructure, laws and institutions that allow security 
of water tenure, rather than how and whether to privatize and trade water. To address this 
question, we need a more complex and layered understanding of water rights than the current 
prescriptive instrumental and legalistic notion of water rights that prevails in neo-liberal water 
accounts (see also Boelens et al., 2002). In this improved understanding, it is particularly important 
to realize that what a right is, ontologically, cannot simply be 'read' from legal texts and written 
laws. Instead, rights obtain their meaning in the particular contexts in which they are discussed, 
used and applied. 
Dimensions and Contents of Water Rights 
What, then, is a water right? When referring to irrigation, it is useful to think about a water right 
as the right that provides its holder with the authorization to take water from a particular source, 
including the particular social privileges and obligations that are associated with such authorization 
(Beccar et al., 2002). A water right encompasses three dimensions: socio-legal, technical and 
organizational. Socio-legally, a water right is an expression of agreement about the legitimacy of 
the right-holder's claim to water: such agreement must exist within the group of claimants, but it is 
equally important that rights over a resource be recognized by those who are excluded from its 
use. Agreement about the legitimacy of right-holders' claims to water is intimately linked to social 
relations of authority and power, and can be based on a variety of grounds: it can be based on 
state legislation, water laws and regulations, but it can also be based on local rules established 
and authorized by traditions and community organizations53 
However, having the legal possibility (and social power) to take water is meaningless without 
the two other dimensions of water control. First, the means (infrastructure, technology, and 
technical skills) to actually take water from a source and convey it to fields — the technical 
dimension — must be present. Second, it is necessary to organize and manage not just water 
allocation and the operation of infrastructure, but also the mobilization of resources and decision-
making processes around these issues — the organizational dimension. Responsibility for these 
management tasks may lie with government or non-government agencies, with private companies, 
or community organizations, or with a combination of these. Many irrigators' organizations in the 
Andes are community-type organizations, although some are set up or supported by governments 
or NGOs. Having a right to water often goes hand in hand with the right to participate in systems 
operation and management, but also with a number of duties and obligations, such as the 
requirement to contribute cash or labor to the operation, maintenance and management of an 
irrigation system. Failure to comply with those duties often leads to sanctions such as exclusion 
from one or more water turns or the payment of fines (Boelens and Zwarteveen, 2003; Gerbrandy 
and Hoogendam, 1998). 
Rights in Action 
The distribution of water is much less straightforward than that of many other resources: 
because of the variable availability and fluid characteristics of water, and because of the difficulties 
of rigorously monitoring and controlling water flows, there is much scope for users at different 
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levels to act in ways that diverge from distributional agreements as stipulated in state laws, 
regulations, infrastructural lay-outs and technologies. This explains why water distribution is 
typically subject to continuous bargaining and negotiation. Such bargaining may involve the 
technical characteristics of the irrigation infrastructure, the operation of that infrastructure, or the 
very contents of the water right. Water distribution and control, therefore, cannot be understood by 
simply looking at the legal status of right-holders, nor can it be deduced from statutory law. An 
understanding of actual water use and distribution practices is also required, including the different 
norms and discourses that groups of users refer to when claiming access to, or simply taking, 
water. 
To allow for such differentiation, and thus to capture the difference between 'rights on paper' 
and actual water control and distribution, we suggest the following distinction of categories of 
rights: reference rights, activated rights and materialized rights. This distinction should not be read 
in the evolutionary sense of expressing increased levels of specification, or as a typology or 
taxonomy distinguishing different types of water rights. Instead, it aims to capture the fact that the 
precise meaning of rights changes depending on the context in which it is used. These categories 
can be seen as different manifestations of rights. 
Reference rights can be derived from broader principles, rules and ideologies that embody 
notions of fairness and justice (Boelens and Dâvila, 1998); they may be based on national law or 
on locally formalized water regulations, such as communities' irrigator regulations. Reference rights 
specify, in general terms, the powers of right-holders — in terms of access related, operational, 
and decision-making privileges and choices — and also define the characteristics of right-holders, 
for instance by specifying that water right-holders should be landowners, community members, 
men or heads of households (F. and K. von Benda-Beckmann, 2000). Reference rights matter, for 
instance, in discussions between state agencies and user groups about water allocation priorities, 
or in negotiations about national or regional water policies and plans. 
Activated rights (or 'rights in action') refer to the operationalization of reference rights. In 
irrigation systems, they often consist of rules and procedures for water distribution, and of rules 
about participation and voting in meetings of water users' organizations. Seasonal water delivery 
plans and water rotation schedules are clear expressions of activated rights. These usually come 
about in pre-season meetings among (representatives of) irrigators, which may or may not involve 
representatives of state water agencies. Assessments of actual water availability to decide on 
quantities of water to distribute often matter here, as do records of the behavior of right-holders in 
previous seasons — did they contribute the stipulated amount of labor or cash; did they take more 
water than agreed, and so on. 
Materialized rights refer to actual water use and distribution practices, and to the decision-
making processes about these practices. Materialized rights are often not written down, but are 
authorized by routine or are unspoken or informal agreements. Both the definition of the contents 
of each of these rights and the links of transformation from one right to the other are subject to 
negotiations and struggle. The social and political domains in which such negotiations and 
struggles occur are likely to be different for each type of right, although they may overlap. Inclusion 
in such domains is thus important in terms of the protection of one's water security. 
Legal Pluralism and Embeddedness 
In most Andean irrigation systems water rights exist in conditions of legal pluralism where rules 
and principles of different origin and legitimization co-exist in the same locality. The question of 
which rules and principles are to be considered (most) legitimate is therefore often an intrinsic part 
of struggles over water in the Andes, including the current ones surrounding the privatization of 
water. State laws are often challenged by representatives of local communities by referring to 'their 
own' traditional socio-legal systems. There may also be a diversity of mechanisms for acquiring 
water rights, and the mechanisms considered legitimate by water users' communities are not 
necessarily those adhered to by legislative authorities at national levels. In many cases, the very 
existence of detailed local water rights and laws only comes to the attention of legislators at 
national level through the resistance of local communities against proposals for water reforms. 
Water legislation as formulated at national levels in countries like Ecuador, Peru and Chile does 
not recognize existing diverse and dynamic water rights and distribution practices, but often does 
include very specific and precise rules and prescriptions about how water users should behave and 
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organize, and about how water should be distributed (Bustamante, 2002; Gentes, 2002; Guevara 
et al., 2002; Pacari, 1998; Palacios, 2002). 
Apart from territorial rights claims and outcomes based on historical struggles and negotiations, 
the prevalent way in which local Andean communities have obtained ownership of water, now and 
historically, is through investments of often tremendous amounts of labor and other resources in 
the construction of irrigation infrastructure. Labor investments also served as a way to decide who 
within the community could use water and have decision-making rights: investments in collective 
property construction, therefore, led to the 'construction' not only of the infrastructure but also of 
individual or household rights to access water and to its management. Two different types of rights 
were thus established: the collective rights that refer to the claim of the group of users of one 
irrigation system (or sometimes a series of water-use systems) vis-à-vis third parties; and individual 
(or household level) rights that refer to the rights of water users within one irrigation system and 
specify their claims vis-à-vis each other. This process of acquiring ownership of water lies behind 
Coward's notion of hydraulic property, developed to express the fact that investment processes in 
irrigation not only establish people's relation to the irrigation system, but also their relation to each 
other. Such relationships constitute the social basis for collective action in various irrigation tasks. 
Thus, labor contributions to maintenance of irrigation systems serve not only the upkeep of the 
system, but also the actualization of property rights (Coward, 1986). In many Andean irrigation 
systems, rights embody years of accumulated labor investments and simultaneously form 
expressions of social relations among irrigator households. In the current context of privatization 
discussions, it is important to emphasize that water rights of individuals exist within (and because 
of) collective agreements and are enforced by and through local, collectively legitimated 
authorities. As such, they are radically different from the 'privatized water rights' referred to in neo-
liberal water policies (Beccaret al., 2002; Boelens and Doornbos, 2001). 
The rules, rights and duties attached to water are, in many Andean communities, closely linked 
to all kinds of non-water related rights and duties and are closely intertwined with economic and 
non-economic institutions and networks of social and political relations. In other words, as Peters 
observes, definitions of rules, rights and obligations, of appropriate uses and users, and the ways 
in which these definitions are to be materialized, are closely embedded in specific historical sets of 
political and economic structures as well as in cultural systems of meanings, symbols and values 
(Peters, 1987; see also Gelles, 1998; McCay and Jentoft, 1998). The transfer of water rights, for 
instance, happens in a social context in which locally-specific exchange relations function as 
important mechanisms to maintain networks of friends and relatives. In some communities, 
people's sense of community identity is strongly linked to having a shared history of struggling 
against landlords or mining companies for water and land rights. Importantly, current resistance is 
also a way to express and reinforce community values. 
Ironically, although privatization aims at deregulating bureaucratic water management through 
the delegation of decisions to the lowest possible level, actual water reforms in the Andes threaten 
to destroy existing local and indigenous water rights systems. Local communities and actors are 
only granted decision-making powers when they accept the terms and conditions specified by 
higher-level laws and rules. Co-existence of a great diversity of rules, rights and obligations is 
actively discouraged, since such diversity is seen as potentially obstructing inter-regional and 
international transfers and trades; locally-specific rules and rights that tie water to a geographical 
area or to a community may get in the way of investments and profits. Moreover, recognition of a 
diversity of local water authorities is sometimes interpreted as a threat to the power and rule-
making capacity of national bureaucrats. 
4.3 Prices and politics: evidence of neo-liberal water reforms 
Neo-Liberal Claims and Counterclaims 
Expectations about the benefits of neo-liberal water reforms are high. Proponents claim that 
such reforms will result in water savings, greater water-use efficiencies, more private investments 
in water infrastructure and maintenance, less government spending on water management, and 
higher economic returns to investments. In addition, they claim that water reforms will be 
accompanied by democratization of water decision-making. However, a growing number of case 
studies have produced evidence that casts doubt on whether these claims are realized, or whether 
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they are even realistic. Hendriks (1998) shows how water distribution, water-use efficiency and 
agricultural productivity in several Chilean irrigation systems are worsening instead of improving as 
a result of water rights privatization. Trawick (2003) describes the causal link between privatization 
of water rights and the decline of water-use efficiency and productivity in collective irrigation 
systems in Peru. Hendriks (1998) and Ore (1998) describe cases where water rights privatization 
discouraged investments in local irrigation systems. Dourojeanni and Jouravlev (1999) and Bauer 
(1997, 1998) show how the Chilean privatization model in practice worked towards the 
monopolization of water rights in the hands of elites and a few powerful companies, instead of 
enabling a multitude of competitors to interact in an open market atmosphere. Whereas water 
markets were supposed to stimulate allocation of water to the economically most beneficial and 
valuable uses, examples from Chile show that one effect of privatization may actually be non-
productive speculation with water rights (Solanes, 2002). There is not necessarily any positive 
correlation between how much people are willing to pay for water and their eagerness to use it 
efficiently. All the above studies raise doubts about whether neo-liberal water policies meet their 
own expectations, measured against their own goals and indicators for success. Our argument 
here is that many of these cases of failure can be interpreted in terms of the incommensurability of 
existing irrigation realities with the policy model: existing realities cannot be described and 
represented in neo-liberal terms, and they do not 'behave' as predicted by the model. 
There are an increasing number of documented instances of farmer organizations fiercely 
standing up against privatization efforts and neo-liberal water reform programs. This resistance 
shows that 'not fitting the model' is often a conscious choice, and not — as privatization 
proponents would have it—a result of traditionalism or stubbornness. Describing and 
understanding this opposition using the conceptualization of rights proposed in the previous 
section leads to a different interpretation of the determinants of water-use efficiencies, and points 
to the need for re-assessing water allocation priorities. The struggles can be read as a critique of 
the very rationality of the reforms, and actively question their claims to neutrality and objectivity. 
Peasant irrigator communities do not just demand alternative, more equitable ways to distribute 
water rights among stakeholder groups in society; they also demand new ways to think and talk 
about water. 
Large-scale water conflicts and related social differentiation processes under private water 
property regimes are by no means new to the Andes. In Peru and Ecuador, for instance, private 
property regimes prevailed before the establishment of the Water Laws (of 1969 and 1972, 
respectively) which nationalized property rights. The private property regimes were the cause of 
much violent struggle between large hacienda owners and indigenous communities54 These 
struggles form an important part of the political and social history of many communities, which 
partly self-identify through the collective memory of these important water rights battles. However, 
many of those battles were won by the large landowners, and the resulting problems of water 
scarcity are still fresh in the minds of many communities. The new proposals for privatization thus 
ring some familiar bells. Many communities and indigenous organizations perceive the new water 
plans as yet another in a sequence of attempts to take away resources that historically belong to 
them and that form the basis of their livelihoods. In Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador massive nationwide 
uprisings have effectively resulted in a standstill or change in the implementation of the new water 
policies and laws. The rest of this section provides some illustrations of such struggles, and uses 
the contextualized rights' framework presented above to begin interpreting them. 
Establishing Water Allocation Priorities 
In order to promote possibilities for free trade in water rights and to allow water to be allocated 
to its most profitable uses, Chilean neo-liberal water policy states that water rights allocation 
should follow market principles. Chilean legislation, therefore, does not establish access priorities 
or preferences for particular uses (such as drinking water for human consumption above industrial 
use), nor does it express norms to protect particularly vulnerable groups, the environment or, 
ultimately, water quality (CEPAL, 1998; Dourojeanni and Jouravlev, 1999). Peasant and 
indigenous organizations in the other Andean countries that were to adopt Chile's water legislation 
have strongly objected to this lack of prioritization in water allocation. For example, CONAIE — the 
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Federation of Indigenous Nationalities in Ecuador — defended a water allocation principle in their 
Water Law proposal that prioritizes water for human and domestic use and for subsistence 
agriculture above water for commercial agriculture. Commercial agriculture, in turn, gets a higher 
priority as compared to industrial, mining and power generation activities (CONAIE, 1996). In 
Bolivia, peasant and indigenous organizations fiercely protested against market allocation 
principles which would, in their opinion, endanger water access to the economically less powerful 
(Bustamante, 2002; WALIR, 2002). 
Throughout the Andes, peasant irrigators thus challenge the reference rights and allocation 
priorities as stipulated in existing laws and new neo-liberal reform proposals. Often, struggles are 
also about the right to be included in the social arenas in which reference rights are determined. 
Along with the mechanisms of water allocation, the underlying values on which allocation is based 
are questioned. Although the struggles are primarily about demands for alternative legal priority 
orders that are based on greater social justice and local embedded ness, they also illustrate that 
changing water realities is not just a matter of changing legal reference rights. It is simultaneously 
a quest for activating and materializing alternative rights orders 'in the field' and changing the 
actually existing water allocation priorities as they are embedded in unequal power relationships in 
society. 
'Unused' Rights Accumulation 
In Chile, when the new Water Code was enforced in 1981, most indigenous communities were 
unaware of the need to officially register their century-old customary rights. In the words of a 
Mapuche leader: 'The big landowners here in the area have registered the water rights in their 
names, and the Mapuches, for not knowing about the laws of the Chilean State, were left without 
possibilities to claim theirs' (quoted in Solon, 2003). Water rights that were not formally registered 
were neutrally labeled 'unused rights', and were allocated to those who presented official requests 
— powerful commercial companies, especially mining and power generation enterprises, and 
landlords. Mapuche communities are furious about this. The Mapuche leader expressed his anger: 
The water sources that originate in the communities here have 98% of their trajectory on Mapuche 
territory, but the owner of the water is a landlord who lives in the city. He bought the water from the 
State, and nobody can use it. We cannot use it for irrigation, not even for drinking water, because the 
water has been bought. But the water was born in and flows through Mapuche communities, and no 
one of the Mapuches was aware of the need for official recognition when this person registered the 
water rights on his name. No one of us was consulted and no Mapuche ever knew of the existence 
of this law. (Quoted in Solon, 2003) 
It is not only the neo-liberal assumption that (market) information is freely available to everyone 
that is challenged here, but also the very basis for rights claims. Mapuche communities feel 
strongly that the water is theirs, because they have been using it for centuries and because it flows 
through their territory, whereas the Water Code demands official registration as a first basis for 
rights allocation (see also Gentes, 2000, 2002; van Kessel, 1992). This case illustrates that there 
are different social domains in which water rights are negotiated and contested, and that 
indigenous communities may not be well-positioned to be included and represented in the domains 
that officially matter. It also illustrates that legal reference rights often do not express the historical 
and social realities of the Mapuches, pointing to a serious lack of social legitimacy and applicability 
of the new water policy. 
Companies versus Communities 
Mining companies based in Chile have already appropriated a large part of the historical water 
rights of Atacameno and Aymara indigenous communities in northern Chile. The same mining 
companies are now trying to get authorization for the appropriation of Bolivian water, which is 
currently collectively owned by indigenous communities. The legalization of certain rights — in this 
case, the right of the Bolivian government to sell and export privatized water rights — automatically 
implies the illegalization of all existing rights, such as ancestral and socio-territorial rights. Bolivian 
indigenous communities struggle against this neo-liberal policy. In the words of one user: 'They 
want to export 3000 to 6000 liters per second to Chile. We are talking about subterranean water 
resources. What the government wants to do is to make a law to export water and favor the big 
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Chilean enterprises such as Chuquicamata, Ines de Collahuasi and Escondida. This is our great 
preoccupation'. Another indigenous irrigation leader in Bolivia commented on this water power 
play: 'Behind the back of our communities, the Bolivian government wanted to enforce a new law 
to legalize water export to Chile. The communities never were consulted or knew about this law, 
which was handled in secret. . . Rainfall in this Southern Altiplano region is extremely limited, only 
100 mm/year. And in the Eduardo Abaroa reserve it's even less, 60 mm/year. . . . I think that to 
defend our water is a matter of life and death' (both quoted in Solon, 2003). This case is another 
example of how current water reforms inherently evoke struggles about water tenure, and shows 
that they are not neutral programs fostering more efficiency. Indigenous communities are not 
recognized as water right-holders, in spite of their long history of using water and of investing in 
infrastructure to make such use possible. They are not offered the choice of how to control what 
they consider as their water, but are simply disregarded as right-holders. 
Democratizing Decision-Making? 
In most communal water systems in Peru, Bolivia and Ecuador, the one person, one vote' rule 
applies, implying that each right-holder has one decision-making vote in the users' organization. In 
contrast, World Bank and Inter American Development Bank proposals for new water legislation in 
Peru and Ecuador stipulated that voting rights should be made proportional to the quantity of 
water-use rights each user holds, like shareholders in a joint-stock company (see World Bank, 
1995, 1996). The Chilean Water Code sets the example for these proposals. Hendriks (1998) gives 
an example of how such a re-definition of voting rights may shape local political economy and 
power relations. In Belén, Precordillera Comuna de Putre, the great majority of irrigators — 
smallholders who depend on agriculture for their livelihoods — called for changes to the irrigation 
schedule in order to intensify their agriculture and save water. They wanted to have more frequent 
irrigation turns with smaller flows, a decision ratified in several community assemblies. But in 
Belén, a majority of water shares is owned by a small group of wealthy absentee landholders who 
live in the city of Arica and make their money from other economic activities. They only go to the 
irrigation system when necessary, for example when they have their water turns. Obviously, they 
have no interest in increasing irrigation frequency, for it would mean more time and travel costs. 
This group's voting weight and related decision-making power prevents the majority of 
smallholders, who depend on agriculture, from improving their irrigation system and increasing 
economic productivity. As Hendriks (1998: 306) remarks: 
When users with abundant water and less need for careful use of available water have more weight 
in decision-making it affects the rationality of the system's collective operation. This problem of 
resistance to change, by the people who migrate to the city and own a relatively heavy weight of 
water shares, is recurrent in many remote locations in the north of Chile. 
Similar cases have been reported in Peru after the neo-liberal government of Fujimori changed 
the regulations of water-user associations, concentrating decision-making rights and voting rights 
in the hands of a powerful minority of large water right-holders (Ore , 1998; Vos, 2002). 
Generally, both legal and local reference water rights include specifications of how water control 
decisions are to be made and who is allowed to join this process. As this example illustrates, neo-
liberal reference norms concerning control over decision-making seriously endanger the 
possibilities for marginalized water-user groups to activate their water access rights, to improve 
system efficiency, and to materialize traditionally existing collective choice rights. 
Another example of this kind of struggle comes from Bolivia. The main water users of the 
Central Valley of Cochabamba, Bolivia, are peasant and indigenous irrigator communities, who for 
decades have organized access to and distribution of water according to their 'uses and customs'. 
They engaged in a major conflict when, in 1997, the Cochabamba drinking water company started 
to drill wells in the Central Valley, affecting their already over-extracted ground water resources. In 
2000, the Valley again became a violent battlefield when indigenous and peasant communities 
together with urban water users protested against the state's plans to privatize the drinking water 
sector. The government signed a contract with a large foreign consortium, and enacted a 
privatization support law that allowed the international company to have exclusive water rights over 
all waters in the district, including those of smaller systems in the metropolitan area and rights to 
exploit the aquifers. Another law was rushed through the parliament so that the company could 
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capture new water resources, and even charge water fees for co-operative wells that were to be 
expropriated. Directly after privatization, the international company raised water fees substantially, 
without any system improvement. Urban and rural water users formed an alliance of opposition: 
the citizens protested against rising water rates, while the rural municipalities and indigenous 
communities protested against the new law, because it affected their rights and could expose them 
to new encroachments of their water sources. Violent confrontations with the army were the result. 
At the end of this 'water war', the government had to retract its decision and commit to amending 
all of the articles in the proposed law to which the popular alliance objected (Boelens and 
Hoogendam, 2002; Bustamante, 2002; Laurie et al., 2002). These water struggles originate from 
the co-existence of different sources of legitimation for rights' claims. Peasant communities 
demand that their history of use of and investment in water is accepted as a legitimate claim to 
water, and that their 'uses and customs' are accepted as a rightful framework of reference for 
water management. 
Decentralized User Negotiations 
Bottom-up and democratic watershed platforms are central to user-oriented water management 
policies. Inclusion and participation in such decision-making platforms by local and indigenous 
communities is regarded as a means to ensure that they can voice their concerns and secure their 
interests. In Chile, success with such platforms is mixed. The influence that local communities can 
exert in platform meetings is limited, partly because negotiations are dominated by the rich and 
powerful. Indeed, water rights negotiations do not happen in isolation from economic power 
relations. Bauer, for instance, shows how, in multiple-sector conflicts in Chile, the bigger and more 
powerful water users have little incentive to negotiate water allocation and settle conflicts in 
platforms, precisely because their private rights are so strong relative to the regulatory authority of 
the state or any possible platform: 'The task of coordinating different water uses at the level of river 
basins is left mainly to voluntary bargaining among private rights holders and their organizations. 
Because state administrative intervention is so limited, when bargaining fails the conflicts are 
supposed to be settled by the ordinary civil courts, which have expanded powers' (Bauer, 1998: 
149). 
In the case of the Maule River, local irrigators for many years confronted the power generation 
company, which cut off their water upriver to store it during the season of maximum agricultural 
demand. The company also often interrupted the flow and released water in irregular amounts and 
unforeseeable timing, making it unusable for farmers. Before the company was privatized, there 
were ways to solve such conflicts in terms of public interests, but now the two parties face off as 
two private entities in court. After many years of legal battle, the Supreme Court backed the 
company, but found no solutions for the thousands of local farmers affected. The courts made 
decisions solely on the basis of legalistic prescriptions, closing their eyes to the social and 
productive consequences. Meanwhile, several other hydropower plants have been built in the 
watershed, reinforcing the sector's growing power and allowing it to consolidate its rights. Similarly, 
Bauer reports on the construction of the Pangue dam on the Bio Bio River, which would reduce 
down-river flow and concentrate pollutants. Affected indigenous, environmental and irrigators' 
organizations joined in an action platform and went to court. At first, the court ruled in favor of the 
dam opponents, asking the dam project to make a compromise with the affected users before 
continuing construction. However, the Supreme Court overruled that decision and gave the project 
its blessing, without considering possible alternative solutions that would be less harmful to the 
indigenous communities, the farmers and the environment. Instead of insisting on a platform 
compromise, the court worsened the conflict by ruling in favor of power generation: 'The Pangue 
decision resulted in a major transfer of wealth from farmers and the agricultural sector to power 
companies: a political decision with significant distributional consequences' (Bauer, 1998: 142). As 
Bauer explains, in Chile's legalistic private-ownership system, other multi-sectoral watershed 
management issues are even more troublesome, with all problems to be settled through ordinary 
civil law courts, between private and privatized players of unequal power. Even when economically 
less powerful user groups do have legal reference rights to access and control water, the neo-
liberal model makes it difficult for them to solve disputes and activate and materialize their rights 
through local negotiation and platform collaboration. 
These examples show, firstly, that the presumably objective and efficient restructuring of water 
entitlements and water rules implied by neo-liberal water reforms does not go uncontested. 
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Secondly, different actors engage in these contestations on very unequal terms. The formal ability 
to demand rights to water, in the neo-liberal world, becomes a function of one's ability to enter and 
bargain in markets and meetings. Neo-liberal political programs simply assume that all water 
actors are equal in terms of these abilities; markets and meetings only work when all participants 
can interact 'as equals'. These assumptions, while critical to the very success of the neo-liberal 
programs, could hardly be more erroneous in the Andean water situation, which is characterized by 
deep, historically-embedded social differentiations and divisions. Water actors in the Andes are not 
equal in terms of monetary income; making the ability to pay for water a prime allocation 
mechanism thus favors private companies and business actors. Also, market prices rarely 
adequately capture water's marginal value or utility to indigenous communities and are therefore a 
poor language for expressing this value. Nor are water actors equal in terms of their ability to 
access and influence decision-making and wield power in platforms and meetings: there are 
differences in terms of skills, information and education, which are often deeply rooted in historical 
divides and intertwined with cultural beliefs and biases. Gender, class and ethnicity are three 
important axes of such divides, and work in complex ways to color and shape an individual's 
possibilities for political deliberation (cf. Fraser, 1997: 78). Rather than modeling and seeing water 
actions and decisions of different actors as functions of markets and formalized meeting 
procedures, they should be seen as the result of continuous processes of networking and 
negotiations, struggles and social interactions that are permeated by wider social relations of 
economic and political power. 
In the absence of money and influence in formal meetings, local irrigators' communities have to 
resort to less formal and less lawful ways to defend their water rights and express their water 
opinions. In the Andes, more than in many other parts of the world, indigenous movements and 
organizations have actively taken up the issue of water. Through organizations and in 
demonstrations and public campaigns, they form parallel discursive arenas in which they invent 
and circulate counter discourses about water, permitting the formulation of oppositional 
interpretations of their rights, identities and needs. The success of these struggles and actions 
partly depends on the political willingness of governments to listen and provide space, that is, on 
the political climate of the particular country. So far, water struggles have hardly led to opening and 
widening the discursive spaces for discussing new water policies, nor have the terms of the debate 
significantly altered as a result of protests. Neo-liberalism has not yet been dethroned as the 
hegemonic water language. It is high time for this to happen. As a first important step, the 
assumptions of political neutrality and scientific objectivity legitimizing Andean water reforms 
should be cast aside in favor of conceptualizations and narratives that explicitly show the on-the-
ground politics of water policies and their effects, that allow for diversity and historical 
contextualization, and that acknowledge subjectivity and situatedness. The question of water 
tenure should be made much more central to attempts to understand water reforms and the 
reactions they provoke. In all the cases presented here, indigenous communities — rather than just 
questioning privatization or water pricing and marketing — question the legitimacy of the state in 
framing water policies. In particular, they question the proposed rules and principles for distributing 
water rights as well as the state's authority in making such rules and establishing such principles. 
4.4 Prices or Politics? Some concluding remarks 
We have shown that neo-liberal water reforms in the Andes meet with resistance from different 
social movements which demand alternative ways of using, owning and managing water. While 
such movements are motivated by a range of concerns, including social justice, the environment, 
'right to livelihood' or ethnic identity, they all make claims for more equitable and just access to 
water. Logically, they all centre on the question of property rights; whoever controls property rights 
controls the processes of water allocation, distribution and management. Water reform struggles 
are also, and importantly, over the right to define what a water right entails, how it can be obtained, 
and over the power to attribute value to water. The struggle for control over water is a struggle for 
existence, and a struggle to define what existence means. 
We have argued that the language of neo-liberalism is not suited to expressing the political 
choices and dilemmas that characterize this struggle. Neo-liberal discourse presents water reforms 
as neutral and technical interventions aimed at assisting central water agencies in controlling and 
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managing water resources and crises. What this article has shown is that the proposed ways in 
which water is to be owned, distributed and managed imply fundamental changes, as do the ways 
in which different water users relate to each other. If the policies are implemented, such relations 
are increasingly dictated by extra-communal laws, institutions and markets. The proposed water 
reforms, therefore, are deeply political, in the sense that they actively create and transform 
(through laws and institutions) the political and social water-world. By asserting that flows of money 
and water follow universal, scientific laws, and that human beings share the same aspirations and 
motives everywhere, neo-liberalism establishes a universal rationality and efficiency, based on a 
'natural' and 'objective' truth. The policies that are based on new institutional theories, in their turn, 
establish universal criteria for optimizing water management. Such universalization can be seen as 
a process of Foucauldian disciplining and normalization, while at the same time actively 
depoliticizing the water debate by labeling decisions about resource allocation as technical 
interventions. 
Using the terms employed by Bourdieu in another thematic field, neo-liberal policies and the 
theories underlying them can be typified as 'pure mathematical fictions, based from the outset on a 
gigantic abstraction'. But, as Bourdieu goes on to explain, 'It has now more than ever the means of 
making itself true' (Bourdieu, 1998: 94-5). In the current era, which celebrates the death of 
ideologies and the rise of belief in markets, the power of neo-liberal water policies and discourses 
is not to be underestimated. However, as we have tried to show, they are not silently accepted. On 
the contrary, peasant movements and indigenous organizations are actively and vocally standing 
up for their rights. Understanding such protests requires a more nuanced, contextualized and 
complex analysis than the one that currently tends to dominate global debates. The current 
struggles are not, as many observers would have it, a simple battle between public and private 
water interests; nor are they a conflict between common and private property regimes where the 
former is associated with tradition and the latter with modernity. It is not simply economic growth 
versus subsistence, abundance versus scarcity or rationality versus 'local ways of knowing'. The 
cases we have presented illustrate that Andean irrigators demand that their worlds and livelihoods 
be recognized and protected. They are not against new water reforms or liberalization per se, but 
they fear the loss and destruction of their land- and waterscapes. They organize for continued 
collective control over water, without being solely anti-commodity and pro-subsistence. The 
struggles over water, over the right to sustenance and livelihood, over the right to healthy and 
socially just forms of living are also struggles for specificity and contextuality, for own ways to 
define the language and rules of play, for the right to 'otherness'. 
It is time that these demands were taken seriously, also in academic and policy arenas. For this 
to happen, conceptualizations of water use, distribution and management that take contextualized 
water tenure as their entry point, and that allow recognition of water as a contested resource, 
provide a much more dynamic and layered understanding than those of new-institutionalism. 
Coupled with insights derived from legal pluralism and political economy, such a conceptual 
language invites investigation of how water rights and policy models become manifest 'in action' in 
peasant irrigation systems, rather than normatively predicting what should happen according to 
reference policy models and judging 'unruly' realities against such predictions. 
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